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I. INTRODUCTION
Did recent revisions to Article 8 of the Uniform Commercial
Code' accomplish their purpose without sowing seeds that could
result in either an unintended restructuring of the securities markets
or in an unanticipated financial crisis?
Article 8's recent revisions represent a bold and long overdue
advance that facilitates the day-to-day transfer and registration of
securities in the country's active securities markets. They
established a new legal regime to comport with the market realities
of transferring and registering securities held indirectly (through a
broker or other intermediary) 2 and streamlined the legal regime
governing the transfer and registration of securities held directly.
Article 8 is a more comprehensive statute than the 1977 version it
replaced, yet for the most part, it covers the legal landscape in more
concise and functional terms. The drafters generally did not fall prey
to the common tendency of making legal revisions more complicated
1. UNIF. COMMERCIAL CODE art. 8 (amended 1994), 2C U.L.A. 58 (Supp.
2001). Significant conforming amendments were made to Article 9 in
connection with the promulgation of the 1994 revisions to Article 8. When
Article 9 was revised, those revisions were more carefully integrated into
Article 9 and conforming amendments were made to Article 8. See UNIF.
COMMERCIAL CODE art. 9 (amended 2000), 3 U.L.A. 5 (2000).
Hereinafter, citations to the Uniform Commercial Code and its official
comments are to the reproduction contained in Uniform Laws Annotated.
Citations to Article 8 without further indication are to the 1994 version as
amended by the conforming amendments promulgated with revised Article 9.
The prior version of Article 8 is referred to as the 1977 version. Citations to
Article 9 without further reference are to revised Article 9. Citations to Article
3 without further reference are to the 1990 version as subsequently amended.
And citations to Article 1 without further reference are to the 1962 version as
subsequently amended.
As of July 1, 2001, all states except South Carolina had adopted the
1994 version of Article 8 and all states had adopted revised Article 9. See
U.C.C. REP. SERV. STATE U.C.C. VARIATIONS, xxi-xxii, xxv-xxvi (Supp. Sept.
2001).
2. Holding securities indirectly means "ownership" is evidenced by book-
entries in accounts maintained by securities intermediaries. It is often referred
to as holding securities in "street name." An intermediary holds such securities
directly by being the person in possession of the security certificate or the
person to whom the security is registered on the books of the issuer. The
owners holding indirectly are sometimes referred to as beneficial owners, a
term defined in federal securities law. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-3 (2000).
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by overly detailed provisions or unduly complex structures.
Labeling the effort a tour de force for the securities industry would
not be an exaggeration. However, interwoven with the simplicity of
Article 8 are provisions that create concerns about the legal
framework for the indirect holding system. Did the securities
industry overreach in critical areas and thereby lay the foundation for
the demise of the system? If so, the tour de force may be a Pyrrhic
victory.
The goals guiding the work of the Article 8 drafting committee
are readily determined. The prefatory note justifies Article 8 because
the legal uncertainties that surrounded the indirect holding system
adversely affected everyone involved in the securities markets.3 The
reporter, Professor James Steven Rogers, explains that the
elimination of this uncertainty was one key element in a broader
effort to reduce "systemic risk" in the securities markets. 4 Systemic
risk refers to the real or theoretical risk that the financial failure of
one participant in the securities markets could have a domino effect
on other participants (due to intricate interrelationships) and threaten
the entire system.5  Finally, the drafters espoused a neutrality
principle in drafting to avoid influencing the method of security
ownership participants in the market would select.
6
Even though the appropriateness of these goals is not without
some controversy, 7 they provide three important and relevant
questions to address in evaluating Article 8 and the changes to
Article 8 made in connection with Revised Article 9.8 Does it create
functional rules for the indirect holding of securities? How
effectively does it reduce systemic risk in the securities markets?
Does it affect an investor's choice of methods of holding securities?
3. UNiF. COMMERCIAL CODE art. 8 (amended 1994), Prefatory Note, 2C
U.L.A. 59, at Part I.D. (Supp. 2001) [hereinafter Prefatory Note].
4. James Steven Rogers, Policy Perspectives on Revised U C.C. Article 8,
43 UCLA L. REv. 1431, 1436-41 (1996).
5. See id. at 1437.
6. The drafters claimed no express intent "to influence [the development
of securities holding practices] in any specific direction." Prefatory Note,
supra note 3, at Part lI.A.
7. See Francis J. Facciolo, Father Knows Best: Revised Article 8 and the
Individual Investor, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 615, 624-41 (2000) (arguing that
systemic risk is an inadequate justification).
8. See supra note 1.
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The comparison of Article 8's direct holding system with its
indirect holding system that follows, arrives at several interesting
conclusions. The rules for the indirect holding system are functional,
with a few important exceptions. Systemic risk has been reduced to
the extent that Article 8 can reduce it, but some methods of reduction
have shifted risks in the securities markets from lenders to
intermediaries and investors (and potentially taxpayers) in ways that
weaken rather than strengthen the securities markets. Finally, Article
8 falls short of the goal of neutrality. Persons holding securities in-
directly have two types of increased risks: risks inherent in the
indirect holding system and risks created by Article 8.
The higher risks in the indirect holding system should be
reduced in light of the following facts: (1) a significant number of
the increased risks are not inherent in indirect holding; (2) an
investor's risks can be significantly reduced by holding securities
directly; and (3) holding uncertificated securities directly would not
recreate the paper-crunch which was the raison d'etre for the indirect
holding system.9 The provisions in Article 8 which create increased
risks for those who hold securities indirectly could be readily
improved without threatening the functioning of the securities
markets and without complicating those parts of the statute which are
elegantly simple. In fact, the resolutions would clarify and simplify
the few obtuse provisions of the Article. Such improvements to the
legal regime governing the indirect holding system would more
closely embrace the neutrality principle espoused by the drafters and
permit the pattern of security ownership to develop unhindered or
undirected by legal rules.
Failure to restructure the indirect holding system may result in
its gradual demise. All that is needed is a market-based clearing and
settlement system for uncertificated securities because, similar to
indirectly held securities, they are based on book entries. Transfer
agents would necessarily be directly involved in the process.10 There
9. See infra note 17 and accompanying text.
10. In 1994 the Securities and Exchange Commission solicited comments
on a system whereby investors could choose to have their ownership of
securities evidenced by entries on the books of a transfer agent, rather than
requesting a stock certificate. See Transfer Agents Operating Direct
Registration System, 59 Fed. Reg. 63,652 (Dec. 8, 1994) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. 240). A pilot program was launched by the Depository Trust Company
in November 1996. See Order Granting Accelerated Approval of a Proposed
INDIRECTLY HELD SECURITIES
would be supreme irony if the new Article 8, by explicating rules for
indirect holding, became an impetus for broad use of uncertificated
securities (book entry systems), 1 a primary, but failed, goal of the
version it replaced.
A. Historical Setting
The legal regime that reigned since the early twentieth century
in the transfer and registration of securities 12 is based upon a model
involving the reification of the property interest into a physical
certificate. 13 Transferring the security involves physical delivery of
the certificate and, if registered, changing the registered owner on the
books of the issuer or its transfer agent. Article 8 was originally
drafted in the 1940s and 1950s (with the 1962 version being widely
adopted) and followed that model. 14  Some use of uncertificated
securities developed under that version of Article 8. They were
analogized to the reification model by eliminating physical delivery
(there is no certificate to deliver) and focusing on the registration of
ownership.' 5 Both certificated and uncertificated securities establish
Rule Change Relating to the Procedures to Establish a Direct Registration
System, 61 Fed. Reg. 58,600, 58,601 (Nov. 15, 1996). By June 2000, eleven
transfer agents were participating and there were 292 eligible issues. See
Revised Transfer Agent Form and Related Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. 36,602, 36,604
n.26 (June 9, 2000) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. 240, 249(b)).
11. There would be double irony, if this develops. The drafters of the 1977
version operated on the assumption that uncertificated securities would be
embraced when the legal regime was in place-it did not occur. The drafters
of the 1994 Article 8 prepared a legal regime to recognize and facilitate the
indirect holding system-it may doom the system.
12. Originally, certificates and negotiability were not the norm. See James
Steven Rogers, Negotiability, Property, and Identity, 12 CARDOZO L. REv.
471, 471-78 (1990). Negotiable certificates became prevalent in the twentieth
century. See id. at 477-78; see also Egon Guttman, Transfer of Securities:
State and Federal Interaction, 12 CARDOZO L. REv. 437, 443-46 (1990)
(discussing the history of equity ownership in corporations); Jeanne L.
Schroeder, Is Article 8 Finally Ready This Time? The Radical Reform of
Secured Lending on Wall Street, 1994 COLUM. BUS. L. REv. 291, 305 (1994)
(providing a brief history of investment securities).
13. Professor Schroeder raises critical questions about the aptness of this
physical possession model. See Schroeder, supra note 12, at 306-07.
14. See Martin J. Aronstein, The New/Old Law of Securities Transfer:
Calling a "Spade" a "Heart, Diamond, Club or the Like," 12 CARDoZO L.
REv. 429, 429-30 (1990).
15. See Guttman, supra note 12, at 438-41.
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a direct relationship between the issuer and the person making the
financial investment.
The 1962 version of Article 8 contained limited provisions
relating to the transfer and pledge of securities held indirectly
through a central depository. 16 Nevertheless, an indirect holding
system became widely used beginning in the late 1960s in response
to the "paper-crunch" inherent in direct holding of certificated
securities. 
17
The 1977 revisions to Article 8 that began in the early 1970s
were promulgated in an ill-fated venture to guide development of a
paperless securities market in the direction of uncertificated
securities. 18 They were made under a narrow charge' 9 that presumed
the securities industry would move to uncertificated securities (de-
materialization) to resolve the mechanical problems created by the
physical delivery of certificates.20 However, by 1977, the indirect
holding system (immobilization) had already solved the problems of
transferring paper certificates-problems some believed would
inexorably lead to the use of uncertificated securities. Moreover, the
1977 revisions virtually overlooked the realities of the indirect hold-
ing system.2'
16. See SANDRA M. ROCKS & CARL S. BJERRE, THE ABCS OF THE
U.C.C.-ARTICLE 8: INVESTMENT SECURITIES 3 (1997).
17. See generally Prefatory Note, supra note 3, at Part I.C (describing the
indirect holding system); Guttman, supra note 12, at 437-38, 446-49
(discussing the changes in the securities markets that necessitated the
development of the system); Schroeder, supra note 12, at 310-11, 322-24
(discussing the effect of volume increases on securities handling processes).
18. See Prefatory Note, supra note 3, at Part I.B; Charles W. Mooney, Jr.,
Beyond Negotiability: A New Model for Transfer and Pledge of Interests in
Securities Controlled by Intermediaries, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 305, 313
(1990); Schroeder, supra note 12, at 311-21; Jeanne L. Schroeder & David
Gray Carlson, Security Interests Under Article 8 of the Uniform Commercial
Code, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 557, 559-60 (1990).
19. See Prefatory Note, supra note 3, at Part I.B; Aronstein, supra note 14,
at 433-34; Rogers, supra note 4, at 1435, 1452-53.
20. See Prefatory Note, supra note 3, at Part II.A.
21. The 1977 version did not completely ignore the indirect holding system.
Its provisions on transferring within a central depository system, § 8-320, and
on transfer of securities, § 8-313 (an intricate provision describing
relationships in the indirect holding system), recognized the existence of the
system. The 1977 version, however, made no attempt to treat indirect holding
any differently than direct holding or to spell out the rights and obligations
between the participants in the indirect holding system. See Schroeder, supra
INDIRECTLY HELD SECURITIES
The use of uncertificated securities has not significantly
expanded. Hindsight and the relatively short life of the 1977 version
reveal that incomplete and unrealistic presumptions were made at the
time it was conceived. The naivety of the presumptions was that the
indirect holding system would happily give way to another solution
to the problem that had spawned it with no impetus beyond the
creation of an explicit legal framework. But indirect holding
developed without an explicit legal framework as did some use of
uncertificated securities. The most that could be expected of a legal
framework was to facilitate more rapid development. However,
there is a great impediment to change. The indirect holding system
has a number of major private sector players with vested interests in
maintaining the system. The forces against changing from indirect
holding to uncertificated securities are most readily understood by
analyzing the impact on securities brokers. With indirect holding, an
investor does not make a trade without coming back to the broker
through whom it indirectly holds the security.22 This customer-
broker adhesive and its economic benefit to the broker are not going
to be changed by brokers without significant pressure. The pre-1994
incentive for moving to uncertificated securities was merely an
alternative to avoid the paper crunch certificates created.23 There
was no incentive for the brokers to seek a change.
When Article 8 was revised in 1994, significant uncertainty
existed regarding rights and duties within the indirect holding
system.24 Although the indirect holding system had operated for
years,2 5 the few legal rules directly governing it were established ad
hoc through court decisions or federal securities legislation. These
uncertainties were especially strongly felt by industry professionals.
note 12, at 322-24; see also Peter F. Coogan, Article 9-An Agenda for the
Next Decade, 87 YALE L.J. 1012, 1042-45 (1978) (exploring possible problems
regarding "possession" in Article 9). Professor Coogan, for some reason, did
not focus on these inadequacies when he later criticized the 1977 version. See
Peter F. Coogan, Security Interests in Investment Securities Under Revised
Article 8 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1013, 1022-28
(1979).
22. See Nancy Ann Jeffrey, Your Money Matters: Investors Feel Heat to
Keep Securities in 'Street Name,'WALL ST. J., Mar. 2, 1995, at Cl.
23. See Rogers, supra note 4, at 1442-43.
24. See id. at 1445-49.
25. See id. at 1449-53.
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Article 8's legal regime for securities held indirectly was strongly
influenced by these professionals 26 and has removed much of the
legal uncertainty by spelling-out relationships and legal rights to
govern the indirect holding system. Much of this regime was created
on a clean slate and involved significant deviations from the legal
regime governing direct holding.
B. Article 8's Limited Role
The drafters of Article 8 are explicit about the limited role it
plays in the securities markets. The prefatory note describes Article
8's role as governing the settlement of securities trades not the trades
themselves.27 Article 8 does not govern contracts for the purchase
and sale of securities, even though a few such rules were in the 1977
version. 28 Even much of the settlement, especially in the indirect
system, is governed by separate rules and agreements concerning
clearing arrangements. 29 Article 8 simply encompasses the property
rules for the transfer and registration of interests in securities and
rules on how securities are evidenced.3 ° It does not attempt to
regulate the relationship between customer and broker or among
brokers and clearing corporations, although its principles have a
significant effect on those relationships.
Most important issues regarding the securities markets in the
United States are governed by state and federal securities law and are
clearly outside the scope of Article 8.3 1 The interrelationships and
potential interactions between Article 8 and these bodies of law raise
a number of fascinating questions, but such an inquiry, with one
exception, goes in a different direction than the inquiry undertaken in
this Article. That exception is the Security Investors Protection
Corporation created in 1970 by the Security Investors Protection
Act3a to provide a partial safety net for investors who use certain
securities intermediaries. The drafters relied upon that act and a
26. The strong influence is chronicled by the list of acknowledgements at
the end of the prefatory note. See Prefatory Note, supra note 3, at Part V.
27. See id. at Part III.B.
28. See id. at Parts HI.B, IV.B.8.
29. See id.
30. See id. at Part III.B.
31. See id.
32. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa-78111 (1994).
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number of federal securities regulatory provisions to mitigate some
of the risks in the indirect holding system.
33
I. IMPROVEMENTS TO DIRECT HOLDING
Article 8 restructured the rules governing securities held
directly34 to resolve some longstanding issues. The major changes
involved simplifying the rules governing uncertificated securities and
increasing protections for purchasers of directly held securities. The
law that governs directly held securities bears some important
similarities to Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code.35 Thus,
the drafters also had the benefit of centuries of case law and statutory
developments in that area when determining how to resolve many
issues in the direct holding system.
A. Simplified Frameworkfor Uncertificated Securities
Article 8 completely revamps the rules regarding uncertificated
securities by providing greater flexibility for market and judicial
developments. The drafters dropped from Article 8 all requirements
for delivering transaction statements based upon a determination that
transfer and registration of uncertificated securities could work
efficiently without them.36  Transaction statements were an
innovation of the 1977 version designed to provide notices to
security holders and perform certain other functions of a securities
certificate. 37 The idea had been to make the rules for uncertificated
securities as closely analogous as possible to those for certificated
securities. 38  There was some concern that transaction statement
requirements impeded widespread use ofuncertificated securities.
39
33. See U.C.C. § 8-511 cmt. 2; Mooney, supra note 18, at 414; Schroeder,
supra note 12, at 300-01. Many of these protections are outlined and their
adequacy questioned by Professor Facciolo. See Facciolo, supra note 7, at
675-88.
34. The rules governing direct holding have been consolidated in Part 2
(obligations and rights of issuers), Part 3 (transfer of securities and rights of
adverse claimants), and Part 4 (registration of transfer) of Article 8. The
definitions and general rules contained in Part 1, of course, also apply.
35. See Prefatory Note, supra note 3, at Parts II.B, IV.B.8.
36. See id. at IV.B.4.
37. See U.C.C. § 8-408 (1977).
38. See Prefatory Note, supra note 3, at Part IV.B.4.
39. See id.
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Important questions arise regarding the elimination of
transaction statements. How are holders of uncertificated securities
given notice of the terms of a security or of restrictions on transfer?
Both of these items need to be referenced on security certificates.
4 0
The terms of an uncertificated security are in documents pursuant to
which it was issued but there is no required procedure under Article
8 whereby a purchaser of the security obtains knowledge of them.4 '
They are valid regardless of lack of knowledge or notice.42 The lack
of a notice mechanism is simply a risk inherent in uncertificated
securities. In contrast, for an issuer's restrictions on transfer to be
valid against the purchaser of an uncertificated security, the
purchaser must have knowledge of them or the issuer must have
notified the registered owner of them.43 By leaving the method of
giving notice up to the party seeking to enforce the restriction,
Article 8 leaves room for market and judicial development in this
area.
The other noteworthy change in Article 8 relating to
uncertificated securities is the reduction in legal distinctions between
certificated and uncertificated securities."a It distinguishes between
certificated and uncertificated securities only when necessary or to
ensure clarity.45 The most common example is whenever a rule
refers to delivery of a physical certificate, the corresponding rule for
uncertificated securities simply focuses on the registration of the new
owner.46 The detailed provisions for registered pledges that were in
the 1977 version to facilitate pledging uncertificated securities4 7 were
eliminated because the mechanisms exist elsewhere in Article 8 for
similar transactions, if important in the market.4 8 By minimizing
special provisions for uncertificated securities, the drafters kept the
law simple and flexible to facilitate future market developments.
40. See U.C.C. §§ 8-202(a), 8-204(1).
41. See id. § 8-202(a).
42. See id. § 8-202 cmt. 2.
43. See U.C.C. § 8-204(2).
44. See Prefatory Note, supra note 3, at Part II.B.
45. See id. at IV.B.3.
46. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 8-301 (a)-(b) (defining delivery of a security).
47. See U.C.C. §§ 8-108, 8-207, 8-320, 8-401 (1977).
48. See Prefatory Note, supra note 3, at Part IV.B.5; U.C.C. § 8-106 cmts.
3, 4 ex.6; § 8-303 cmt. 3. Relevant rules would be the control provisions in
§ 8-106, with a control agreement providing the mechanism.
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B. Streamlining Negotiability
The common law concept that a transferee take exactly what the
transferor owned and no more, especially regarding being subject to
claims to the property transferred, 49 has frequently been cited as an
impediment to efficiently functioning markets. Early English law
made exceptions to this derivative rights doctrine for goods
purchased in "market overt"5 0 and for bills and notes transferred as
substitutes for currency.5' These exceptions were rules of
negotiability that developed to protect bona fide purchasers for value.
They have played a significant role in commercial law and the
functioning of markets. 52 Negotiability rules focus not on the history
of the transferred pioperty, but on the deserving attributes of the
purchaser acquiring the property in an appropriate market. Naturally,
negotiability rules increase the risk on parties wanting to assert
claims. These increased risks can be justified by the fact that regular
participants in the market will be in a position to benefit from the
rules more often than they will suffer any detriment from the rules.53
Many commentators have questioned the advisability of
negotiability rules in the context of negotiable instrument law in
current society. 4 A key ground for the critique has been that the
49. This doctrine is commonly referred to by the Latin maxim nemo dat qui
non habet (one who has not cannot give). See Rogers, supra note 4, at 1461.
50. After centuries, the English Parliament changed the rule to avoid the
protection it gave thieves. See Schroeder, supra note 12, at 493 n.459.
51. See Peacock v. Rhodes, 99 Eng. Rep. 402, 402 (K.B. 1781) (holding
that there is no difference between a bill of exchange indorsed in blank, a
banknote payable to bearer, and currency); Miller v. Race, 97 Eng. Rep. 398,
398-90 (K.B. 1758) (holding that banknotes are treated as currency for the
purposes of commerce).
52. See Jane Kaufinan Winn, Couriers Without Luggage: Negotiable
Instruments and Digital Signatures, 49 So. CAR. L. REv. 739, 745-50 (1998).
53. In the market, as many financial assets are sold as are purchased. This
excludes sales upon original issuance, where purchaser rules are not necessary
for protection, and redemptions by the issuer, where other rules protect the
issuer. Purchaser protections clearly benefit all purchasers, but also benefit
sellers by making financial assets more marketable and therefore potentially
increase prices due to market efficiency. A detriment from purchaser rules
only arises if a participant's interest in a financial asset has been transferred
inappropriately, an event quite rare in these high-volume markets.
54. See, e.g., Vern Countryman, The Holder in Due Course and Other
Anachronisms in Consumer Credit, 52 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1973); Grant Gilmore,
Formalism and the Law of Negotiable Instruments, 13 CREIGHTON L. REv.
441 (1979); Grant Gilmore, The Good Faith Purchase Idea and the Uniform
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rules are most frequently used to cut off defenses of the obligor in
contexts where the negotiable instrument is not needed as a substitute
for currency. 55 This was the basic reason for their development when
currency was in short supply in eighteenth-century England.
Whatever the merits of these trenchant criticisms, our securities
markets are one context in which negotiability concepts are as
important today as they were when they developed.56 Securities are
widely and frequently traded without the direct involvement of the
issuer of the security and in circumstances where many prior
purchasers could have had some defect in "title" with no way for a
subsequent purchaser to learn of the defect.57 In these markets the
key role of negotiability rules is to cut off ownership claims of
persons previously having rights in the security, not the defenses of
the issuer.58  The negotiability rules make completed transactions
final if the requirements of the rules are met.59 This decreases the
risk that settled trades can be upset and reduces systemic risk.60
Thus, in the context of investment securities, public policy supports
facilitating negotiability rather than constricting it.
The drafters of Article 8 took a number of steps to increase the
negotiability of directly held securities. They eliminated an
independent good faith requirement. 61 Because "good faith" is an
Commercial Code: Confessions of a Repentant Draftsman, 15 GA. L. REV. 605
(1981); James Steven Rogers, The Irrelevance of Negotiable Instrunents
Concepts in the Law of the Check-Based Payment System, 65 TEX. L. REV. 929
(1987); James Steven Rogers, Negotiability As a System of Title Recognition,
48 OIO ST. L.J. 197 (1987) [hereinafter Rogers, Title Recognition]; Albert J.
Rosenthal, Negotiability: Who Needs It?, 71 COLuM. L. REv. 375, 375 (1971);
M.B.W. Sinclair, Codification Of Negotiable Instruments Law: A Tale Of
Reiterated Anachronism, 21 U. TOL. L. REV. 625 (1990).
55. See Rosenthal, supra note 54, at 378-80.
56. But see Rogers, Title Recognition, supra note 54, at 213-17 (arguing
that registration or issuance of a new certificate is the real mechanism
protecting purchasers); Rogers, supra note 12, at 477-78 (arguing that
negotiability of stock certificates developed late and is useful only while stock
is certificated).
57. See Schroeder, supra note 12, at 352-56.
58. Separate rules govern cutting off defenses or restrictions by issuers.
Issuers of investment securities are more sophisticated about these defenses
and restrictions than are issuers of negotiable instruments.
59. See Schroeder, supra note 12, at 355-56.
60. See Rogers, supra note 4, at 1460-65. Professor Rogers's view is
criticized by Professor Facciolo. See Facciolo, supra note 7, at 629-33.
61. See Rogers, supra note 4, at 1472.
1NDIRECTLY HELD SECURITIES
English equivalent of "bona fide,"62 the elimination of that
requirement resulted in replacing the term "bona fide purchaser
63
with a new Article 8 term, "protected purchaser." 64 The drafters also
made several changes affecting the "no notice" requirement making
it easier to qualify as a protected purchaser. These changes included
redefining the nature of adverse claims, changing the type of notice
of adverse claims that defeat protected purchaser status and limiting
duties to adverse claimants.
65
1. Eliminating good faith
Good faith was eliminated as a requirement for becoming a
protected purchaser for two basic reasons. First, the requirement had
developed out of an interpretation of good faith different from its
66original "authentic" or "legitimate" meaning. One reason for this
development is probably linked to the uneasiness with which many
view negotiability rules blocking obligors (particularly consumers)
from raising defenses to negotiable instruments. Second, attempts to
separate the good faith inquiry from the no-notice inquiry when
analyzing court opinions is often extremely difficult.6 7 In fact, it
appears that good faith may often be the requirement courts have
relied upon to expand the imputation of knowledge to purchasers
without actual knowledge.68
Because ensuring predictability is so fundamental to the
securities markets in which Article 8 operates, the drafters took care
to avoid rules that could be used in sympathetic cases to defeat
protected purchaser status. The good faith requirement of the 1977
version was a classic example of such a rule.
69
62. See id. at 1470.
63. U.C.C. § 8-302(1) (1977).
64. This term was derived from "protected holder," a term used in the
Convention on International Bills and Notes. U.C.C. § 8-303 cmt. 4.
65. See Prefatory Note, supra note 3, at Parts II.B, IV.B.2, IV.B.6.
66. See Rogers, supra note 4, at 1470. But see Egon Guttman, Mediating
Industry and Investor Needs in the Redrafting of U.C.C. Article 8, 28 UCC L.J.
3, 31 n.137 (1995).
67. Official comment 10 to § 8-102 implicitly recognizes this problem by
explaining that questions regarding a purchaser taking a security under
suspicious circumstances are addressed by the rules on notice of adverse
claims, not those on good faith.
68. See Rogers, supra note 4, at 1471-72.
69. But see Facciolo, supra note 7, at 650-53 (arguing that these revisions
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2. Limiting notice of adverse claims
A purchaser of directly held securities is protected from adverse
claims to the securities unless it has notice of an adverse claim.70
Although the 1977 version's provisions on "notice of adverse
claims" simply described five specific circumstances that gave the
notice, 7 1 the official comments clarified that it was an open-ended
concept and referred approvingly to "reason to know" cases.
72
Constructive notice, however, is problematic in high liquid securities
markets.
Notice of adverse claim was redefined in Article 8 to make it
harder to find constructive notice.73 Article 8 provides three rules to
establish whether notice exists: actual knowledge, willful blindness
to information that would establish a claim, or a statutory or
regulatory duty to investigate (such as a duty to check a stolen
securities registry) that would result in learning of the adverse
claim.74 The willful blindness standard requires that the purchaser
"deliberately avoid" iaformation in the face of facts indicating a
to Article 8 were inappropriate); Guttman, supra note 66, at 31-33 (arguing for
use of good faith).
70. See U.C.C. § 8-303.
71. U.C.C. § 8-304 (1978) charged a purchaser with notice of adverse
claims if: (1) a certificated security was indorsed "for collection" or "for
surrender;" (2) a certificated security was in bearer form and contained an
unambiguous statement that it was the property of someone other than the
transferor; (3) the adverse claim was noted on an initial transaction statement
sent to the registered owner or registered pledgee; and (4) it had knowledge
that the transfer was for, or proceeds were being used for, the personal benefit
of a fiduciary. U.C.C. § 8-305 (1978) charged a purchaser with notice of
adverse claims when a certificated security was transferred one year after the
date set for presentment or surrender for redemption or exchange or six months
after the date set for payment of money against presentation or surrender.
72. See U.C.C. § 8-304 cmt. 1 (1977).
73. See U.C.C. § 8-105 cmts. 1, 2.
74. U.C.C. § 8-105(a) provides:
A person has notice of an adverse claim if:
(1) the person knows of the adverse claim;
(2) the person is aware of facts sufficient to indicate that there is a
significant probability that the adverse claim exists and
deliberately avoids information that would establish the existence
of the adverse claim; or
(3) the person has a duty, imposed by statute or regulation, to
investigate whether an adverse claim exists, and the investigation
so required would establish the existence of the adverse claim.
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"significant probability" of an adverse claim.75 The clear thrust of
this new structure was to limit a court's discretion in finding notice
of an adverse claim.76 Article 8 also restates the four relevant
specific situations from the 1977 version that constituted notice of an
adverse claim: (1) acquiring a certificated security more than six
months or a year after a date set for payment or surrender; (2)
acquiring a certificated security indorsed "for collection," "for
surrender," or a purpose other than transfer; (3) acquiring a
certificated security in bearer form containing an unambiguous
statement that it was the property of someone other than the
transferor; and (4) having knowledge (not notice) that the ,transfer by
a representative was a transaction for, or proceeds were being used
for, the personal benefit of the representative.77 Finally, Article 8
delineates two situations that do not create notice of an adverse
claim. As under the 1977 version, knowledge that the transferor was
a representative does not give notice that the party represented has an
adverse claim and creates no duty to inquire.78 Article 8 authorized
perfection of security interests in financial assets by filing a
financing statement but negated the argument that such filings
provide notice of an adverse claim to the financial asset. 79 The
definition of adverse claim was also narrowed by further limiting
when one has notice of adverse claims.
8 0
Ill. INDIRECT HOLDING-THE FRAMEWORK
As its most important contribution, Article 8 explicates rules
governing the way the vast majority of securities are held in our
economy-indirectly through intermediaries.81  Article 8 was
prepared under a mandate recognizing the existence of the indirect
75. See U.C.C. § 8-105 cmt. 4.
76. But see Facciolo, supra note 7, at 644-49 (arguing that these revisions
were not justified).
77. U.C.C. § 8-105(b)-(d). Article 8 eliminated notice via initial transaction
statements, because they are no longer required.
78. See U.C.C. § 8-105(b); cf § 8-304(3) (1977) (setting forth the prior,
virtually identical, rule).
79. See U.C.C. § 8-105(e).
80. See id. cmt. 2; see infra notes 200-209 and accompanying text.
81. Approximately sixty to eighty percent of the securities trading on
exchanges or over-the-counter are held indirectly. See Prefatory Note, supra
note 3, at Part I.C.
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holding system and directing development of legal rules to govern its
operations.
82
Because the indirect holding system developed in the
marketplace out of the direct holding system, the legal rules used to
govern it were the rules for directly held securities, rather than rules
tailored to the characteristics and needs of the indirect holding
system.83 A significant body of case law did not develop.8 4 The
reported cases did not establish well-reasoned legal doctrines to
resolve competing policies unique to the indirect holding system.
There is support for the notion that courts deciding cases involving
the indirect holding of securities applied whatever principles were
necessary to protect innocent investors.8 5 Because an intermediary
was holding property for the benefit of another, the 1977 version was
based on principles of agency or bailment so courts could readily
rely upon and apply these principles.8 6 Many of the obligations and
property rights of the parties to the indirect system were uncertain
87
or, when resolved by the courts, were the source of significant
consternation to the securities industry.
88
The drafters had the benefit of effectively starting with a clean
slate. Troubling precedents could be overruled by the adoption of
contrary concepts that matched the perceptions of those most
familiar with the operation of the system-securities professionals.
The interest and experience of securities professionals were essential
to an Article 8 that could successfully govern the indirect holding
system. 89 The securities industry did not want to use principles of
82. See Rogers, supra note 4, at 1435-37, 1445-48; Schroeder, supra note
12, at 349. As these references indicate, the impetus was heightened concern
over the functioning of the existing system and the recognized need to address
it explicitly in the law and improve its operation.
83. See generally Mooney, supra note 18 (examining issues concerning
property rights that arise in modem securities markets and proposing certain
legal reforms); Rogers, supra note 4, at 1447-49 (discussing the conceptual
inadequacies of the 1977 version); Schroeder & Carlson, supra note 18
(discussing the inadequacies of the 1977 version for secured lending).
84. See generally Schroeder & Carlson, supra note 18, at 679 (attributing
the lack of litigation to the diligent federal regulation of the securities
industry).
85. See Schroeder, supra note 12, at 335-48.
86. See id. at 328-31.
87. See Rogers, supra note 4, at 1449.
88. See Schroeder, supra note 12, at 336.
89. The extensive involvement of the securities industry can be seen in the
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bailment, agency, or trust law to describe the basic operations of the
indirect holding system, even though agency law governs much in
the relationship between the securities industry and its customers.
90
They preferred a sui generis structure for their custodial role in the
indirect holding of securities.
91
One important goal in revising Article 8 was to simplify transfer
rules for the indirect holding system. The rules in the 1977 version
governing transfers and pledges were unduly complex because they
tried to cover the relationships existing in the indirect holding
system 92 using direct holding concepts. By defining rights and
obligations among the parties in the indirect holding system, Article
8 eliminated the complex legal provisions for transferring and
pledging indirectly held securities.
9 3
The indirect holding rules are set forth in Part 5 of Article 8 and
include the definitions and general rules contained in Part 1. These
rules can be studied most readily by breaking them into two
functional divisions. This section explores the definitions and legal
framework for indirect holding. A later section explores the rights of
third parties.
A. Basic Structure
Article 8's legal regime for indirect holding is built around four
basic concepts: (1) the securities account, the account to which an
indirectly held investment is credited if the one maintaining the
account treats the account holder as entitled to exercise the rights
comprising the investment;94 (2) the securities intermediary, the
acknowledgments at the end of the prefatory note. See Prefatory Note, supra
note 3, at Part V.
90. See U.C.C. § 8-509 official comment; Prefatory Note, supra note 3, at
Part HLI.B; Rogers, supra note 4, at 1496; Schroeder, supra note 12, at 348-49,
358-59.
91. See Prefatory Note, supra note 3, at Part III.B; Rogers, supra note 4, at
1494-96; Schroeder, supra note 12, at 363-64.
92. Much of this law was contained within U.C.C. §§ 8-313, 8-320 (1977),
which were very complex sections of the U.C.C. See Rogers, supra note 4, at
1447-48; Schroeder, supra note 12, at 318-20; Schroeder & Carlson, supra
note 18, at 575-619.
93. See Prefatory Note, supra note 3, at Parts IV.B.1, IV.B.2, IV.B.5.
94. U.C.C. § 8-501(a) defines a securities account as "an account to which
a financial asset is or may be credited in accordance with an agreement under
which the person maintaining the account undertakes to treat the person for
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person through whom an investment is held indirectly; (3) the
financial asset, the investment held indirectly; and (4) the securities
entitlement, the name given to the property rights and interests of the
person holding a financial asset indirectly.95 One additional concept
follows logically from these four. An entitlement holder is the
person having a security entitlement to a financial asset against its
securities intermediary.
96
1. Credit to securities account
A securities account is created if the person maintaining the
account "undertakes to treat the person for whom the account is
maintained as entitled to exercise the rights that comprise the
financial asset."97  This requirement excludes trust relationships
where legal title is in the trustee, because the trustee exercises the
rights and ownership for the benefit of the beneficiary. 98 The
requirement also eliminates mutual funds because the shareholders
are not entitled to exercise the rights in the assets. The relationships
created by a deposit account and by a guaranteed investment contract
are also excluded because in those arrangements the person with
whom the money is invested becomes the debtor of the person
making the investment.99 While most securities accounts will be
formalized by a detailed written agreement, a written agreement is
not necessary to create a securities account.
100
By statute, an entitlement holder acquires a security entitlement
in one of three ways: (1) the securities intermediary credits a
financial asset to the entitlement holder's securities account; (2) the
securities intermediary accepts a financial asset for credit to the
entitlement holder's securities account; or (3) the securities
intermediary is obligated by law to credit a financial asset to the
entitlement holder's securities account (a security entitlement
whom the account is maintained as entitled to exercise the rights that comprise
the financial asset." The term "account" is not defined in Article 8. The key
requisite for an account appears to be a custody agreement.
95. See U.C.C. § 8-102(a)(17).
96. See id. § 8-102(a)(7).
97. Id. § 8-501(a).
98. See id. § 8-501 cmt. 1.
99. See id.
100. See id. cmt. 2.
680
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implied in law). 0' The security entitlement is created by any such
credit to a securities account even if the securities intermediary has
no rights to the financial asset.1
0 2
One consequence of these methods of acquisition is that they
treat a stock certificate in the possession of a securities intermediary
as a security entitlement if indorsed to the intermediary or in blank.
This is true even if the certificate was registered, issued or specially
indorsed in the name of another person103 This means that
delivering a directly held security to a broker just before executing a
trade generally converts that security to a security entitlement (an
indirectly held financial asset) at least until the trade is completed.
Thus, the majority of securities' trades 0 4 occur in the indirect
holding system even if shortly before the trade the security is held
directly.
10 5
Various custody relationships could be swept into the indirect
holding system if the nonholding party is entitled to exercise the
rights embodied in the asset. In fact, the drafters identify the
question of classifying whether an investment product or
arrangement is governed by the indirect holding system as "the most
difficult-and important-issue" raised by Article 8.106 The drafters
also caution courts not to use "mechanical jurisprudence" but to
interpret the definitions based upon the suitability of applying Article
8's substantive rules.
10 7
101. See id. § 8-501(b).
102. See id. § 8-501(c).
103. See id. §§ 8-301(a)(2), (3) (negative implication); see id. § 8-301 cmt.
2; see id. § 8-501(d) (negative implication); see id. § 8-501 cmt. 4.
104. Delivery to a securities intermediary after the trade, but in time to affect
settlement is one exception. A broker trading for its own account directly with
another broker trading for its account would not necessarily involve a security
entitlement. Note, however, that if done through a clearing corporation or
other intermediary, a security entitlement may be involved.
105. Note that a prime justification for the indirect holding system is the
ability to settle trades rapidly by not requiring physical delivery of securities.
See U.C.C. § 8-507 cmt. 1. See generally Facciolo, supra note 7, at 673-74
(discussing the impracticality of traders holding directly).
106. See Prefatory Note, supra note 3, at Part III.C.14.
107. See id.; see also U.C.C. § 8-501 cmt. 1.
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2. The securities intermediary
The securities account is maintained by a securities
intermediary. Article 8 defines securities intermediaries to include
clearing corporations and banks, brokers, and those who in the
ordinary course of their business maintain securities accounts.1
0 8
Some important differences between the two distinct groups of
securities intermediaries, clearing corporations and persons
maintaining securities accounts, will be explored later.1
0 9
Clearing corporations include federal reserve banks, clearing
agencies registered under federal securities laws, and clearing
agencies not required to register because they are regulated by state
or other federal authority. 10 Generally, clearing corporations also
maintain securities accounts for their participants. They are
separately defined as securities intermediaries to simplify the
analysis in arrangements like the system involving the National
Securities Clearing Corporation and the Depository Trust Company
(NSCC-DTC) which plays the largest role in indirect holding.
Although those two companies function as an integrated system, the
clearance and netting functions are handled by NSCC while DTC is
the depository for the securities."'1 NSCC is a securities
intermediary which does not need to hold financial assets for another
because it meets the separate definition of a clearing corporation by
providing clearing or settlement services in connection with financial
assets.
Securities intermediaries also include brokers or dealers under
federal securities law, 1 2 banks, 13 and others when maintaining
108. See U.C.C. § 8-102(a)(14).
109. See infra notes 352-357 and accompanying text.
110. See U.C.C. § 8-102(a)(5).
111. See id. cmt. 14.
112. The definition of securities intermediary in § 8-102(a)(14) specifically
refers to brokers. Broker is defined in § 8-102(a)(3) to include persons defined
as brokers (those acting as agents) or dealers (those acting as principals) under
federal securities laws. Thus, they are included for Article 8 purposes whether
or not they are required to be registered under federal law, if they meet the
federal law definitions.
113. The definition of securities intermediaries in § 8-102(a)(14) specifically
refers to banks performing these functions. In addition, the definition of
broker under § 8-102(a)(3) includes banks that are excluded from the definition
of broker or dealer under federal securities laws by virtue of their status as
banks.
INDIRECTLY HELD SECURITIES
securities accounts for others in the ordinary course of their business.
The securities intermediary designation is limited to their custodial
role in holding the securities. 114 Brokers effecting trades are agents
of their customers or principals, not securities intermediaries."1
5
Similarly, banks could be transfer agents, dealers, or lenders holding
the securities as collateral, without becoming securities
intermediaries. 116  Note that the broad scope of the securities
intermediary definition to include "others" could have surprise
consequences for a nonbank or nonbroker whose activities
inadvertently fall within the definition of maintaining a securities
account that holds financial assets under an agreement whereby the
entitlement holder is entitled to exercise the rights comprising the
asset.
117
3. Property held indirectly
Financial asset is intentionally defined to be broader than the
basic Article 8 term security." 8 In addition to securities, financial
assets include: (1) property which a securities intermediary agrees to
treat as a financial asset" 9 and (2)
an obligation of a person or a share, participation, or other
interest in a person or in property or an enterprise of a
person, which is, or is of a type, dealt in or traded on
114. See U.C.C. § 8-102 cmt. 14.
115. See id.
116. See id.
117. See id. § 8-501(a). The securities account concept is sufficiently broad
to cover many custody arrangements. Does this bring transactions such as
mortgage servicing and loan participations within Article 8? A mortgage
servicer holds the notes and mortgages or deeds of trust, collects payments,
and deals with delinquencies and default, yet is holding the assets for another
who can exercise rights in the notes. In some loan participations, one
participating lender holds the note and collects payments and otherwise deals
with the maker of the note, yet ownership of and the ability to exercise rights
in the note is in each participant. Certainly, few loan participants or mortgage
servicers think they are creating security accounts governed by Part 5 of
Article 8.
118. See U.C.C. § 8-102 cmt. 9; Prefatory Note, supra note 3, at Part IlI.A.
119. U.C.C. § 8-102(a)(9)(iii) includes the following as financial assets:
"any property that is held by a securities intermediary for another person in a
securities account if the securities intermediary has expressly agreed with the
other person that the property is to be treated as a financial asset under this
Article."
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financial markets, or which is recognized in any area in
which it is issued or dealt in as a medium for
investment .... 120
The second type of financial asset closely tracks the definition of
security. 121 It substitutes the word "person" for "issuer" and the term
"financial markets" -for "security exchanges or securities markets."
More importantly, a financial asset need not be one of a class or
series' 22 and does not require a security certificate or registration on
the books of the issuer. 123 The broader definition expands the scope
of Part 5 of Article 8 beyond the remainder of Article 8.124 The
broadened scope further reveals the inadequacy of prior law to
address the issues raised by indirect holding.
The Code expressly addresses whether four types of investment
products are financial assets or securities: (1) options and similar
obligations issued by clearing corporations to their participants are
not securities, but are financial assets; 125 (2) commodity contracts are
neither securities nor financial assets; 126 (3) negotiable instruments
which do not qualify as securities (they are not part of a series, yet
are investment devices) are financial assets, if held in a securities
account; 2 7 and (4) an interest in a limited liability company or
partnership that is not traded in a securities market is not a security
(the partnership did not opt into Article 8 coverage as a security), but
is a financial asset, if held in a securities account.
12 8
Some financial assets, notably many municipal bonds, meeting
the definition of securities, can only be held indirectly because they
are issued in book-entry form. That is, on the books of the issuer the
only holder is a clearing corporation, but that single interest is
120. U.C.C. § 8-102(a)(9)(ii).
121. Id. § 8-102(a)(15).
122. Cf id. § 8-102(a)(15)(ii) (which includes the class or series requirement
in the definition of security).
123. Cf id. § 8-102(a)(15)(i) (which includes the certificate or registration
requirement in the definition of security).
124. See id. § 8-102 cmt. 9.
125. See id. § 8-103(e). This rule clarifies the treatment of traded stock
options.
126. See id. § 8-103(f).
127. See id. § 8-103(d); Prefatory Note, supra note 3, at Parts III.C.8-9. For
example, bankers' acceptances are governed by Article 3, but commonly held
in securities accounts. See U.C.C. § 8-104 cmt. 1.
128. See U.C.C. § 8-103(c); Prefatory Note, supra note 3, at Parts III.C.8-9.
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divided among all those having a security entitlement on the books
of the clearing corporation.
2 9
In summary, a financial asset is a security or other property held
indirectly in a securities account. The term financial asset can
include a security entitlement held indirectly. 3 ° The term financial
asset refers, depending on the context, to either the underlying asset,
or the means by which ownership thereof is evidenced (the
certificated security, the uncertificated security, or the security
entitlement). 3'
4. Who holds indirectly?
The vast majority of publicly held securities are represented by
jumbo certificates registered in the name of Cede & Co., the nominee
of the Depository Trust Company (DTC). 3 2 Approximately 600
banks and brokers have accounts at the Depository Trust Company
for their own holdings and for the holdings of those for whom they
act as securities intermediaries.'33 There are frequently additional
tiers of indirect holding whereby intermediaries who are not
members of DTC hold through securities accounts with
intermediaries who are members. 134 In other words, the Depository
Trust Company holds the securities directly and the banks and
brokers, as well as their customers hold them indirectly as security
entitlements. This same system can be used for corporate and
municipal debt securities and for commercial paper. 35 This is not
the only indirect holding system in existence but it is the largest.
Some concerns that have been raised regarding Article 8 relate
to the perception that it does not adequately protect consumers.
136
This seems to presume that consumers are the primary indirect
holders. Essential to understanding security entitlements and the
indirect holding system is the realization that securities
intermediaries are generally also entitlement holders. Usually, the
securities intermediary is a bank or broker and the financial asset is
129. See U.C.C. § 8-102 cmt. 15; see id. § 8-508 cmt. 1.
130. See id. § 8-102(a)(9); see id. § 8-102 cmt. 9.
131. See id.
132. See Rogers, supra note 4, at 1443-44.
133. See Prefatory Note, supra note 3, at Part I.C.
134. See Schroeder, supra note 12, at 327-328.
135. See Prefatory Note, supra note 3, at Part I.C.
136. See Facciolo, supra note 7, at 617-20; Guttman, supra note 66, at 5-7.
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held indirectly by that intermediary and held directly by the
Depository Trust Company or another clearing corporation. 137 There
may be more than two tiers of indirect holding for any financial
asset. While this could be criticized as creating multiple levels of
risk for the ultimate entitlement holder, these levels of risk are
mitigated to a significant extent by the fact that Article 8 makes the
immediate securities intermediary effectively a guarantor of any
upper tier securities intermediaries. 1
38
B. What Does an Entitlement Holder Hold?
For years, those holding securities indirectly have considered
themselves "owners" of the securities-having all rights and
property interests in the securities. Article 8 does not support that
view, although it was "designed to ensure that parties will retain their
expected legal rights and duties .... "139 To understand why this is
true a distinction must be drawn between the property interest in the
security entitlement itself and the property interest in the underlying
financial asset. An entitlement holder has all rights and property
interests in the security entitlement. The question is what rights and
property interests the security entitlement provides to the underlying
financial asset.
Security entitlement is defined broadly as the "rights" and
"property interest" of an "entitlement holder" specified by Part 5 of
Article 8 with respect to a "financial asset." 140 The drafters are clear
in their intent that the property rights of an entitlement holder are
created by Article 8 and not by common law property concepts.
1 4 '
Thus, an analysis of the eleven sections comprising Part 5 of Article
8 is necessary to understand the nature of the "property interests" and
"rights" relating to a financial asset which comprise a security
entitlement.
42
137. See Facciolo, supra note 7, at 621.
138. See WILLIAM D. HAWKLAND & JAMES S. ROGERS, REVISED ARTICLE
8: INVESTMENT SECURITIES, 7A UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERIES 652
(1996); infra notes 176, 298-299 and accompanying text. But cf Facciolo,
supra note 7, at 668-71, 706 (arguing that the Article 8 language can be
construed to limit this duty when an upper-tier intermediary fails).
139. U.C.C. § 8-104 cmt. 3 (emphasis added).
140. See id. § 8-102(a)(17).
141. See id. § 8-503 cmt. 2.
142. The drafters state that Part 5 of Article 8 can be viewed as the definition
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1. The "property interest"
The essence of property is a bundle of rights in something of
value that can be enforced against others. Limitations on the types of
rights to a financial asset that can be enforced or the persons against
whom they can be enforced are necessarily limitations on the
property interest.
A security entitlement includes a property interest in the
financial asset.143 Unfortunately, extracting from Article 8 the nature
of this property interest is not easy. Subsections 8-104(a)(2), (b)
provide that a person "acquires" a financial asset or "an interest"
therein if one obtains a security entitlement in the financial asset.
Similarly, subsection (d) provides that a person fulfills his/her legal
obligation to "transfer, deliver, present, surrender, exchange, or
otherwise put in the possession of another" a financial asset by
causing the transferee to acquire a security entitlement in it. While
those provisions give the appearance that a security entitlement in a
financial asset is equivalent to ownership of the financial asset, their
purpose is not to delineate rights and property interests, but to
"translate" indirect holding terminology so that it does not conflict
with terminology in agreements and documents establishing and
governing the rights under a financial asset when transfers involve
indirect holding. 44 It was necessary to include such provisions
because a security entitlement involves something less than
ownership of the financial asset.
A security entitlement involves a property interest in the
financial asset (as contrasted with in personam rights against the
securities intermediary) only to the extent it includes rights to the
financial asset enforceable against other persons. 145 Subsection 8-
104(c) limits an entitlement holder's interest as a "purchaser" of a
financial asset to the rights enumerated in section 8-503. The picture
gets simultaneously clearer and murkier by examining section 8-503.
Subsection 503(a) provides that financial assets held by a securities
of security entitlement. See U.C.C. § 8-102 cmt. 17.
143. See id. § 8-102(a)(17).
144. See id. § 8-104 cmt. 3.
145. Official comment 17 to § 8-102 makes essentially this same assertion
by describing a security entitlement as "both a package of personal rights
against the securities intermediary and an interest in the property held by the
securities intermediary."
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intermediary are "not property of the securities intermediary" and are
exempt from claims of general creditors of the securities
intermediary (but not certain secured creditors). The subsection
further provides that financial assets are held by a securities
intermediary for its entitlement holders "to the extent necessary" to
meet its obligations to entitlement holders. This provision protects
the entitlement holder from the securities intermediary's general
creditors and, thus, provides some property interest, 146 but it does not
empower the entitlement holder to assert rights against any person.
Subsection 8-503(b) describes the entitlement holder's property
interest in a financial asset as a "pro rata property interest" in all
interests in that financial asset held by the securities intermediary.
Although it is not explicitly stated, the pro rata interest is implicitly
limited to the amount of the financial asset credited to the securities
account. In other words, if the security entitlement is to 100 shares
of IBM stock and the securities intermediary holds 100,000 shares of
IBM stock, the security entitlement is a 1/1000 interest in each share
of IBM stock held by the intermediary. It is important to note that
this pro rata interest extends to financial assets acquired by the
securities intermediary before the entitlement holder acquired the
security entitlement as well as to those acquired thereafter. 147 Thus,
the fungible bulk in which an entitlement holder has a pro rata
interest regularly changes. This pro rata interest in the fungible bulk
of a particular financial asset, however, is not a claim to a specific
asset held by the financial intermediary. 148 The drafters refer to the
entitlement holder as having obtained a property interest "only in the
sense that under section 8-503 a security entitlement is treated as a
sui generis form of property interest."
149
146. After describing the limitations on a securities intermediary's rights and
those of its general creditors to the financial asset held for an entitlement
holder, the drafters declare: "Thus, a security entitlement is itself a form of
property interest not merely an in personam claim against the intermediary."
Prefatory Note, supra note 3, at Part II.C.
147. Section 8-503(b) describes the entitlement holder's property interest to
be "without regard to the time the entitlement holder acquired the security
entitlement or the time the securities intermediary acquired the interest in that
financial asset."
148. See U.C.C. § 8-104 cmt. 2; see id. § 8-503 cmt. 2.
149. Id. § 8-104 cmt. 2.
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Under subsection 8-503(c), enforcement of that property interest
against the securities intermediary is limited to the rights enumerated
in sections 8-505 through 8-508. These are discussed below in the
section on rights against the securities intermediary. More
profoundly, under subsections 8-503(d) and (e) enforcement of the
"property interest" against third parties is severely limited. These
limitations are discussed in the next section.
Notably, section 8-116 makes the securities intermediary, not
the entitlement holder, the "purchaser for value" of the financial
asset. Thus, the securities intermediary has the rights of a purchaser
when it needs to assert those rights against third persons. To this
extent, the entitlement holder obtains the benefit of purchaser status
indirectly through the actions of the securities intermediary. Note
that the entitlement holder has no rights to direct the securities
intermediary in asserting that status. Remember in this regard that
subsection 8-503(a) states that the financial asset is not property of
the securities intermediary, but held for entitlement holders to the
extent necessary for the securities intermediary to meet its
obligations to them.
2. The "rights"
The "rights" embodied in a security entitlement under Article 8
reveal significant limitations on an entitlement holder's enforceable
"property interest" in the financial asset.
a. rights against thirdparties
Article 8 provides an entitlement holder only extremely limited
rights in the financial asset against persons other than its securities
intermediary. There are no rights against the issuer of the financial
asset which is the essence of a property interest in a financial
asset.150 Much of the indirect holding system involves at least two
tiers of securities intermediaries (meaning that the financial asset is a
securities entitlement). 151 An entitlement holder is not given any
150. See id. § 8-102 cmt. 17. Part 5 of Article 8 only enumerates limited
property interests enforceable against "purchasers." These are contained in
§ 8-503. No rights against the issuer of the financial asset are described. See
In re County of Orange, 219 B.R. 543, 553-56 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1997).
151. See supra notes 133-138 and accompanying text
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rights against an upper tier intermediary.' 52 In summary, there are no
legal rights under Article 8 against persons up the indirect holding
chain.
While this absence of rights may be distressing to an entitlement
holder, it is not astounding because it is inherent in the indirect
holding system. No one in the indirect holding chain, except the
immediate securities intermediary, has any way of knowing that the
entitlement holder has an interest in the financial asset.
In contrast, Article 8 includes rights of an entitlement holder
against purchasers of a financial asset underlying a security
entitlement, but only in extremely limited circumstances. 53  Four
explicit requirements must be met:154  First, the securities
intermediary must be subject to insolvency proceedings. Before the
entitlement holder can pursue rights against the purchaser, the trustee
in the securities intermediary's insolvency proceeding must have
elected not to pursue those rights. 55  Second, the securities
intermediary cannot have sufficient financial assets to meet its
152. See U.C.C. § 8-102 cmt. 17; see id. § 8-503 cmt. 2; Rogers, supra note
4, at 1455-56.
153. The drafters state that "except in extremely unusual circumstances"
there are no rights against third party transferees. U.C.C. § 8-503 cmt. 2.
154. U.C.C. § 8-503(d) provides:
An entitlement holder's property interest with respect to a particular
financial asset under subsection (a) may be enforced against a
purchaser of the financial asset or interest therein only if:
(1) insolvency proceedings have been initiated by or against the
securities intermediary;
(2) the securities intermediary does not have sufficient interests in
the financial asset to satisfy the security entitlements of all of its
entitlement holders to that financial asset;
(3) the securities intermediary violated its obligations under
section 8-504 by transferring the financial asset or interest therein
to the purchaser; and
4) the purchaser is not protected under subsection (e).
The trustee or other liquidator, acting on behalf of all entitlement
holders having security entitlements with respect to a particular
financial asset, may recover the financial asset, or interest therein,
from the purchaser. If the trustee or other liquidator elects not to
pursue that right, an entitlement holder whose security entitlement
remains unsatisfied has the right to recover its interest in the
financial asset from the purchaser.
155. See U.C.C. § 8-503(d).
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obligations to entitlement holders.'56 Third, the transfer of the
financial asset to that particular purchaser must have violated the
securities intermediary's obligation to maintain sufficient interests in
the financial asset.'57 The sole effect of this third requirement is to
limit the identity of the purchaser who can be pursued because of
insufficient financial assets. Meeting the second requirement will
also violate the securities intermediary's duty described in this third
requirement. 158  Fourth, the purchaser cannot be protected under
subsection 8-503(e). Subsection 8-503(e) 159 protects any purchaser
who has given value and obtained control of the financial asset from
any action based on the entitlement holder's property interest unless
that purchaser colluded 160 with the securities intermediary in
violating its duties to the entitlement holder. The vast majority of
purchasers qualify for this protection (the requirements are certainly
easier to satisfy than those of a "protected purchaser" of a security).
In summary, it is an extraordinarily rare circumstance in which
an entitlement holder's rights will be enforceable against a purchaser.
Some of these limitations on rights against third persons are inherent
in an indirect holding system because the entitlement holder is to
look first, and almost exclusively, to its securities intermediary in
claiming the underlying financial asset. The higher standards of
purchaser protection in subsection 8-503(e), however, are not
inherent in the indirect holding system. The advisability of these
limitations will be explored in the section exploring indirect holding
and third persons.
156. See id.
157. See id.
158. See id. § 8-504(a).
159. U.C.C. § 8-503(e) provides:
An action based on the entitlement holder's property interest with
respect to a particular financial asset under subsection (a), whether
framed in conversion, replevin, constructive trust, equitable lien, or
other theory, may not be asserted against any purchaser of a financial
asset or interest therein who gives value, obtains control, and does not
act in collusion with the securities intermediary in violating the
securities intermediary's obligations under Section 8-504.
160. The selection of a no-collusion requirement raises some important
issues that are explored in depth in a subsequent section. See infra notes 536-
564 and accompanying text.
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b. rights against its securities intermediary
Article 8 gives an entitlement holder a number of specific rights
against its securities intermediary. These rights are the essence of
a securities entitlement and virtually its sum total. 162 This conclusion
is presaged by the definition of entitlement holder itself, "a
person... having a security entitlement against the securities
intermediary,', 163 and the definition of security entitlement, "the
rights and property interest of an entitlement holder with respect to a
financial asset specified in Part 5.,,114 In other words, an entitlement
holder has the rights and property interest enumerated in Part 5 of
Article 8 against its securities intermediary and little else.
The rights an entitlement holder may enforce against the
securities intermediary are limited to enforcement of the securities
intermediary's Article 8 obligations. These obligations are described
in detail below.
3. Obligations of a securities intermediary
A securities intermediary satisfies its obligations and effectuates
all rights the entitlement holder has against it to the financial asset by
performing eight statutory obligations. Central to these obligations is
the concern that the entitlement holder receives the economic and
corporate rights that comprise the financial asset.
165
a. statutory obligations
Two of these obligations are fundamental to the entire system,
because they encompass the key expectation of an entitlement
holder. The securities intermediary must take action to obtain a
payment or distribution made by the issuer of a financial asset.
166
This is accompanied by an almost absolute obligation 167 to the
161. See U.C.C. § 8-503(c).
162. That little more than in personam rights against the securities
intermediary are included in a securities entitlement is implied from several
references in the official comments to the security entitlement being a bundle
of rights against the securities intermediary. See id. § 8-110 cmts. 1, 3; see id.
§ 8-501 cmt. 4.
163. Id. § 8-102(a)(7) (emphasis added).
164. Id. § 8-102(a)(17).
165. See id. § 8-503 cmt. 2.
166. See id. § 8-505(a).
167. The obligation is subject to set-off or counterclaim. See id. § 8-505
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entitlement holder to pass along payments or distributions made by
the issuer of a financial asset and received by the securities
intermediary. 68 The obligation to pass through economic benefits of
the financial asset is the only obligation of a securities intermediary
not subject to limitation by agreement or a commercial
reasonableness standard.1
69
Together with the obligation to obtain and pass through to the
entitlement holder payments and distributions, the obligation of the
securities intermediary to exercise ownership rights with respect to
the financial asset on behalf of the entitlement holder constitutes the
essence of a security entitlement.170 These rights encompass such
things as voting rights, conversion rights, rights to make demand for
payment of an instrument which is a financial asset, and rights to
enforce legal obligations. 171  There are two important contrasts
between the obligation to pass through economic benefits and the
obligation to pass through other rights of ownership. First, the
securities intermediary must exercise the other rights of ownership
only if directed to do so by an entitlement holder. 172 A securities
intermediary can satisfy this obligation by placing the entitlement
holder in a position to exercise the rights directly. 173 Note that
Article 8 gives the securities intermediary no express obligation to
make the entitlement holder aware of the existence or terms of such
rights. 174 Second, the obligation to exercise those rights is dependent
upon the agreement between the securities intermediary and the
entitlement holder.17
5
The next two obligations are important in minimizing the
entitlement holders' financial risks. The securities intermediary must
obtain and maintain sufficient quantities of the financial asset to
satisfy the claims of its entitlement holders. 176 The only exception to
cmt. 3; see id. § 8-509(c).
168. See id. § 8-505(b).
169. Id.
170. See supra notes 97-102 and accompanying text.
171. See U.C.C. § 8-506 cmts. 3-4.
172. See id. § 8-506.
173. See id. § 8-506(2).
174. Federal securities laws create a number of statutory obligations in this
area for securities intermediaries subject to those laws. See id. § 8-506 cmt. 4.
175. See id. § 8-506(1).
176. U.C.C. § 8-504(a) provides as follows:
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this requirement is for "a clearing corporation that is itself the
obligor of an option.... 177 Second, the securities intermediary has
an obligation not to grant security interests in the financial assets
held for entitlement holders without agreement. 178 The exception for
contrary agreements has important justifications but raises troubling
questions which are discussed in a later section.
179
The final three obligations relate to complying with entitlement
orders or directions from the entitlement holder. An "entitlement
order" directs the securities intermediary to "transfer or [redeem] a
financial asset to which the entitlement holder has a security
entitlement."'180 The entitlement order only directs the transfer, it is
not an order to sell the financial asset.'18 It is the indirect holding
system's analog to indorsement and delivery of a certificated security
or an instruction 182 to transfer an uncertificated security. Any other
instruction to the securities intermediary is referred to as a
direction.
183
A securities intermediary shall promptly obtain and thereafter
maintain a financial asset in a quantity corresponding to the aggregate
of all security entitlements it has established in favor of its entitlement
holders with respect to that financial asset. The securities
intermediary may maintain those financial assets directly or through
one or more securities intermediaries.
The provision is based on federal securities law requirements, 17 C.F.R. §
240.15c3-3 (2000), and recognizes that a security entitlement is a pro rata
claim to the fungible bulk of interests in the financial asset maintained by the
securities intermediary.
177. U.C.C. § 8-504(d). This exception, although not so limited, was
necessary to accommodate the Options Clearing Corporation, which does not
hold options, but guarantees the obligations of its participants. See id. cmt. 5.
The operation of the Options Clearing Corporation is explained in the prefatory
note. See Prefatory Note, supra note 3, Part III.C.12.
178. See U.C.C. § 8-504(b).
179. See infra notes 505-512 and accompanying text.
180. U.C.C. § 8-102(a)(8).
181. See id. § 8-507 cmt. 5.
182. The definition of entitlement order parallels the defined term
"instruction," which relates to transfer and redemption directions given to the
issuer of directly held uncertificated securities. See id. § 8-102(a)(12).
183. Direction is not a defined term in Article 8, but it is the term used in
§§ 8-506 and 8-508 to describe instructions from an entitlement holder to a
securities intermediary and the intermediary's duties in connection therewith.
Note, however, that official comment 8 to § 8-102, as supplemented by the
conforming amendments to revised Article 9, explains that the "direction"
referred to in § 8-508 is an entitlement order.
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The securities intermediary must comply with an entitlement
order, if originated by the appropriate person and the securities
intermediary has (1) reasonable opportunity to assure itself of
genuineness and authenticity and (2) reasonable opportunity to
comply.' 84  The appropriate person is the entitlement holder, 185
unless the entitlement holder is deceased or incapacitated.' 86 An
entitlement order not issued by an appropriate person is nevertheless
effective if ratified by the appropriate person or made by its agent.'
87
This would include an entitlement order issued by a purchaser
obtaining control of the security entitlement by agreement.
The securities intermediary's obligation to comply with
entitlement orders from the appropriate person is bolstered by a
second obligation. If the securities intermediary acts on an
ineffective entitlement order, it must reestablish a security
entitlement and pay or credit any distributions or payments not
received as a result of a wrongful transfer. 188  If the securities
intermediary does not reestablish the security entitlement, it is liable
for damages.' 89 There is an important limitation on these duties.
While the securities intermediary is only required to comply with an
entitlement order from an appropriate person, it is not liable if it
transfers a financial asset pursuant to an "effective" entitlement order
that is not from the appropriate person. 190
Finally, the securities intermediary has a duty to "act at the
direction of an entitlement holder to change a security entitlement
into another available form of holding for which the entitlement
holder is eligible, or to cause the financial asset to be transferred to a
securities account of the entitlement holder with another securities
intermediary."191 Changing the form of security holding, of course,
permits an entitlement holder to demand to hold the financial asset
directly rather than indirectly. The right to transfer a security
184. See U.C.C. § 8-507(a).
185. This includes a purchaser obtaining control of the security entitlement
by becoming the entitlement holder.
186. See U.C.C. § 8-107(a)(3)-(5).
187. See id. § 8-107(b)-(e); see id. § 8-507 cmts. 3, 4.
188. See id. § 8-507(b).
189. See id.
190. See id. § 8-115 (allowing transfers of financial assets subject to
exceptions for violating legal process or acting in collusion with a wrongdoer).
191. Id. § 8-508.
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entitlement to a securities account with another securities
intermediary makes an important inroad into the practical monopoly
a securities intermediary has which would otherwise require the
entitlement holder to use it in connection with any transfer of the
indirectly held financial asset. Although the term "direction" in
section 8-508 would imply that changing the form of holding can
only be done by entitlement holders, in contrast with entitlement
orders which may be effective when issued by others as provided in
subsections 8-107(b)-(e), that "direction" is an entitlement order.'
92
All things considered, the obligations to comply with
entitlement orders and directions create the strongest "property
interest" the entitlement holder has.
b. standards ofperformance
A securities intermediary satisfies its obligations under Article 8
by complying with other legal requirements, by exercising due care
in accordance with reasonable commercial standards, or by
performing its duties as specified by agreement. 193  A securities
intermediary's compliance with another statute, regulation, or rule
satisfies its Article 8 duty if the substance of the duty is the subject of
that other legal requirement. 94 To the extent not covered by statute,
regulation, rule, or by the party's agreement, duties are to be
performed and rights are to be exercised in a commercially
reasonable manner. 95 The agreement of the parties can specify how
the securities intermediary satisfies most of its obligations without
observing due care in accordance with reasonable commercial
standards. 196 This provision raises a significant issue. Should there
be an independent standard requiring securities intermediaries to
observe due care in accordance with reasonable commercial
standards? This question is explored in a later section.
197
192. See id. § 8-102 cmt. 8.
193. See id. §§ 8-504(c)(1)-(2), 8-505(a)(1)-(2), 8-506(1)-(2), 8-507(a)(1)-
(2), 8-508(1)-(2), 8-509.
194. See id. § 8-509(a).
195. See id. § 8-509(b).
196. See id. §§ 8-504(c)(1), 8-505(a)(1), 8-506(1), 8-507(a)(1), 8-508(1).
Note that this formulation is intended to avoid the normal inability to disclaim
a duty of care under § 1-102(3), but it does not eliminate the duty to act in
good faith under §§ 1-203, 8-102(a)(10). See id. § 8-504 cmt. 4.
197. See infra notes 499-504 and accompanying text.
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A securities intermediary may withhold performance of its
obligations because of unfulfilled obligations the entitlement holder
has to the securities intermediary.' 9  This right to withhold
performance may arise out of a security interest, under a security
agreement with the entitlement holder or otherwise, or under other
law or agreement. 1
99
IV. CHANGES AFFECTING THIRD PERSONS IN BOTH SYSTEMS
A. Revised Concept ofAdverse Claims
Article 8 narrowed the definition of "adverse claim." The 1977
version had an open-ended definition: "Adverse claim includes a
claim that a transfer was or would be wrongful or that a particular
adverse person is the owner of or has an interest in the security." 200
This definition was broad enough to cover any restriction on transfer
and any claim of ownership to or interest in the security. Article 8
limits an adverse claim to a "claim that a claimant has a property
interest in a financial asset and that it is a violation of the rights of
the claimant for another person to hold, transfer, or deal with the
financial asset. 2" °0
The revised definition makes several significant changes. The
change from "security" to "financial asset" was necessitated because
the indirect holding system includes "financial assets" that are not
"securities." 20 2  Restrictions on transfer are no longer expressly
defined as adverse claims,20 3 although they have not been expressly
eliminated. More importantly, a claim is limited to a property
interest and the claim is not an adverse claim unless the claimant's
rights are violated by "holding, transferring or dealing with" the
financial asset.
20 4
198. See U.C.C. § 8-509(c).
199. See id.
200. U.C.C. § 8-302(2) (1977) (emphasis added).
201. U.C.C. § 8-102(a)(1).
202. See id. § 8-102 cmt. 9.
203. The language in § 8-302(2) of the 1977 version, "adverse claim
includes a claim that a transfer was or would be wrongful," was broad enough
to include restrictions on transfer.
204. See U.C.C. § 8-102(a)(1).
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1. Violated property interest limitation
The drafters included the property interest limitation to avoid the
suggestion "that any wrongful action concerning a security, even a
simple breach of contract, gave rise to an adverse claim. '20 5 While
the limitation to a "property interest" is intuitively correct, it is new.
The difference between a property interest and some other interest is
not a clear legal distinction. Will this change provide a meaningful
benefit to purchasers? The requirement that the claimant's rights
must be violated by holding, transferring, or dealing with the
financial asset also has intuitive appeal, but may inadvertently limit
purchaser protections. These questions are explored in a later
206section.
2. Restrictions on transfer
Understanding the effect of eliminating the express inclusion of
restrictions on transfer as adverse claims requires distinguishing
transfer restrictions crcated by issuers from those imposed by statute
or among shareholders. Issuer restrictions on transfer are covered
separately in Article 8-similar to the treatment they were given in
the 1977 version. 207  An issuer restriction is ineffective against
persons without knowledge of it, unless noted on the security
certificate or notification of it has been given to the registered owner
of an uncertificated security.20 8 Note that a person holding securities
indirectly has no guaranteed way to learn of effective issuer
restrictions on transfer.
Transfer restrictions imposed by statute or among shareholders
are not expressly covered.2 °9 Treatment of statutory restrictions will
depend on the statutory provisions and their legal effect.
Shareholder transfer restrictions receive the same treatment they had
under the 1977 version, only if they meet the new requirements for
205. Id. § 8-102 cmt. 1.
206. See infra notes 460-496 and accompanying text.
207. See U.C.C. § 8-204 (1977).
208. See U.C.C. § 8-204. The differential treatment of certificated and
uncertificated securities is simply the difference in what is required to
complete a transfer. Delivery of the certificate accomplishes the transfer of a
certificated security, while the uncertificated security is not transferred until
the transfer is registered on the issuer's books. See id. cmt. 3.
209. The drafters explain that they have been left to other law. See id.
cmt. 5.
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an adverse claim. They should easily meet the "violation"
requirement because they preclude transfers. The issue becomes
whether they are property interests. Transfer restrictions are not
always accompanied by an option to purchase, a right of first refusal
or a forfeiture provision. The shareholders may simply want to
enjoin a prohibited transfer. Is such a right a property interest or a
mere contractual right outside the definition of adverse claim?
If these transfer restrictions are not covered by Article 8's
narrower definition of adverse claim, they are left in a legal never-
never-land. There are two possible outcomes. First, a protected
purchaser does not take free of the restrictions, whether or not the
purchaser has notice because they are not adverse claims (a reading
that would not be supported by the drafters). Alternatively, the
restrictions are completely outside the rules of Article 8, requiring
courts to fashion whatever rules seem appropriate. This second
possibility is unacceptable to shareholders seeking to impose transfer
restrictions without any way of knowing whether they will be
enforceable against third parties. The incentive created is to make
sure the restriction includes a property interest.
B. Duties to Adverse Claimants
Several provisions in Article 8 facilitate free transferability of
securities or security entitlements by limiting the duties issuers,
financial intermediaries, or certain other parties have to one asserting
an adverse claim to the security or security entitlement.21 Such
provisions insulate holders of securities from legal pressure brought
against record keepers involved with the security.2 1  These
protections are new to Article 8.212
1. Protecting those in administrative roles
Those acting in an administrative capacity or as conduits for
transfers are given important protections from liability.21 3 Although
issuers, authenticating trustees, transfer agents, registrars and
securities intermediaries, brokers, agents, and bailees are liable for
210. See U.C.C. §§ 8-115, 8-404, 8-407.
211. See Rogers, supra note 4, at 1497-503.
212. See, e.g., Prefatory Note, supra note 3, at Part IV.B.6.
213. See U.C.C. § 8-115 cmt. 1; see id. § 8-404 cmt. 2.
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acting on ineffective indorsements, instructions, or orders,214 it is
difficult to block their compliance with effective indorsements,
instructions or orders.
Section 8-115 protects brokers, agents, or bailees in the direct
holding system and securities intermediaries in the indirect holding
system that transfer a financial asset pursuant to an effective
entitlement order or direction from liability to an adverse claimant
unless it had been timely served with legal process or was in
collusion with the wrongdoer.215  Absent this protection, these
persons could have liability in common law conversion. The policy
behind this protection is to facilitate prompt action on customer
orders and thereby facilitate securities settlement systems despite
notice of adverse claims to the securities. 216 The drafters did not
want to require those entities to make a legal judgment in the face of
such a claim. 217 Section 8-115 provides greater rights to the adverse
claimant if a security certificate was stolen. In this situation, the
person acting as a conduit is liable if he/she had notice of the adverse
claim.2 18 This different treatment is in deference to public policy
against facilitating transfers of stolen security certificates.219
In a similar way, sections 8-404 and 8-407 protect issuers,
authenticating trustees, transfer agents, and registrars registering
transfers pursuant to effective indorsements or instructions from
assertions of adverse claims unless section 8-403's stop-registration
214. Issuers are expressly liable under § 8-404(c) and that liability has been
newly extended to authenticating trustees, transfer agents, and registrars under
§ 8-407. Securities intermediaries, agents, and bailees have potential liability
under general principles of conversion law. See id. § 8-115 cmt. 1.
215. U.C.C. § 8-115 provides in pertinent part:
A securities intermediary that has transferred a financial asset.., or a
broker or other agent or bailee that has dealt with a financial asset...
is not liable to a person having an adverse claim to the financial asset,
unless [it]...:
(1) took the action after it had been served with an injunction,
restraining order, or other legal process...
(2) acted in collusion with the wrongdoer...; or
(3) in the case of a security certificate that has been stolen, acted with
notice of the adverse claim.
216. See U.C.C. § 8-115 cmt. 3.
217. See id.
218. See id. § 8-115(3).
219. See id. § 8-115 cmt. 3.
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procedure has been complied with, an injunction issued, or they act
in collusion with the wrongdoer.22 0  They have no duty to inquire
into the adverse claims a.2 2 Under section 8-403, a claimant who is an
appropriate person to indorse securities or issue valid instructions
can delay registration of the transfer by making a demand not to
register a transfer but must ultimately enjoin it or get an indemnity
bond. 2 The drafters intended these rules to provide parity with the
indirect holding system so that a book entry direct holding system
could develop. That parity was in the form of eliminating any
issuer's duties to adverse claimants in the same way clearing
corporations are protected from adverse claimants under section 8-
115 because each is simply performing a record-keeping function.
223
2. Limited obligations to honor claims
Section 8-112, which did not have a counter-part in the 1977
version, specifies on whom legal process must be served by a
creditor in order to reach a debtor's security or security
entitlement.2 24 For each way a security may be held (certificated,
220. Subsection 8-404(a) provides liability for wrongful registration of a
transfer to a person not entitled to it if: the indorsement or instruction was
ineffective, there was a demand not to register and the § 8-403 procedure was
followed (notice to the demanding party with time to obtain an injunction or
indemnity bond), a timely injunction had been served, or the issuer acted in
collusion with the wrongdoer. Subsection 8-404(c) exempts the issuer from
liability for registration pursuant to an effective indorsement or instruction,
except for the reasons set forth in § 8-404(a) or law outside the U.C.C. relating
to collection of taxes.
221. See U.C.C. § 8-401 cmt. 1; see id. § 8-402 cmt. 4.
222. Although § 8-403 provides a procedure for one who is authorized to
indorse a security certificate or give instructions on an uncertificated security
to demand that the issuer not register a transfer, the procedure only buys time
(up to 30 days) for that person to obtain a court order or to file a bond. U.C.C.
§ 8-403(d) provides in pertinent part: "An issuer is not liable to a person who
initiated a demand that the issuer not register transfer... if the person ... does
not... (1) obtain an appropriate restraining order... enjoining the issuer from
registering the transfer; or (2) file with the issuer an indemnity bond .
223. See U.C.C. § 8-404 cmt. 2; Rogers, supra note 4, at 1503 n.98.
224. U.C.C. § 8-112 provides:
(a) The interest of a debtor in a certificated security may be reached by
a creditor only by actual seizure of the security certificate... except
as otherwise provided in subsection (d)....
(b) The interest of a debtor in an uncertificated security may be
reached by a creditor only by legal process upon the issuer at its chief
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uncertificated, or as a security entitlement) there is only one way to
reach it. Delaware corporate law, unlike the law of many other
states, treats a securities certificate as mere evidence of the security
rather than the security itself?225 Delaware corporate law contains a
provision preempting the Delaware Commercial Code whenever
there is an inconsistency with corporate law.226  As a result, for
securities of a Delaware corporation, attachment against the record
owner may be made by legal process under provisions of law
different from section 8-112. A recent amendment to section 324 of
the Delaware General Corporation Law requires compliance with
section 8-112 when attaching a certificated security.227  This
significantly reduces concerns that stock of a Delaware corporation
could be attached without obtaining possession of the certificate.
C. Expanded Protection for Secured Creditors
Priority for secured parties under the Code is generally linked to
perfection of the security interest. Article 8 and revised Article 9
expanded the ways to perfect security interests in financial assets.
Concomitant changes in priority rules accommodated the new ways
to perfect.
executive office.., except as otherwise provided in subsection (d).
(c) The interest of a debtor in a security entitlement may be reached
by a creditor only by legal process upon the securities intermediary...
except as otherwise provided in subsection (d). (Emphasis added).
Subsection (d) permits legal process on the debtor's secured party if it has
possession, is registered as the owner, or has the security entitlement in its
name.
225. Note that this is the conceptual approach taken by the drafters of Article
8 in their definitions of security and security certificate. See U.C.C. § 8-
102(a)(15), (16); see also Prefatory Note, supra note 3, at Part II.B (discussing
Article 8's treatment of certificates as a way to evidence ownership).
226. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 201 (1991). The relevant sections of
Delaware law are cross-referenced in Delaware's Article 8 to aid interested
parties in locating the provisions that may supersede the provisions on serving
process to make adverse claims in certain circumstances. The relevant sections
are in title 8, §§ 169 and 324 and title 10, §§ 365, 366, and 3501-513 of the
Delaware Code.
227. Title 8, § 324 of the Delaware Code was amended in 1998 to require
compliance with U.C.C. § 8-112 when attaching a certificated security. DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 324(a) (1998).
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1. Perfecting security interests
Prior law required a security to be transferred to the secured
party to perfect a security interest in it.228  In essence, transfer
required the secured party to either obtain possession of a certificated
security or have an uncertificated security registered in its name.
229
Possession or registration could be accomplished through a third
party. Because indirectly held securities were in the possession of,
or registered in the name of, someone other than the debtor, a
secured party under the 1977 version of Article 8 had to either obtain
a registered pledge230 or comply with one of the more complicated
provisions on transfer in section 8-313.231
Under Article 8 and revised Article 9, perfection of a security
interest in either directly or indirectly held investment property can
be obtained by filing a financing statement under subsection 9-
312(a). In addition, secured parties of brokers and securities
intermediaries are automatically perfected under subsection 9-
309(10). 232 Perfection can still be accomplished through possession
228. Technically, U.C.C. § 8-321 (1977) required transfer for a security
interest to attach and a security agreement, the giving of value, and the debtor
to have rights in the security (the U.C.C. § 9-203 requirements for attachment)
as additional steps for perfection. U.C.C. § 8-313 (1977) described what was
required to constitute a transfer of the security. Because perfection requires
attachment, the transfer requirement was the key element of the entire process.
Under the 1977 version an unperfected security interest was highly unlikely.
See U.C.C. § 8-321 cmt. 2 (1977).
229. See id. § 8-313.
230. See id. § 8-320.
231. The provisions in U.C.C. § 8-313 (1977) which governed transfer when
the certificate was in the possession of a third party or the security was
registered to a third party included: confirmation and book entry by a financial
intermediary identifying securities in the possession of or registered to the
intermediary as belonging to the secured party, see id. § 8-313(1)(d); entry on
the books of a clearing corporation to a secured party's account under § 8-320
(1977), see id. § 8-313(1)(g); and receipt by a financial intermediary of written
notification of a security interest in a security held on its books for a debtor,
see id. § 8-313(l)(h)-(i). Courts had construed some of these provisions in
ways that broadened protection of purchasers. See Schroeder, supra note 12, at
343-47.
232. This automatic perfection is best understood as a codification and
expansion of the practice that had developed of rolling over short-term loans
under "agreements to pledge" to take advantage of the 21-day automatic
perfection rule in § 9-304(4) (1972). See Mooney, supra note 18, at 341 n.121;
Schroeder, supra note 12, at 320. It reflects an understanding in the securities
ApVril 2002]
LOYOLA OFLOSANGELESLAWREVIEW [Vol. 35:661
of a certificated security and registration of an uncertificated
security, actions that are included in perfection by "delivery" or
"control 233 under Article 8 and revised Article 9.234 Perfecting a
security interest in a security entitlement by control235 requires the
secured party (or a third party on its behalf) to either become the
entitlement holder, or obtain the agreement of the securities
intermediary to follow its entitlement orders without further consent
of the entitlement holder.236  A securities intermediary granted a
security interest by its entitlement holder in a security entitlement has
control.
237
These rules facilitating perfection of security interests simplify
financing in the securities markets.2 3 8 Greater and easier access to
credit is another way systemic risk has been reduced.239 That
reduction is particularly apparent for those financing brokers and
securities intermediaries-they are now automatically perfected.
2. Priority of secured parties
Under prior law, priority between secured creditors went to the
first to perfect 4° unless the requirements of the bona fide purchaser
industry that the norm is for security industry professionals to have
encumbered their assets. See Schoeder, supra note 12 at 399.
233. Delivery under § 8-301 requires obtaining possession, directly or
through an appropriate third person, of a certificated security and being
registered, directly or through an appropriate third person, as owner of an
uncertificated security. Control is defined in § 8-106(a),(b) and (c) as delivery
and any appropriate indorsement or registration for a certificated security, and
delivery or agreement by the issuer to follow the purchaser's instructions for
an uncertificated security.
234. See U.C.C. § 9-313(a) (delivery of certificated securities); see id. § 9-
314(a) (control of any investment property).
235. See id. § 9-314(a).
236. See id. §§ 8-106(d), 9-106(a).
237. See id. § 8-106(e).
238. Professor Schroeder sets forth the primary types of lending against
investment property under the 1977 version and points out that a primary
purpose of the revisions was to facilitate credit secured by investment property.
See Schroeder, supra note 12, at 450.
239. See id. at 375.
240. See U.C.C. § 9-312(5) (1972).
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rule were met by the subsequent perfected secured party.241 Priority
over lien creditors was obtained by perfection.
242
Article 8 and revised Article 9 provide secured parties greater
protection from lien creditors, most notably a trustee in bankruptcy.
Priority over lien creditors is obtained either by perfecting the
security interest or by filing a financing statement and having an
authenticated security agreement.243 Perfection of security interests
is also made easier with the possibility of perfecting by filing a
financing statement or perfecting automatically.
The new perfection options created new issues making priority
for secured creditors a more complex question under Article 8 and
revised Article 9. A perfected secured party without control loses to
a secured party who has obtained control,244 even if the control
comes later and the later secured party has knowledge of the earlier
perfected interest.245 If both secured parties have control, they rank
according to the time control was obtained.246 Between secured
parties, if neither has control, the first to file or perfect wins,
24 7
unless the debtor is a broker or securities intermediary in which case
the secured parties rank equally.2 48 This last rule introduces a pro
rata priority concept among secured creditors.2 49 Perfected secured
241. U.C.C. § 9-312(1) (1972) provided that § 9-312 only applied when no
other rule in part 3 of Article 9 applied and § 9-309 (1972) provided that
nothing in Article 9 limited the rights of a bona fide purchaser under § 8-302
(1977).
242. See U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(b) (1972).
243. See U.C.C. § 9-317(a)(2).
244. See id. § 9-328(1).
245. U.C.C. § 9-328(1) is not limited by the knowledge of the secured party.
The rule also prevails over the first to file or perfect rule in U.C.C. § 9-
322(a)(1), due to the language in § 9-322(f)(1).
246. See U.C.C. § 9-328(2)(A).
247. U.C.C. § 9-322(a)(1) applies to these disputes and awards priority to the
first to file or perfect.
248. See U.C.C. § 9-328(6).
249. Prior to the revision of Article 9, the conforming amendments to Article
9 promulgated with revised Article 8 created a second pro rata priority between
any two secured parties having control. See U.C.C. § 9-115(5)(b), (e) (1994).
Reflection on the problems created by a pro rata priority rule apparently
convinced the drafters of revised Article 9 to eliminate it except between
creditors of brokers or securities intermediaries.
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parties still lose to purchasers qualifying for the benefits of the
protected purchaser rule.
250
Two issues raised by these new priority rules are explored in a
subsequent section. Should knowledge of a prior security interest
(relevant under the protected purchaser rule but irrelevant under
control priority rules) play a role in these priority rules?25' Does the
pro rata priority concept improve the functioning of the system?
252
D. Choice of Law and Adverse Claimants
The choice of law rules in Article 8 mandate that the local law
of the securities intermediary's jurisdiction governs adverse claims to
security entitlements and the securities intermediary's duties to
adverse claimants.25 3 The securities intermediary's jurisdiction is
determined by reference to the contract between the securities
intermediary and the entitlement holder. Preference is given to an
explicit designation in the document governing the securities
account.254 If such designation is not expressly made, other
statements in the account documentation or circumstances
surrounding the account help "locate" the securities intermediary's
jurisdiction.255 The drafters, while eliminating great uncertainty
250. See U.C.C. §§ 8-303, 9-331(a).
251. See infra notes 576-583 and accompanying text.
252. See infra notes 606-609 and accompanying text.
253. See U.C.C. § 8-1 10(b)(3)-(4).
254. The Article 8 rules for determining the securities intermediary's
jurisdiction were sufficiently problematic that the conforming amendments to
Article 8 made by revised Article 9 changed § 8-110(e) to give first preference
to an express provision of governing law for purposes of Article 8.
255. U.C.C. § 8-110(e) provides as follows:
(e) The following rules determine a "securities intermediary's
jurisdiction" for purposes of this section:
(1) If an agreement between the securities intermediary and its
entitlement holder governing the securities account expressly provides
that a particular jurisdiction is the securities intermediary's jurisdiction
for purposes of this part, this article, or this [Act], that jurisdiction is
the securities intermediary's jurisdiction.
(2) If paragraph (1) does not apply and an agreement between the
securities intermediary and its entitlement holder [governing the
securities account] expressly provides that the agreement is governed
by the law of a particular jurisdiction, that jurisdiction is the securities
intermediary's jurisdiction.
(3) If neither paragraph (1) nor paragraph (2) applies and an
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under prior law,256 sought to provide contractual flexibility in this
determination with a hierarchy of rules.
This contractual flexibility makes sense as an abstract
proposition. 257 The securities intermediary's jurisdiction, however,
cannot readily be determined by an adverse claimant applying
Article 8. That claimant in most cases has no access to the
information necessary to make the determination. The rights of
third-party claimants should not be determined by a body of law
which cannot be readily, independently, and objectively determined
by those claimants. From the perspective of third parties, governing
law should be determined by the most objective of the options given
in subsection 8-110(e), the jurisdiction in which the securities
intermediary's chief executive office is located.
A similar, although less serious problem, is that Article 9
mandates the application of the law of the securities intermediary's
jurisdiction to govern priority, perfection, and the effect of perfection
or nonperfection of a security interest in either a security entitlement
or securities account unless perfection is by filing a financing
statement or automatic.
2 58
In the context of obtaining a security interest, the secured party
will be able to get access to the agreement upon which the
determination is based. This agreement, however, is subject to
amendment without notice to the secured party. Even including a
covenant in the security agreement to prevent amendment without
notice is unsatisfactory. A claim of breach is of no value when the
agreement between the securities intermediary and its entitlement
holder governing the securities account expressly provides that the
securities account is maintained at an office in a particular jurisdiction,
that jurisdiction is the securities intermediary's jurisdiction.
(4) If none of the preceding paragraphs applies, the securities
intermediary's jurisdiction is the jurisdiction in which the office
identified in an account statement as the office serving the entitlement
holder's account is located.
(5) If none of the preceding paragraphs applies, the securities
intermediary's jurisdiction is the jurisdiction in which the chief
executive office of the securities intermediary is located.
256. See Rogers, supra note 4, at 1457-60.
257. See U.C.C. § 8-110 cmt. 3.
258. See id. § 9-305(a)(3), (c).
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security interest has become unperfected due to the change of
governing law.
259
These same two problems arise to a lesser degree in the direct
holding system. They result from the flexibility given issuers of
securities under subsection 8-110(d) to specify a jurisdiction other
than the jurisdiction under which it is organized to govern adverse
claims to securities, the duties of the issuer to adverse claimants,
260
and the priority, perfection and the effect of perfection or
nonperfection of a security interest perfected by a means other than
filing or automatically. 261 How and where this "specification" is to
be made is not stated. Likewise, there is no provision governing
future changes to the specification. A third party is again potentially
unable to determine what law will govern its claim. Whatever
justifications support the choice of law provisions in section 8-110
do not apply here. The need for objectively determinable and
relatively stable rules is the paramount guiding principle for the
choice of law rules in sections 9-301 to 9-307 and subsections 8-
110(a)(4)(5), (b)(3)(4). From the perspective of third parties, the
governing law should be determined in the same manner as it was
prior to the revisions to Article 8-the law of the jurisdiction under
which the issuer is organized.
E. Issuer Defenses
Article 8 did not make significant changes to the rules regarding
an issuer asserting defenses to its securities. A summary of those
rules, however, provides a useful basis for contrasting and
understanding other rules in Article 8. An issuer's defense that a
security certificate is not genuine can be asserted against anyone,
including a protected purchaser. 62  Other defenses, such as:
invalidity (except constitutional defects asserted against one taking
upon original issuance or asserted by some governmental issuers),
nondelivery or conditional delivery, an unauthorized signature on a
security certificate, or an incorrectly completed security certificate
259. U.C.C. § 9-307(f)-(g) provide that upon a change in the securities
intermediary's jurisdiction, the secured party has up to four months in which to
take any necessary action without becoming unperfected.
260. See U.C.C. § 8-110(a)(4)-(5).
261. See id. § 9-305(a)(2), (c).
262. See id. § 8-202(c).
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cannot be asserted against a purchaser for value without notice of the
particular defect.263 These rules differ in two important ways from
the protected purchaser rule. First, the purchaser is not required to
have control. Second, only notice of the particular defect, as
contrasted with notice of any adverse claim, subjects the person to
the issuer's defense based on that defect.264 These protections are
extended to entitlement holders in the indirect holding system by
subsection 8-202(f).
An important difference between protection against issuer
restrictions and defenses and protection against claims to a
certificated security265 is manifested in the different standards used
when imputing notice based upon acquiring the security beyond the
maturity date or the date fixed for redemption or exchange. Notice
of an issuer's defects or defenses is imputed to purchasers after one-
year or two-year time periods.266 However, when imputing notice of
a claim to the security, the time periods are reduced to one year and
six months.267 The difference evidences a clear preference to give
issuers less protection than adverse claimants.
V. INDIRECT HOLDING-THIRD PERSONS
The indirect holding system differs significantly from the direct
holding system when viewed from the perspective of the rights of
and the rights against third persons. The differences between the
rules in the two systems, the justifications for those differences, and
the circumstances under which each rule applies need to be examined
to understand the protections available to-and the risks and
uncertainties created for-those who hold securities indirectly. The
indirect holding rules are more complex because they involve both
an underlying financial asset and a security entitlement to that asset.
Indirect holding rules are further complicated because both the
263. See id. §§ 8-202(b), (d), 8-205, 8-206(a)(2). Subsection 8-202(d) refers
to "security" then to "certificated security," making it unclear whether
uncertificated securities are covered.
264. Compare U.C.C. §§ 8-202(b)(1), (d), 8-205(a)(2) and 8-206 with § 8-
303(a)(2)-(3).
265. For issuers, the rules only need to apply to certificated securities,
because for uncertificated securities, the issuer is expected to raise the issue
when it receives a request to register a transfer. See id. § 8-203 cmt. 1.
266. See id. § 8-203.
267. See id. § 8-105.
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entitlement holder and its securities intermediary are involved with
the security entitlement and the underlying financial asset.
A. Protecting Purchasers in Indirect Holding
Because the vast majority of trades occur in the indirect holding
system,2 68 attempts to control systemic risk in securities markets by
facilitating the finality of settlements through the operation of rules
protecting purchasers focus on the indirect holding system. Rules
protecting purchasers in the indirect holding system have changed
significantly under Article 8.269 Under prior law a purchaser of the
security prevailed over an adverse claimant by qualifying as a bona
fide purchaser for value. ° Only two limited ways of holding the
security indirectly qualified the purchaser to assert bona fide
purchaser status.
271
Conceptually, the direct holding system's protected purchaser
rule2 72 could have been applied with appropriate modifications in the
indirect holding system to each situation needing a rule to protect
purchasers. The drafters of Article 8, however, opted for a different
approach. In addition to the important informal structural protection
inherent in the indirect holding system, they created three unique
rules to protect purchasers. One rule protects the entitlement holder
from adverse claims asserted against it to the financial asset.2 73 The
second rule similarly protects those purchasing a security entitlement
from an entitlement holder against adverse claims to either the
financial asset or the security entitlement.274 The third rule is very
different. It protects a purchaser of the financial asset from adverse
claims asserted by an entitlement holder.275  Each rule differs in
268. See supra notes 103-105 and accompanying text.
269. See Rogers, supra note 4, at 1466-69.
270. See U.C.C. § 8-302 (1977).
271. U.C.C. § 8-313(2) (1977) limited the circumstances in which a
purchaser of a security held by a financial intermediary could be a bona fide
purchaser to having a specific certificated security in the hands of the financial
intermediary or being designated on the books of a clearing corporation.
Courts misread the statute to broaden this protection. See Schroeder, supra
note 12, at 336-49.
272. See U.C.C. § 8-303.
273. See id. § 8-502.
274. See id. § 8-510(a).
275. See id. § 8-503(d)-(e); see also supra notes 154-160 and accompanying
text.
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fundamental ways from the protected purchaser rule. The three rules
do not cover all possible purchaser/adverse-claimant disputes over
financial assets in the indirect holding system. The other disputes
were left to rules outside the indirect holding system or do not have
specific purchaser protections.
1. Structural protection-tracing
An adverse claimant to a financial asset in the indirect holding
system faces practical problems before it can assert its claim against
either the securities intermediary or the entitlement holder. It must
first trace the financial asset to the securities intermediary. It is not
clear whether tracing the financial asset to the securities intermediary
would involve tracing the actual trade-finding the buyer(s) whose
order(s) was matched with the seller-or tracing the movement of
the financial asset in the settlement of the trade. The drafters imply,
without providing any justification, that tracing should be through
the settlement process. 276 Those two approaches lead to different
analyses and results. Tracing the financial asset through the trade by
matching buy and sell orders would be possible, depending on record
availability, in an over-the-counter market. However, this would be
very difficult in an auction type market like the New York Stock Ex-
change. Tracing a financial asset through the settlement process is
extremely difficult due to the netting of trades which occurs during
the clearing process in securities markets. 77 Each intermediary will
first net sales and purchases made by it that day. Each clearing
corporation involved in the settlement will net trades among its
participants on that day. To trace a financial asset through those
netting processes is extremely difficult, if not impossible.
276. The official comments contain an example which discounts the
possibility of relying on the matching of a particular sell order with a particular
buy order (which would also be a significant challenge to trace) in favor of
describing the challenges of tracing through the settlement process. See
U.C.C. § 8-502 cmt. 2. Preferring the settlement process over the trade itself
seems very closely tied to the historical physical reification concept of
certificated securities, but is much less justifiable for uncertificated securities
and completely incomprehensible for security entitlements.
277. The drafters describe this tracing problem in some detail, including an
example. See id. § 8-502 cmt. 2; see also Schroeder, supra note 12, at 332-34
(describing the difficulty of tracing when trades are netted against each other).
278. The drafters claim such a task would "ordinarily be impossible."
U.C.C. § 8-502 cmt. 2.
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If the adverse claimant is somehow successful in tracing the
financial asset to the securities intermediary, 279 it must also learn of
the entitlement holder's interest before asserting its claim against the
entitlement holder. Note that even if the financial asset can be
successfully traced to the securities intermediary, a claim against the
securities intermediary is as likely as a claim against either one of its
entitlement holders or a purchaser from an entitlement holder.
280
The purchaser protection provided by the tracing problem is not
dependent on an Article 8 rule; it is inherent in the indirect holding
system.281 In the final analysis, this structural protection is the most
important purchaser protection in the indirect holding system
because it will be the protection most frequently relied upon. As the
subsequent discussion demonstrates, the Article 8 rules protecting
purchasers in the indirect holding system have a much more limited
application.
2. Protection of entitlement holders
On a superficial level, the section 8-502 rule protecting
purchasers in the indirect holding system is most closely analogous
to the direct holding system's protected purchaser rule.28 2  It
precludes the assertion of an adverse claim to the underlying
financial asset against an entitlement holder if the entitlement holder
acquired the security entitlement for value and without notice of that
adverse claim.
283
279. For a firsthand description of the difficulty in tracing what at first blush
appeared to be a relatively easy tracing problem, see Schroeder, supra note 12,
at 491 n.458.
280. If the claimant successfully traces the financial asset, it would of course
make its claim against whichever party is not entitled to protection under the
relevant purchaser protection rule.
281. See U.C.C. § 8-502 cmt. 2.
282. The drafters assert in official comment 1 to § 8-502 that it plays a role
in the indirect holding system analogous to the protected purchaser rule in the
direct holding system.
283. U.C.C. § 8-502 provides as follows: "An action based on an adverse
claim to a financial asset, whether framed in conversion, replevin, constructive
trust, equitable lien, or other theory, may not be asserted against a person who
acquires a security entitlement under § 8-501 for value and without notice of
the adverse claim."
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a. comparison with protected purchaser rule
Two of the four differences between this rule and the protected
purchaser rule are inconsequential. First, the entitlement holder is
not required to have control. Requiring control would add nothing to
establishing that the entitlement holder deserves protection. While
an entitlement holder always has control of a security entitlement,
28 4
it cannot have control of the underlying financial asset. By the very
nature of indirect holding, the entitlement holder is only entitled to
exercise the rights constituting the financial asset.285 Second, the
rule does not protect the entitlement holder from adverse claims to
the security entitlement itself.286  That protection would be
meaningless because the entitlement holder would necessarily have
notice of these claims. They would either be claims against the
entitlement holder or claims based on actions taken by the
entitlement holder.
The third difference between this rule and the protected
purchaser rule is the structure of section 8-502 as a preclusion of the
adverse claimant's action rather than as a set of requirements the
entitlement holder inust meet in order to defeat the adverse claim.
Purchaser rules historically are stated from the perspective of the
purchaser and provide the qualifications for the purchaser to take free
of adverse claims. The section 8-502 rule, however, prohibits a legal
action "based upon an adverse claim" (regardless of the legal
theory)287 against the entitlement holder. The rule does not expressly
provide who wins if the action can be asserted.2 8 The different
formulation apparently shifts the burden of proof from the
entitlement holder, as part of its defense to the adverse claim, to the
adverse claimant as part of any action it pursues based upon its claim
to the financial asset. This result is not expressly stated in Article 8,
284. U.C.C. § 8-106(d) includes becoming an entitlement holder in the
definition of obtaining "control of a security entitlement."
285. U.C.C. § 8-501(a) defines "securities account" to require that the one
maintaining the account agree "to treat the person for whom [it] is maintained
as entitled to exercise the rights that comprise the financial asset."
286. See U.C.C. § 8-502.
287. Section 8-502 specifies that the claim can be "framed in conversion,
replevin, constructive trust, equitable lien, or other theory." The purpose of
enumerating these potential types of actions seems to be to ensure that any
equity-based claims are included. See id. § 8-502 cmt. 2.
288. See id. § 8-502.
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but the description of a similar rule in the official comments 289
presumes the burden has shifted. A shift in burden would be the
natural consequence of the action preclusion formulation. Shifting
the burden increases the protection of the entitlement holder.
The fourth difference is that an entitlement holder's protection
under section 8-502 is defeated by notice of only the specific adverse
claim upon which the action is based while a protected purchaser
cannot have notice of any adverse claim. In the extreme, an
entitlement holder could acquire a security entitlement with
knowledge that the financial asset was subject to numerous
significant claims and still be protected from a particular claim,
because it did not happen to have notice of that claim. This
limitation provides significantly greater protection to the entitlement
holder. The appropriateness of these last two differences is analyzed
in a later section.
2 9°
b. who receives this protection
The superficiality in considering this rule the analog to the direct
holding system's protected purchaser rule becomes apparent by
ascertaining the circumstances under which section 8-502 will come
into play. These circumstances are quite limited. The drafters
suggest the rule plays some role in a dispute between two entitlement
holders using the same securities intermediary. 291  That is,
Entitlement Holder A could rely on the rule to defeat a claim of
preemptive rights to the financial asset asserted against it by
Entitlement Holder B. By virtue of having the same securities
intermediary, Entitlement Holder B necessarily has notice of adverse
claims of other entitlement holders, including Entitlement Holder
289. The drafters in describing the effect of using a no-collusion standard in
§ 8-503(e) state that the claimant "must show" wrongdoing by the purchaser
rather than the purchaser having "any burden of showing" lack of awareness of
the wrongful conduct. Id. § 8-503 cmt. 3. In official comment 2 to § 8-503,
the drafters state that the rules "operate in a slightly different fashion than
traditional adverse claim cut-off rules." However, the only explanation of the
different operation is that they "specify the circumstances in which this
particular form of claim can be asserted." Id. § 8-503 cmt. 2. Professors
Facciolo and Schroeder come to the same conclusion about burden of proof.
See Facciolo, supra note 7, at 641-42, 654; Schroeder, supra note 12, at 474.
290. See infra notes 513-524 and 530-535 and accompanying text.
291. See U.C.C. § 8-502 cmt 4.
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A.292 Even if a purchaser rule needs to be invoked in such a dispute,
why would it be section 8-502 when the drafters say that subsection
8-503(e) trumps section 8-502 when the claimant is an entitlement
holder?293
As a result of the practical protection of the tracing problems,
the most likely beneficiaries of the rule are secured parties to whom
the financial asset may be more readily traced.294 This conclusion is
consistent with the six unusual, perhaps even contrived, examples the
drafters give to illustrate how the section will operate. Three of the
examples in official comment 3 to section 8-502 require the reader to
"assume-implausibly--" that tracing is successful.295 Of the other
three examples, two involve secured parties as entitlement holders-
they successfully rely on the rule.296 In the remaining example, the
entitlement holder is the wrongdoer and thus cannot rely on the
rule.297  The drafters' examples illustrate how difficult it is to
describe a claim to the financial asset that would be asserted against
an entitlement holder who is not a secured party.
c. additional protection for entitlement holders
Section 8-502 protects an entitlement holder indirectly. If the
adverse claim to the financial asset is asserted against the securities
intermediary, rather than the entitlement holder, and if the securities
intermediary holds the financial asset indirectly (which will often be
292. The result is correct: subsection 8-503(b) gives each entitlement holder
a pro rata share, but it is not clear that a purchaser rule has a role to play.
293. See U.C.C. § 8-503 cmt 2. Note that § 8-503(e) protects purchasers of
"an interest" in a financial asset and, limited though it may be, a security
entitlement is an "interest in" the underlying financial asset.
294. The protection afforded by the difficulty of tracing is articulated in the
text accompanying notes 276-281.
295. U.C.C. § 8-502, comment 3, examples 3, 4, and 6 involve implausible
tracing scenarios and the entitlement holders win for lack of notice. In
addition, the sixth example involves a secured party repledging the financial
asset, which the drafters point out is not wrongful under § 9-207. Therefore,
the original debtor does not even have an "adverse claim" against its secured
party's secured party. See U.C.C. § 8-102(a)(1).
296. U.C.C. § 8-502, comment 3, examples 2 and 5 involve, respectively, a
secured party entitlement holder receiving stolen bearer bonds, and a secured
party who is an entitlement holder receiving a wrongfully pledged financial
asset.
297. U.C.C. § 8-502, comment 3, example 1 involves an entitlement holder
stealing a bearer bond and placing it in a securities account.
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the case), then the adverse claim is simply a claim against an
entitlement holder of an upstream security entitlement and is
governed by the section 8-502 rule.
Another entitlement holder protection arises because a securities
intermediary establishing a security entitlement in a financial asset is
deemed to be a purchaser for value of that financial asset.2 98 If an
adverse claim to that financial asset is asserted against the securities
intermediary and it fails to qualify for purchaser protection, the
securities intermediary is obligated to the entitlement holder to
replace the financial asset.2 99 That protection is limited only by the
solvency of the securities intermediary, a risk inherent in indirect
holding.
300
3. Purchasers of a security entitlement
The second rule protecting purchasers in the indirect holding
system, subsection 8-510(a), protects one purchasing a security
entitlement from an entitlement holder from an action based upon an
adverse claim to either the security entitlement or the financial asset
if the purchaser gave value, had no notice of the adverse claim, and
obtained control.30 1 The rule virtually duplicates the section 8-502
rule protecting entitlement holders. The difference is that this rule
requires the purchaser to obtain control and it covers adverse claims
to both the financial asset and to the security entitlement.30 2 Neither
of these features was necessary for the section 8-502 rule, thereby
justifying a separate rule. Obtaining control of a security entitlement
simply requires that the purchaser either become the entitlement
holder or obtain the securities intermediary's agreement to honor the
298. See U.C.C. § 8-116.
299. U.C.C. § 8-504(a) obligates the securities intermediary to maintain a
sufficient quantity of the financial asset to satisfy the claims of all entitlement
holders.
300. See U.C.C. § 8-503 cmt. 1.
301. U.C.C. § 8-510(a) provides:
[A]n action based on an adverse claim to a financial asset or security
entitlement, whether framed in conversion, replevin, constructive
trust, equitable lien, or other theory, may not be asserted against a
person who purchases a security entitlement, or an interest therein,
from an entitlement holder if the purchaser gives value, does not have
notice of the adverse claim, and obtains control.
302. See U.C.C. § 8-510(a).
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purchaser's entitlement orders without further approval from the
entitlement holder.
30 3
a. comparison with protected purchaser rule
This rule contains the same substantive differences from the
protected purchaser rule as the section 8-502 rule.30 4 It shifts the
burden of proof to the claimant and fails to expressly provide who
prevails when the claim is asserted. Furthermore, it provides that the
notice to the purchaser permitting the adverse claimant's action to go
forward is notice of the specific adverse claim rather than notice of
any adverse claim. 30 5 The appropriateness of these changes is
analyzed in a subsequent section.
306
b. who receives this protection
Subsection 8-510(a) protects a narrow range of possible
purchasers. Those purchasing a security entitlement from an
entitlement holder will be primarily of three types: a secured
creditor obtaining a security interest in the security entitlement, a
purchaser under a repurchase agreement ("repo purchaser") covering
the security entitlement,30 7 or a bulk purchaser of the assets of an
entitlement holder. Beyond these three situations, there is little need
or incentive to transfer a security entitlement. Settling a securities
trade in the indirect holding system involves terminating the seller's
security entitlement and creating a new one for the buyer.3 8 It does
not involve the purchase of a security entitlement.309 Furthermore,
securities intermediaries would be necessary parties to transfers of
security entitlements and they are unlikely to create such a market.3 10
Thus, secured creditors and repo purchasers would be the primary
beneficiaries of this purchaser rule. This conclusion comports with
the drafter's description of the rule's purpose as protecting persons
303. See id. § 8-106(d).
304. See supra notes 287-290 and accompanying text.
305. See U.C.C. § 8-510(a).
306. See infra notes 513-524, 530-535 and accompanying text.
307. Repurchase agreements are described in the prefatory note. See
Prefatory Note, supra note 3, at Part III.C. 10.
308. See U.C.C. § 8-501 cmt. 5.
309. See id.
310. See id.
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who "take security interests in security entitlements" from the
entitlement holder.
311
c. protection against which claims
There are three types of claims to a security entitlement: First,
nonconsensual claims against the entitlement holder (or against one
obtaining rights from the entitlement holder) such as a lien creditor
or the trustee in bankruptcy. Second, consensual claims arising from
agreements with the entitlement holder (or with one obtaining rights
from the entitlement holder such as agreements to act as trustee,
nominee, agent, etc.). And third, consensual claims arising from
transfers from the entitlement holder (or from one obtaining rights
from the entitlement holder) such as purchasers (including secured
parties) of the security entitlement. This third group is the same
group that could benefit from the rule.
Adverse claims to the underlying financial asset could also be
barred by this rule. However, if the purchaser obtained control by
becoming the entitlement holder, it would be protected by section 8-
502 against adverse claims to the financial asset. Thus, this aspect of
the rule is primarily designed for those who obtain control by agree-
ment.312  The most common potential claimants, the securities
intermediary and other entitlement holders of that securities
intermediary, however, are not barred by the rule, because the
purchaser of the security entitlement necessarily has notice of their
claims.3 13 Any other adverse claimant to the financial asset has to
overcome the tracing problem. 314 Thus, the subsection 8-510(a) rule
protecting purchasers of security entitlements will likely play only a
small role in claims to the underlying financial asset.
4. Entitlement holders as adverse claimants
The third rule protecting purchasers in the indirect holding
system, subsection 8-503(e), protects purchasers from entitlement
311. Id. § 8-510 cmt. 2.
312. See id. § 8-510 cmt. 2; see also id. § 8-106(d)(2) (defining control by
agreement).
313. A security entitlement by nature is a pro rata claim with other
entitlement holders and the securities intermediary to the financial asset. See
supra note 147 and accompanying text.
314. See supra notes 276-281 and accompanying text.
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holders claiming the financial asset. This rule, however, is the
indirect holding system's linchpin rule protecting purchasers.
Because virtually all securities trading occurs in the indirect holding
system and because those holding securities in the indirect holding
system are entitlement holders, this rule applies to most adverse
claims that could arise. This fact explains why the drafters' most
involved discussion of policy concerning the indirect holding
system's rules protecting purchasers occurs in the official comments
to section 8-503. 315 The rule trumps any other rule protecting
purchasers that may otherwise apply316 because it is part of the
definition of the entitlement holder's rights.
317
a. two layers ofprotection against entitlement holders
Before the entitlement holder can assert a claim to the
underlying financial asset against a purchaser claiming the protection
of subsection 8-503(e), it must first satisfy four requirements
established in subsection 8-503(d): (1) there must be insolvency
proceedings against the securities intermediary; (2) the securities
intermediary must not have sufficient interests in the financial asset
to satisfy all of its entitlement holders; (3) the transfer to the
purchaser must have violated the securities intermediary's
obligations to maintain sufficient interests in the financial asset to
satisfy its entitlement holders; and (4) the trustee or liquidator of the
securities intermediary must have elected not to pursue the financial
asset. These requirements provide an additional layer of protection
for purchasers of financial assets (and conversely an additional level
of risk for entitlement holders).
After penetrating the first layer of protection, the .entitlement
holder (or more typically a trustee on behalf of entitlement holders)
has simply proceeded to the point where other adverse claimants
begin. Next, it must navigate the shoals of subsection 8-503(e)
which protects purchasers of financial assets who give value, obtain
control, and do not act in collusion with the securities intermediary in
violating its obligations under section 8-504 (the obligation to
maintain adequate interests in the financial asset).318
315. See U.C.C. § 8-503 cmt. 3.
316. See id. § 8-503 cmt. 2.
317. See supra notes 153-160 and accompanying text.
318. U.C.C. § 8-503(e) provides:
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The subsection 8-503(e) rule differs from the protected
purchaser rule in two important ways. The rule, like the others in the
indirect holding system, is a preclusion of an action rather than a
traditional purchaser rule, shifting the burden of proof to the
entitlement holder,319 and rather than focusing on the purchaser's
notice of adverse claims, the rule uses a no-collusion standard for the
purchaser.
The no-collusion requirement raises a question. When must the
"collusion" occur to defeat a purchaser's protection: in purchasing,
or in obtaining control?320 The section does not specify which time
is relevant. While a textual argument can be made for the time of the
purchase because the collusion relates to the securities intermediary
violating its rule to maintain an adequate interest in the financial
asset, 321 that argument overlooks the effect of section 8-511 if the
purchaser is a secured party. Under section 8-511 the purchaser
cannot prevail over an entitlement holder, unless it has obtained
control.3 2  Because Article 8 is silent, the most meaningful
interpretation would be to require that all elements be satisfied at one
time, thereby making any collusion effective to defeat protection as
An action based on the entitlement holder's property interest with
respect to a particular financial asset under subsection (a), whether
framed in conversion, replevin, constructive trust, equitable lien, or
other theory, may not be asserted against any purchaser of a financial
asset or interest therein who gives value, obtains control, and does not
act in collusion with the securities intermediary in violating the
securities intermediary's obligations under Section 8-504.
319. See supra notes 287-289 and accompanying text. Note that the fact that
§ 8-503(e) does not specify who prevails when the adverse claim may be
asserted is not important. The § 8-503(d) threshold states that the claim "may
be enforced" and that the claimant "may recover" the financial asset.
320. An example of a situation in which the times may be significantly
different is a secured party of the securities intermediary. The secured party
would become a purchaser when the security interest attached. Control may
not be obtained until a later time.
321. See U.C.C. § 8-503(d)(3); see also id. § 8-503 cmt. 3 (stating that the
policy behind the collusion test is to allow purchasers to acquire securities in
the indirect system without having to inquire as to the authority of the seller to
transfer such an interest).
322. U.C.C. § 8-511(a) gives the entitlement holder priority over the
securities intermediary's creditors. U.C.C. § 8-511(b) gives the securities
intermediary's secured creditor, if it has control, priority over the entitlement
holder.
INDIRECTLY HELD SECURITIES
long as it relates to either purchasing or obtaining control.323 If that
interpretation is not adopted, collusion in obtaining control should be
used in applying the rule because control is the critical concept to
qualify for protection. The advisability of adopting the no-collusion
standard is explored in a subsequent section.
324
b. which purchasers are protected
Determining which purchasers are the practical recipients of the
protections against claims by entitlement holders involves an
examination of the realities of securities markets. The tracing
problems in identifying the purchaser of financial assets in securities
market transactions protect most purchasers.325 However, financial
assets most likely can be traced to purchasers in unusual or
particularly large transactions (such as purchases directly from the
securities intermediary) which do not go through a clearing
corporation.326 Thus, the purchasers primarily benefiting from this
rule are purchasers who directly negotiated with the securities
intermediary, such as its secured parties or repo purchasers.
5. Purchasers of the financial asset
Subsections 8-503(d) and (e) protect purchasers of financial
assets from claims asserted by entitlement holders. Section 8-502
protects purchasers of a financial asset that is a security entitlement.
If the financial asset is a directly held security, purchasers are
protected by the protected purchaser rule. If the financial asset is a
negotiable instrument that is not a security under Article 8,327 then
the holder-in-due-course rule of Article 3 governs the claim.328 For
financial assets that do not fit any of the foregoing categories,
disputes between claimants and the purchaser are left to common law
purchaser rules.
323. This is consistent with the official comments' description of the no-
notice-of-adverse-claim standard for protected purchasers. See U.C.C. § 8-303
cmt. 2.
324. See infra notes 536-564 and accompanying text
325. See supra notes 276-281 and accompanying text
326. See id.
327. See supra notes 118-131 and accompanying text
328. See U.C.C. § 3-302.
April 2002]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LA WREVIEW [Vol. 35:661
Purchasers in the indirect holding system receive greater
protection than purchasers in the direct holding system who must
rely on the protected purchaser rule.329 Of particular interest is the
fact that the primary beneficiaries of these rules will be repo
purchasers and secured parties providing credit to the securities
industry.
330
B. Unique Priority Rules in Indirect Holding
In addition to the foregoing rules protecting purchasers from
adverse claims, there are three priority rules unique to the indirect
holding system. One creates priority for securities intermediaries.
The other two govern disputes which one would ordinarily expect to
be governed by rules protecting purchasers.
1. Priority for securities intermediaries
All but one of the priority rules between secured parties
contained in Articles 8 and 9 govern security interests in both
directly held securities and security entitlements. 33' The one
exception awards priority over any other secured party to a security
interest held by the debtor's securities intermediary in a security
entitlement or securities account.332  The rule does not explicitly
require that the security interest be perfected.333 However, a
securities intermediary "granted 334 a security interest in its
entitlement holder's security entitlement has control by definition
335
329. See id. § 8-303.
330. See supra notes 294, 311, 326 and accompanying text.
331. The rules in U.C.C. § 9-328 govern most security interests in
investment property. U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(49) defines investment property to
include a security, a securities account, and a security entitlement. Note that
financial assets are not covered unless they are securities or security
entitlements.
332. See U.C.C. § 9-328(3).
333. See id.
334. There are statutory security interests in an entitlement holder's assets in
favor of the securities intermediary. Since these are created by statute, rather
than "granted" to the securities intermediary, they would not technically
qualify as being in the control of the intermediary. The distinction, however,
does not appear to be based upon policy and the limitation to "granted"
security interests is probably an oversight.
335. The securities intermediary has control under § 8-106(e). Official
comment 6 to that section describes margin loans as the common transactions
covered by the rule.
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and is therefore always 6perfected. Issues raised by this rule are
discussed subsequently.
2. Priority between purchasers
Subsection 8-510(c) is a priority rule governing disputes
between two purchasers of a security entitlement who are not secured
parties governed by Article 9 priority rules.337 This rule essentially
duplicates the priority rule for disputes between secured parties
claiming security entitlements when at least one of them has control.
The first to obtain control prevails.
338
The use of a priority rule virtually identical to an Article 9
priority rule to govern disputes between purchasers raises an obvious
question. Who are the intended beneficiaries of the rule? Official
comment 4 to section 8-510 says the rule was designed primarily to
cover securities repurchase agreement transactions ("repo
transactions") 339 that are not covered by other rules. 340  The
336. See infra notes 584-605 and accompanying text.
337. U.C.C. § 8-510(c) (as amended by the conforming amendments to
revised Article 9) provides:
In a case not covered by the priority rules in Article 9, a purchaser for
value of a security entitlement, or an interest therein, who obtains
control has priority over a purchaser of a security entitlement, or an
interest therein, who does not obtain control. Except as otherwise
provided in subsection (d), purchasers who have control rank
according to priority in time of:
(1) the purchaser's becoming the person for whom the securities
account, in which the security entitlement is carried, is
maintained, if the purchaser obtained control under Section 8-
106(d)(1);
(2) the securities intermediary's agreement to comply with the
purchaser's entitlement orders with respect to security
entitlements carried or to be carried in the securities account in
which the security entitlement is carried, if the purchaser obtained
control under Section 8-106(d)(2); or
(3) if the purchaser obtained control through another person under
Section 8-106(d)(3), the time on which priority would be based
under this subsection if the other person were the secured party.
The exception in subsection (d) gives priority- to a securities intermediary over
other purchasers with control.
338. See U.C.C. § 9-328(1)-(3).
339. Repo transactions are financing devices in which one person sells a
security to another person and simultaneously agrees to buy back the same or a
similar security at a future date. The relative cost savings of these transactions
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subsection 8-510(c) rule ensures that the same priority rule applies to
repo transactions that are not disguised security interests governed by
Article 9.341 The problem is that for tax, accounting, and bankruptcy
reasons there is significant interest among repo transaction
participants that they not be characterized as security interests.
342
The drafters of Article 8 specifically avoided "characterizing [repo
purchasers'] interests as Article 9 security interests." 343 There is no
explanation for why the drafters and the securities industry wanted
the same priority rules to apply to these transactions if they are
treated as actual purchases rather than disguised secured
has made them popular alternative financing devices. See Facciolo, supra note
6, at 664-65.
340. See U.C.C. § 8-510 cmt. 4. (Curiously, the comment first describes
secured parties as the most "significant" category of purchasers that would be
covered by U.C.C. § 8-510(c), but for the exclusion of disputes governed by
Article 9).
341. A classic case of a disguised security interest is represented by a repo
transaction that involves a purchase of securities with an obligation to buy
back the same securities within a specified period of time for a fixed price. See
Prefatory Note, supra note 3, at Part III.C.10. Professor Schroeder provides a
careful analysis of whether repo purchases are disguised security interests. See
Jeanne L. Schroeder, Repo Madness: The Characterization of Repurchase
Agreements Under the Bankruptcy Code and the U.C.C., 46 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 999, 1004-25 (1996).
342. See Schroeder, supra note 341, at 1049. See generally William F.
Hagerty, IV, Lifting the Cloud of Uncertainty Over the Repo Market:
Characterization of Repos As Separate Purchases and Sales of Securities, 37
VAND. L. REV. 401 (1984) (proposing a new legal characterization of repos);
Deirdre Mullen, Bankruptcy-Protection of Repurchase Agreements in
Bankruptcy-Bevill, Bresler & Schulman Asset Management Corp. v. Spencer
Savings & Loan, 878 F.2d 742 (3d Cir. 1989), 63 TEMP. L. REV. 621 (1990)
(analyzing the applicability of the 1984 repo amendments in cases where there
are not enough securities to satisfy the competing claims of parties investing in
similar repurchase agreements); Elizabeth M. Osenton, Comment, The Need
for a Uniform Classification of Repurchase Agreements: Reconciling Investor
Protection with Economic Reality, 36 AM. U. L. REv. 669 (1987) (evaluating
the secured loan versus sale and purchase classification of repurchase
agreements); Howard R. Schatz, Note, The Characterization of Repurchase
Agreements in the Context of the Federal Securities Laws, 61 ST. JOHN'S L.
REV. 290 (1987) (considering whether repos are securities within the meaning
of securities laws).
343. U.C.C. § 8-510 cmt. 4. While characterization one way or the other
may have been beyond the jurisdiction of the Article 8 drafting committee, it
certainly was within the scope of the revised Article 9 drafting committee.
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transactions. 344  The rule does strengthen the argument that a
disguised security interest is not involved. If the goal was merely
ensuring identical treatment of all repo transactions for questions of
priority, subsection 8-510(c) is an incomplete remedy for the
problem because it only covers indirectly held financial assets; repo
transactions are not so limited.345 The rule raises a number of
questions that are discussed subsequently.
346
3. Entitlement holder-secured party priority
Section 8-511 determines priority between an entitlement holder
and secured parties of its securities intermediary. These priority
rules involve a complex interaction with subsection 8-503(a), which
provides that the securities intermediary does not have a property
interest in the financial asset that can be acquired by one of its
creditors "except as otherwise provided in Section 8-51 1.'
347
Section 8-511 does not delineate which creditors have interests,
rather it provides rules governing three different priority contests
between entitlement holders and secured parties of the securities
intermediary. 348 The apparent purpose of the combination of rules is
to defeat the claims of lien creditors and recognize only certain
secured creditors of a securities intermediary when it does not have
sufficient interests in the financial asset.
349
The first of the three rules gives priority to entitlement holders if
the secured party does not have control. 5 ° Under the second rule,
entitlement holders lose if the securities intermediary's secured party
has control.351  Because having control of investment property
344. See Prefatory Note, supra note 3, at Part III.C.10.
345. "Delivered-out repos" involve direct holding because they include
"handing over" the securities to the repo purchaser. See id. Subsection 8-
510(c), of course, only applies in the indirect holding system. Purchasers
claiming directly held securities are governed by U.C.C. § 9-331 rather than
U.C.C. § 9-328. Section 9-331 applies the protected purchaser rule, a rule
more closely analogous to U.C.C. § 8-510(a) than U.C.C. § 8-510(c). Of
course in the direct holding system, the protected purchaser rule would apply
in a dispute between two secured parties if one of them can qualify for it.
346. See infra notes 611-616 and accompanying text.
347. U.C.C. § 8-503(a).
348. See id. § 8-511 cmt. 1.
349. See id.
350. See id. § 8-511(a).
351. See id. § 8-511(b). This subsection was not adopted by the State of
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generally provides the greatest available rights, it is inherent in the
indirect holding system for a secured party with control to be
awarded priority over the entitlement holder whose interest cannot,
by definition, include control of the financial asset.
Under the third rule, entitlement holders lose to secured
creditors of a clearing corporation, even if they do not have
control.352 The drafters apparently justify this rule by the difficulties
of obtaining control in a timely manner (a clearing corporation often
holds directly).353 The primary, if not the only, entitlement holders
who have security entitlements with clearing corporations are
securities intermediaries. Clearing corporations have a settlement
function in connection with those intermediaries and are thus
involved in extending credit and need a ready credit source of their
own.354 This rule facilitates readily available security for that credit,
but with the result that securities intermediaries are always at risk
that their clearing corporation has encumbered its financial assets to
a secured creditor. Priority for secured creditors of a clearing
corporation over entitlement holders is less problematic than it would
be for secured creditors of other securities intermediaries 355 because
clearing corporations are focused on the clearing function and are, at
least currently, highly regulated by their members and the SEC.
3 56
Section 8-511 creates clear incentives. All secured creditors of
securities intermediaries (other than clearing corporations) should
obtain control.357  Otherwise, they lose to the intermediary's
entitlement holders.358  Entitlement holders are obviously at
significant risk under these rules because they have no practical way
to limit a securities intermediary from creating a security interest
perfected by control in the fungible bulk of financial assets to which
Connecticut. See STATE U.C.C. VARIATIONS, U.C.C. REP. SERV. 4 (West
Supp. 2001).
352. See U.C.C. § 8-511(c).
353. See id. § 9-309 cmt. 6; HAWKLAND & ROGERS, supra note 138, at 718-
19.
354. See HAWKLAND & ROGERS, supra note 138, at 718-19.
355. See infra notes 635-640 and accompanying text.
356. See Schroeder, supra note 12, at 455.
357. See Howard M. Darmstadter, Revised Article 8 and the Agreement to
Pledge, 28 U.C.C. L.J. 202, 211-12 (1995) (explaining that historic lending
practices in the securities industry have not involved secured parties obtaining
control, so this incentive is likely to restructure practices).
358. See U.C.C. § 8-511(a).
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their security entitlement relates.359 The section 8-511 rules raise a
number of issues that are discussed subsequently.36 °
The priority rules unique to the indirect holding system are part
of a clear pattern that emerges from Article 8. Secured creditors to
the securities industry are provided great protection in the indirect
holding system.
C. Purchaser-Priority Rule Interaction
Understanding the rights of third persons in the indirect holding
system requires exploration of the interaction between its priority
rules and its rules protecting purchasers. While the two types of
rules are closely related, they are formulated and operate in different
ways. Both types of rules resolve disputes to property between
competing parties. However, rules protecting purchasers generally
permit the qualifying purchaser to defeat competing claims entirely
(they are sometimes referred to as cut-off rules).36' Priority rules, by
contrast, generally resolve disputes between secured parties or others
with liens or lesser interests in the property. Under a priority rule,
the one with priority has its claim satisfied first, with anything left
available for the competing party.
These distinctions, however, do not require the application of a
rule protecting purchasers when one is claiming complete ownership
of the property or of a priority rule when the claim is of a lesser
interest. Secured parties claiming less than a full ownership interest
can and do qualify for the benefit of purchaser rules.362 If value is
left in the property after the secured party's claim is satisfied, a party
defeated by the secured party under the purchaser rule may again
pursue his/her claim against that value, like it could under a priority
rule. A party whose claim is given priority over a competing claim
under a priority rule may consume the property entirely in attempting
to satisfy his/her claim, thus leaving nothing for any party with a
359. See infra notes 505-512 and accompanying text (discussing questions
raised by a securities intermediary's ability to encumber underlying financial
assets).
360. See infra notes 617-649 and accompanying text.
361. See U.C.C. §§ 8-303(b), 8-502, 8-503(e), 8-510(a).
362. The terms purchase and purchaser are defined in the U.C.C. to include
secured parties and others obtaining consensual interests in personal property.
See U.C.C. § 1-201(32), (33).
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lower priority-the same result as obtained under a rule protecting
purchasers.
What happens if both types of rules, by their terms, could apply
to the same dispute? Several of these situations exist in Article 8 and
the Code resolves most, but not all of them. One of those resolutions
is counter-intuitive. The unresolved conflicts create significant
potential for confusion.
1. Purchaser rules generally prevail
Subsection 9-331(b) of revised Article 9 provides that the
priority rules in Article 9 do not limit the rights of a person protected
against the assertion of a claim under Article 8. Each of Article 8's
rules protecting purchasers in the indirect holding system is
structured as a limitation on the assertion of claims.3 63 This general
resolution in favor of rules protecting purchasers, however, does not
apply to all conflicts. First, subsection 8-510(a), by its terms is
subordinate to Article 9 priority rules.3 64 Second, the general rule
from revised Article 9 has no effect when the conflicting rules are
both contained in Article 8.
2. Section 8-510's priority rule prevails
As a result of revised Article 9's conforming amendments to
Article 8, the subsection 8-510(a) purchaser rule (protecting
purchasers of a security entitlement) now applies only if the
subsection 8-510(c) priority rule365 does not. There was no
363. Official comment 4 to U.C.C. § 9-331 specifically lists §§ 8-502, 8-
503(e), 8-510, and 8-511 as the provisions in Article 8 protected by this rule.
364. Under Article 8 and its conforming amendments to Article 9, the
question of whether the U.C.C. § 8-510(a) claim preclusion rule or Article 9
priority rules were to be applied was present, but not expressly resolved.
Although U.C.C. § 9-309 expressly gave the protected purchaser rule of
U.C.C. § 8-303 precedence over Article 9 priority rules, there was no similar
provision giving precedence to § 8-510(a). Thus, a second secured party who
took control without notice of the claim of a first secured party with control
could have claimed purchaser protection under U.C.C. § 8-510(a). However,
U.C.C. § 9-115(5) expressly provided that priority between conflicting security
interests in investment property was governed by its rules. Thus, the first
secured party would resist the second secured party's application of the U.C.C.
§ 8-510(a) rule and seek to rely on U.C.C. § 9-115(5). Subsection 9-115(5)(f)
bolstered that argument by providing that U.C.C. § 9-312(5)-(7) would apply
to all cases not covered by U.C.C. § 9-115(5)(a)-(e).
365. Section 8-510 was silent on whether subsection (a) or (c) should be
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explanation given for this change. Making this rule, protecting
purchasers subject to the priority rules in subsection 8-510(c) and
Article 9, is inconsistent with all other rules protecting purchasers
that could conflict with Article 9 priority rules. The appropriateness
of this choice is analyzed subsequently.
3. Entitlement holders vs. secured parties
If an entitlement holder seeks to assert its claim to the
underlying financial asset against a secured creditor of the financial
intermediary, Article 8 provides both a rule protecting purchasers in
subsection 8-503(e) (augmented by the subsection 8-503(d)
prerequisites) and a set of priority rules in section 8-511. No
provision in Article 8 coordinates the application of these different
rules.367 It is not clear why the drafters used this involved approach
to resolve these disputes or why one of the two rules is a claim
preclusion rule and the other a priority rule. A close analysis of this
matrix of rules is undertaken in a subsequent section.
368
VI. TRADING, SETTLEMENT, AND CREDIT
The indirect holding system handles most trades occurring in the
securities markets.369 To properly evaluate Article 8 it is necessary
to understand the mechanisms used to effect these trades. Whether it
occurs on the floor of an exchange or in the over-the-counter market,
the legal effect of a securities trade is the creation of a buy-sell
contract,370  but not a contract for immediate performance.
Performance, delivery371 of the financial asset and payment of the
price, occurs at settlement. From the investor's perspective the trade
establishes the price and, for most practical purposes, who owns the
used, if both could apply, until it was changed in the conforming amendments
to Article 8 promulgated with revised Article 9.
366. See infra notes 611-616 and accompanying text.
367. The drafters imply in official comment 1 to U.C.C. § 8-511 that both
the claim preclusion rule and the priority rule are to be applied to the dispute.
As the subsequent analysis shows, that approach does not work.
368. See infra notes 617-649 and accompanying text.
369. See supra notes 103-105 and accompanying text.
370. See Rogers, supra note 4, at 1439-41.
371. Delivery is a term used very broadly in the securities industry and
includes making book entries as well as physical delivery of a certificate. See
U.C.C. § 8-301 cmt. 3. The delivery definitions of Article 8 track this usage.
See id. § 8-301.
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financial asset. 372  Price fluctuations are now the buyer's risk or
benefit. It is the settlement function that involves Article 8, the
indirect holding system, and securities intermediaries. The time
between trade and settlement is where the systemic risk occurs. The
steps that need to be taken to complete settlement are dependent on
how the seller holds the financial asset and how the buyer will hold
the financial asset. There may be more than one tier of intermediaries
involved on either side of the trade. There are two separate aspects of
these settlement procedures. First, the settlement between the
customers and their respective intermediaries, meaning the buyer
pays its intermediary and receives the financial asset from its
intermediary while the seller delivers the financial asset to its
intermediary and receives payment for the financial asset from its
intermediary. 373 Second, the -settlement involving delivery of the
financial asset and payment for it among the intermediaries involved
(this is where there may be a multitier aspect of the settlement).374
At the end of a trading day, brokers have transacted numerous
purchases and sales of various financial assets. Thus, part of the
settlement can be efficiently done by the broker, as securities
intermediary, netting the sales and purchases of each financial asset
it traded that day.375 Understanding the process is enhanced by
considering the simple case where the buyer and seller use the same
broker/securities intermediary, so transfer of the financial asset can
be effected by the intermediary simply debiting the seller's securities
account and crediting the buyer's securities account. Similarly,
adjustments for the price can be made to the respective entitlement
holder's account. In most cases, however, the netting will result in a
broker needing to deliver the financial asset against payment by
another intermediary or to pay for the financial asset against delivery
by another intermediary. That settlement function is done through a
clearing agent or a clearing corporation.376 Since the 1970s, much of
372. See Prefatory Note, supra note 3, at Part III.B.
373. See Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Property, Credit, and Regulation Meet
Information Technology: Clearance and Settlement in the Securities Market,
55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 131, 137-38 (1992).
374. See id. at 136-38.
375. See Prefatory Note, supra note 3, at Part I.C.; Mooney, supra note 18,
at 318-19; Schroeder, supra note 12, at 324.
376. See Mooney, supra note 18, at 316-24; Rogers supra note 4, at 1442.
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this is handled by the National Securities Clearing Corporation in
connection with the Depository Trust Company.377
The operation of clearing corporations is not regulated by
Article 8. Most clearing corporations are regulated by federal
securities law. Clearing corporations are also subject to rules they
adopt to govern rights and obligations among themselves and their
participants. Article 8 expressly recognizes clearing corporation
rules, even if they conflict with Article 8378 or affect a person who
does not consent to the rules. 379  Rules regarding finality and
reversibility of settlements are examples of clearing corporation
rules.380 Article 8's recognition of these rules is designed to provide
flexibility, especially regarding attempts to obtain certainty in
clearance and settlement of securities trades.
Prior to June 7, 1995, the norm in the United States for the trade
settlement gap was T+5. The settlement date occurred five business
days after the trade date.381 Beginning June 7, 1995, the industry
went to a T+3 system for most trades.382 This change outside Article
8 reduces systemic risk, by reducing the time trades are held open.
383
There is discussion of reducing the time period even further.384
Reduction of the time period makes direct holding, at least in the
current market, more difficult.
385
377. See Prefatory Note, supra note 3, at Part I.C.; Rogers, supra note 4, at
1442-44; Schroeder, supra note 12, at 324-25.
378. U.C.C. § 8-111.
379. See id. Affecting third parties is not grounds for defeating application
of the rule, but the rule cannot directly govern the rights and obligations of
third persons. See id. cmt. 1.
380. See id.
381. See Rogers, supra note 4, at 1440-41.
382. This change was effectuated by SEC Rule 15c6-1. See 17 C.F.R. §
240.15c6-1 (2000).
383. See Rogers, supra note 4, at 1438-41.
384. Same day settlement, T+O, has been suggested as an achievable ideal.
See Chairman Arthur Leavitt, Speeding Up Settlement: The Next Frontier,
Remarks at United States Securities and Exchange Commission Symposium on
Risk Reduction in Payments, Clearance and Settlement Systems (Jan. 26,
1996), 1996 WL 29441, at *3-*4.
385. See id. at *4-*5.
ApLFril 2002]
LOYOLA OF LOSANGELES LAWREVIEW [Vol. 35:661
A. The Credit Risk in Delayed Settlement
During the time period between the trade date and the settlement
date, credit is being extended. The securities have to be transferred
and the payments have to change hands. To protect against an
intervening bankruptcy of a member, clearing corporations often set
up guaranty funds to make the payments and fund them by assessing
members. 3 8 6 The assessments may be by pledge of securities under
the control of the clearing corporation. 3 8 7 It is also common for
upper-tier intermediaries to provide settlement credit by way of
taking a security interest in securities in the broker-dealer entitlement
holder's clearing account and then moving the securities to the
segregation account when paid.3 8 Even at the investor level, the
securities intermediary is extending credit during the trade settlement
gap.38 9 Securities intermediaries need a source of funds for credit
they have extended and some protection from entitlement holders
should the settlement not occur as contemplated.390
B. Ensuring Readily Available Credit
Article 9 provides some automatically created and perfected
security interests to facilitate the credit necessary in security trades.
1. Credit to entitlement holders
A securities intermediary extending credit in the trade-
settlement process is given a statutory security interest in a security
entitlement to a financial asset purchased through it to secure
payment of the price, if the purchaser is obligated to pay and the
financial asset is credited to the purchaser's account before the price
is paid.39' Although Article 9 does not precisely so provide, the
official comments state that these security interests are automatically
386. See Rogers, supra note 4, at 1478-79.
387. See id.
388. See id. at 1479-80; Schroeder, supra note 12, at 331 n.94.
389. See Rogers, supra note 4, at 1479-81.
390. See id. at 1480.
391. See U.C.C. § 9-206(a), (b).
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perfected.392  Subsection 9-328(3) awards these security interests
priority.
2. Credit to securities intermediaries
To encourage the flow of credit to securities intermediaries so
they can extend credit to their entitlement holders, subsection 9-
309(10) provides automatic perfection of security interests in
investment property granted by brokers or securities intermediaries.
In such financing transactions, competing secured parties who have
not taken control of the investment property, rank equally for priority
purposes.393  If one of the secured parties obtains control, it has
priority over the one without control.3 4 If both take control, priority
goes to the first to obtain control.395 If the investment property is a
security entitlement or the securities account and the secured party is
the securities intermediary with which the account is maintained, that
securities intermediary has priority.396
3. Credit for deliveries against payment
Subsection 9-206(c) gives a security interest in the delivered
financial asset to persons in the business of delivering certificated
securities (or other financial assets represented by a writing)
against payment3 97 to secure the payment if done pursuant to
agreement.398 These security interests are automatically perfected.399
392. Official comment 4 to U.C.C. § 9-206 declares that the perfection is
accomplished by control and refers to §§ 8-106 and 9-314. Security interests
in favor of securities intermediaries are perfected by control under §§ 8-106(e),
9-106(a), and 9-314(a). However, this one is created by statute and § 8-106(e)
only provides for control when the security interest is "granted by the
entitlement holder." This appears to be an oversight by the revised Article 9
drafting committee in drafting the conforming amendments to Article 8.
393. See U.C.C. § 9-328(6).
394. See id. § 9-328(1).
395. See id. § 9-328(2).
396. See id. § 9-328(3).
397. See id. § 9-206(d).
398. U.C.C. § 9-206(c)(1)(B) limits this security interest to deliveries made
pursuant to "an agreement between persons in the business of dealing with
such securities or financial assets." It only applies if the security or financial
asset is transferred in the ordinary course of business by delivery and any
necessary indorsement. See id. § 9-206(c)(1)(A). This is a parallel to the cash
sale doctrine found elsewhere in commercial law. See Schroeder, supra note
12, at 450 n.367.
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There is no separate priority rule for this security interest.
Because it is only created between persons in the business of making
deliveries, it arguably would be covered by the subsection 9-328(6)
pro rata priority rule in favor of brokers and securities intermediaries.
However, that priority rule expressly refers to being "created by"
those parties and this security interest is arguably created statutorily.
If that rule does not apply, priority goes to the first party to file or
perfect.400 Both rules, of course, are subject to purchaser rules and
the priority rule favoring a secured party with control, so the
protection is weaker.
C. Shifting the Risk
The inherent risk to entitlement holders in the indirect holding
system is the failure of the securities intermediary. Because of the
nature of indirect holding and the interaction of priority and
purchaser rules in the indirect holding system, priority to financial
assets is generally given to a securities intermediary's secured
lenders over its entitlement holders.401  This means that when a
securities intermediary fails, its secured creditors may recover at the
expense of entitlement holders. Protection for the entitlement
holders in these situations is left to the Bankruptcy Code, private
insurance,402 and the program of the federal government to protect
investors, the Security Investors Protection Act of 1970.
1. Securities Investor Protection Corporation
In December of 1970, as a result of the financial crisis in the
securities industry in 1969-70, which resulted in the failure or
instability of numerous brokerage firms,403 Congress passed the
Security Investor Protection Act of 1970.404 That act established the
Security Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC) for the purpose of
399. See U.C.C. § 9-309(9) (granting automatic perfection in financial assets
delivered against payment).
400. See id. § 9-322(a).
401. See supra note 330 and accompanying text.
402. While private insurance is quite common, it is less reliable as a means
of investor protection. It may lapse, or the insurer may limit its coverage. See
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SECURITIES INVESTOR PROTECTION: THE
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK HAS MINIMIZED SIPC's LOSSES 5 1-52 (1992).
403. See Handelman v. Weiss, 368 F. Supp. 258, 263 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
404. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa-78111 (2000).
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providing financial relief to customers who had securities or cash
with failing brokers or dealers.
405
SIPC is a nonprofit corporation operating under the laws of the
District of Columbia. 40 6 While it is declared not to be an agency or
establishment of the U.S. Government, 4 7 its seven member board of
directors is appointed by the government (one by the secretary of the
Treasury, one by the Federal Reserve Board, and the other five by
the president with the consent of the Senate), 408 membership is
mandatory for brokers or dealers required to register under
subsection 15(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,409 and it is
given limited rule-making authority.
410
When a financially troubled broker or dealer member is brought
to the attention of SIPC,411 it is empowered (if the member meets
certain requirements) 412 to petition for a receiver to be appointed and
have the member liquidated under the procedures of SIPC 41 3 and
Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code.414 The member could be
liquidated under either SIPA415  or the Bankruptcy Code.
Reorganization under the Bankruptcy Code is not an option.4 16 For
405. See Sec. Investor Prot. Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412,413 (1975).
406. See 15 U.S.C. § 78ccc(a) (2000).
407. See id.
408. See id. § 78ccc(c).
409. See id. § 78ecc(a)(2). There are some minor exceptions based on doing
business with foreign rather, than U.S. customers. In addition, others may
become members pursuant to rules promulgated by SIPC. See id. §
78ccc(a)(2)(C).
410. See id. § 78ccc(b)(4). It can define terms in the SIPA, and prescribe
rules for liquidating members, making direct payments and exercising other
rights given to it.
411. See id. § 78eee(a)(1). Only the Securities and Exchange Commission
or the self-regulatory organization of which the member is a part is empowered
to initiate this procedure. Only the SEC can force SIPC to act. See id. §
78ggg(b). Private rights of action have been foreclosed. See Barbour, 421
U.S. at 412.
412. See 15 U.S.C. § 78eee(a)(3), (b)(2) (2000).
413. See 17 C.F.R. pt. 300 (2000).
414. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78eee(b)(4), 78fff(b) (2000); In re Lloyd Sec., Inc., 75
F.3d 853, 857-58 (3d Cir. 1996).
415. See Michael E. Don & Josephine Wang, Stockbroker Liquidations
Under the Securities Investor Protection Act and Their Impact on Securities
Transfers, 12 CARDOZo L. REv. 509 (1990) (describing the mechanics of these
SIPA proceedings).
416. See 11 U.S.C. § 109(b), (d) (1994); Schroeder, supra note 12, at 461-64
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the ten years preceding its 1996 annual report SIPC had petitioned
for receivers for six brokers or dealers on average per year.417 It
commenced proceedings against ten members in 1997, six members
in 1998, and nine members in 1999.418 The largest number in any
one year since SIPC was formed was forty in 1972.419 There have
never been fewer than two in a year.420 There were 7,315 member
firms at the end of 1999.421
Once SIPC's petition against a member firm has been granted, it
has the responsibility of notifying the member's customers about the
proceeding.422 In addition, the SIPC is obligated as promptly as
possible after the petition is granted to deliver to each customer any
"customer name securities" held by the member (securities held
directly by the customer).423 If the customer owes the member
money, payment can be required before the delivery is made.
424
Customers must make a written statement of claim within six
months after receiving the notice from SIPC. 425 Promptly 426 after
receipt of claims (which are appropriately established),42 7 SIPC is to
(giving a brief overview of these options).
417. See SECURITIES INVESTOR PROTECTION CORPORATION, 1996 ANNuAL
REPORT 3 (1997).
418. See SECURITIES INVESTOR PROTECTION CORPORATION, 1999 ANNUAL
REPORT 3, 6-7 (2000).
419. Seeid. at6.
420. See id.
421. See id.
422. See 15 U.S.C. § 78fff-2(a) (2000).
423. See id. § 78fff(a)(1)(A). SIPA requires that "customer name securities"
be delivered. Customer name securities are defined as
securities which were held for the account of a customer on the filing
date by or on behalf of the debtor and which on the filing date were
registered in the name of the customer, or were in the process of being
so registered pursuant to instructions from the debtor, but does not
include securities registered in the name of the customer which, by
indorsement or otherwise, were in negotiable form.
Id. § 78111(3). These are securities directly held by the customer. See U.C.C. §
8-501 cmt. 4.
424. See 15 U.S.C. § 78fff-2(c)(2) (2000).
425. See id. If the customer is too closely associated with the member, a
formal proof of claim is required.
426. Promptness does not necessarily have the meaning nonlawyers would
ascribe. Only a few customers' net equity claims had been paid thirteen
months after customers were asked to submit claims in the case of In re Lloyd
Sec., Inc., 75 F.3d at 855.
427. See 15 U.S.C. § 78fff-2(b) (2000).
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pay the customer its "net equity." This is the amount the member
would have owed the customer for "customer property" if it
liquidated all the customer's holdings at the time SIPC filed for a
protective decree less any debt the customer owed to the member.
428
Customer property encompasses securities held indirectly.429 To the
extent it can practically do so (including purchasing them), SIPC is
to satisfy the claims for these indirectly owned securities with
delivery of such securities. 430 The funds are to be advanced by SIPC
for these purposes even before the assets of the member are fully
known.431 These customer protections have a $500,000 limit per
customer (which includes up to $100,000 for claims to cash in the
member's hands).432
SIPC uses, to the extent possible, assets of the member firm to
meet the obligations to customers.433 SIPC is empowered to use the
avoiding powers of a trustee in bankruptcy to recover customer
property that is recoverable by such means.434  While it has no
general power to recover from third persons responsible for the
member's losses,435 it is subrogated to the claims of customers it has
paid.436 Note that Article 8's rules will play a significant role in
428. See id. § 78fff(a)(1)(B). "Net equity" is defined as "customer property"
less debts to the member arising out of securities transactions. See id. §
78111(11). Customer property is defined as
cash and securities (except customer name securities delivered to the
customer) at any time received, acquired, or held by or for the account
of a debtor from or for the securities accounts of a customer, and the
proceeds of any such property transferred by the debtor, including
property unlawfully converted.
Id. § 78111(4).
429. See U.C.C. § 8-501 cmt. 4. But cf Facciolo, supra note 7, at 692-94
(arguing that the new structure of Article 8 weakens this characterization).
430. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78fff-l(b)(1), 78fff-2(b)(2), (d) (2000).
431. See id. § 78fff-2(b)(1).
432. See id. § 78fff-3(a). Such advances from SIPC are not made to
affiliates of the member or to banks, brokers or dealers (unless their claims are
established to be on behalf of customers otherwise entitled to protection).
433. See id. § 78fff-2(c)(1).
434. See id. §§ 78fff-l(a), 78fff-2(c)(3).
435. See Sec. Investors Prot. Corp. v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 49 F. Supp. 2d
644, 649-54 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
436. See 15 U.S.C. § 78fff-3(a) (2000); Appleton v. First Nat'l Bank of
Ohio, 62 F.3d 791, 799-800 (6th Cir. 1995); Redington v. Touche Ross & Co.,
592 F.2d 617, 624 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 442 U.S. 560
(1979); SEC v. Albert & Maguire Sec. Co., 560 F.2d 569, 574 (3d Cir. 1977).
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SIPC's obtaining of assets of the member firm. Article 8 contains
the property rules applied in bankruptcy proceedings. To the extent
secured creditors have been favored, the claims of customers will be
less successful and SIPC will recover fewer assets.
Additional funds to meet these obligations (including advances
while the trustee is collecting the firm's assets) come from the capital
SIPC maintains by assessing member firms.437  That capital, by
statute, is to be maintained at a level of $150,000,00043' but SIPC
has set and met a goal of $1 billion in its fund.439 Relying on that
capital spreads the customer losses of one member firm among the
other member firms. In the twenty-nine years of its operations, SIPC
has advanced a total of $380,763,000 (of this $146,478,000 was
recovered). 440 Its greatest one year net payout was $63,238,000 in
1981. 441
If its capital is inadequate, the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) can loan SIPC money obtained by the issuance
442
of up to one billion dollars worth of treasury notes. Repayment of
that loan would come from member assessments. However, it can be
accomplished by the SEC levying on each sale of securities on an
exchange with a value of $5,000 or more a charge of 1/50 of a
percent of the price of the securities.443 An SEC levy spreads the
loss of customers of a member firm to all participants in the market
except small trades. SIPC has also obtained from a consortium of
lenders credit facilities totaling one billion dollars.444
But cf Mishkin v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 744 F. Supp. 531, 555-58
(S.D.N.Y. 1990) (stating that SIPC becomes subrogated to claims of customers
against the estate).
437. See id. § 78ddd(a), (c).
438. See id. § 78ddd(d).
439. See SECURITIES INVESTOR PROTECTION CORPORATION, 1996 ANNUAL
REPORT 3 (1997); SECURITIES INVESTOR PROTECTION CORPORATION, 1999
ANNUAL REPORT 3 (2000).
440. See SECURITIES INVESTOR PROTECTION CORPORATION, 1999 ANNUAL
REPORT 17 (2000).
441. See id.
442. See 15 U.S.C. § 78ddd(g), (h) (2000).
443. See id. § 78ddd(g).
444. See SECURITIES INVESTOR PROTECTION CORPORATION, 1999 ANNUAL
REPORT 3 (2000).
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investors, it is inadequate for many retirement funds or institutional
or other large investors that are customers of brokers and dealers.
Fourth, the protection is limited to "securities." While securities are
very broadly defined in SIPA,455 Part 5 of Article 8 covers "financial
assets." "Financial asset" is a concept that includes other investment
media.
456
The most interesting and troubling question is: what if a
member's failure, or the failure of multiple members, results in
claims on SIPC in excess of its capital or the one billion dollar
federal loan? While one hopes never to learn the answer to that
question, there are important factors in the securities markets that
demand that we address it. First, the evidence shows that most
broker-dealer insolvencies are a result of fraud.457 This means that
300.101(a), 300.103, 300.105.
455. 15 U.S.C. § 78111(14) (2000) defines "security" as:
any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evidence of
indebtedness, any collateral trust certificate, preorganization certificate
or subscription, transferable share, voting trust certificate, certificate
of deposit, certificate of deposit for a security,... any investment
contract or certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing
agreement or in any oil, gas, or mineral royalty or lease (if such
investment contract or interest is the subject of a registration statement
with the Commission pursuant to the provisions of the Securities Act
of 1933),... any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege on any
security, or group or index of securities (including any interest therein
or based on the value thereof), or any put, call, straddle, option, or
privilege entered into on a national securities exchange relating to
foreign currency, any certificate of interest or participation in,
temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or
warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase or sell any of the
foregoing, and any other instrument commonly known as a security.
Except as specifically provided above, the term "security" does not
include any currency, or any commodity or related contract or futures
contract, or any warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase or sell any
of the foregoing.
456. Letters of credit and certificates of deposit purchased through a broker
dealer could qualify as financial assets under Article 8. See U.C.C. § 8-
102(a)(9)(iii). Cf SEC v. C.H. Wagner & Co., 373 F. Supp. 1214, 1216-20 (D.
Mass. 1974) (holding that investments in letters of credit and certificates of
deposit purchased through the broker-dealer were not securities includible in
net equity).
457. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SECURITIES INVESTOR
PROTECTION: THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK HAS MINIMIZED SIPC'S
LOSSES 5,29-31 (1992); Schroeder, supra note 12, at 300 n.16, 431.
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2. Gaps in SIPC protections
Several gaps exist in the protections provided by SIPC. First,
not all securities intermediaries are members of SIPC (most notably
banks). 44 5 Banks are also not covered by the Bankruptcy Code,44 6 so
that the rules governing distribution of assets would come from the
Article 8 priority rules and rules protecting purchasers. 44 7 Second,
not all entitlement holders are customers protected by SIPA:44 8 The
term customer does not include secured parties who are entitlement
holders. 449 A trustee is a single customer even if the trust has
multiple beneficiaries. 450  Repo purchasers are generally not
customers.451 Third, each customer is limited to $500,000 ($100,000
for cash delivered to the broker or dealer).452 Note that the dollar
limit is not to the size of the account, but to the shortfall coverage by
SIPA after distribution of assets.453 SIPA does not aggregate certain
customer accounts, thus giving some customers more protection than
the $500,000 limit.45 4  While this is certainly adequate for small
445. See Schroeder, supra note 12, at 464.
446. See 11 U.S.C. § 109(b) (1994).
447. See Schroeder, supra note 12, at 463-65.
448. Customer is defined as:
any person (including any person with whom the debtor deals as
principal or agent) who has a claim on account of securities received,
acquired, or held by the debtor in the ordinary course of its business as
a broker or dealer from or for the securities accounts of such person
for safekeeping, with a view to sale, to cover consummated sales,
pursuant to purchases, as collateral security, or for purposes of
effecting transfer.
15 U.S.C. § 78111(2) (1994).
449. See Don & Wang, supra note 415, at 537; Schroeder, supra note 12, at
467.
450. See Sec. Investor Prot. Corp. v. Morgan, Kennedy & Co., 533 F.2d
1314, 1318 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied sub nom Tr. of Reading Body Works,
Inc. v. See. Investor Prot. Corp., 426 U.S. 936 (1976).
451. The SIPC takes the position that they are not customers. See Don &
Wang, supra note 415, at 537-40. However, some courts have disagreed. See
Schroeder, supra note 341, at 1043-46.
452. "Cash" has been interpreted to include investments made by check. See
Appleton v. First Nat'l Bank of Ohio, 62 F.3d 791, 800-01 (6th Cir. 1995).
453. See Rogers, supra note 4, at 1538 n.161.
454. See 17 C.F.R. § 300.100 (1981). For example, an account held by an
individual, an account held by a corporation of which the individual was the
sole shareholder, and an account of an individual held jointly with a spouse
would be accounts held by three separate customers. See id. §§ 300.100(b),
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regulations cannot be completely effective in preventing the failures.
Second, new investment media are regularly developed and the risks
associated with these investments take time to fully assess. 45 8 If
member assessments are inadequate for the obligations to be covered
by SIPC capital, there is no guarantee that the SEC will authorize the
loan. Neither is there a guarantee that once the loan is authorized the
SEC will authorize the charge on large trades to fund repayment. In
short, there is no mechanism that avoids a financial crisis that could
result in a federal taxpayer funded bailout analogous to that
accomplished by the FSLIC in the savings and loan crisis in the late
1980s.
459
VII. ANALYSIS AND PROPOSED CHANGES
A. Revised Concept ofAdverse Claim
Article 8's narrower definition of an adverse claim, which
affects both the direct and indirect holding systems, raises several
concerns about whether it is appropriate.
1. Adverse claims limited to property interests
The drafters, in requiring adverse claims to be property interests,
expressed concern that the definition in the 1977 version could
include any wrongful action concerning a security, even "a simple
breach of contract."4 60 They specifically rejected two cases, Fallon
v. Wall Street Clearing Co.4 6 1 and Pentech Intl, Inc. v. Wall Street
Clearing Co.,4 6 2 to the extent the holdings in those cases were based
upon the view that a contract breach created an adverse claim. These
cases were not popular with the securities industry.463 Unfortumately,
the cases were decided without expressly deciding whether adverse
458. See, e.g., Schroeder, supra note 12, at 450-51 (discussing the recent
proliferation of derivatives and the financial problems that became associated
with them).
459. See id. at 349.
460. U.C.C. § 8-102 cmt. 1.
461. 586 N.Y.S.2d 953 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992).
462. 983 F.2d 441 (2d Cir. 1993).
463. One commentator describes Pentech Int'l as "the most extreme anti-
secured party case." Schroeder, supra note 12, at 347-48.
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claims based on equitable interests arising under contracts were, or
needed to be, property interests.
464
Both cases arose out of the same broker-dealer insolvency. The
clearinghouse lender for the securities broker-dealer had taken a
pledge of an underwriter's warrant which was subject to a two-year
transfer restriction (except for transfers to its officers) required by the
National Association of Securities Dealers.465 The clearinghouse had
actual knowledge that the broker had agreed in shareholder and
employment agreements that a certain percentage of the warrant
belonged to each shareholder or principal employee, but refused to
reduce to writing a promise to honor those commitments.4 6 6 The
shareholders and employees asserting adverse claims won. Neither
court concerned itself with whether the rights to the warrants were
property interests. The drafters, however, considered the interests
mere contract rights that should not have been recognized in an
action against the secured creditor.
467
There are no facts in the cases that lead one to believe that
justice was not served or that an undue burden was placed on the
clearinghouse secured party who had actual knowledge of the claims.
In fact, there were allegations that the clearinghouse knowingly
helped the broker-dealer violate Securities and Exchange
Commission rules in connection with the pledging of securities.
468
The rejection of these cases by the drafters appears to evidence too
great an influence by the securities industry in trying to ensure that
lenders always win.
Conceptually, only property interests can be adverse claims
because ultimately, the issue with adverse claims is whether the
claimant can enforce its claim against property in the hands of a
person with whom the claimant has had no dealings.469 Although the
464. See Pentech Int'l v. Wall St. Clearing Co., 983 F.2d 441, 445-46 (2d
Cir. 1993); Fallon v. Wall St. Clearing Co., 586 N.Y.S.2d 953, 956 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1992).
465. See Pentech Int'l, 983 F.2d at 442-44; Fallon, 586 N.Y.S.2d at 954-57.
466. See Pentech Int'l, 983 F.2d at 442-44; Fallon, 586 N.Y.S.2d at 956.
467. See U.C.C. § 8-102 cmt. 1.
468. See Fallon, 586 N.Y.S.2d at 955-56.
469. At least one court has held a contractual claim to a security was not an
adequate ownership interest to justify suit for conversion, wrongful transfer,
and tortious interference with contract against an issuer that redeemed the
stock with knowledge of the contractual claim. See Beck v. American
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question of when a contractual right to property arises to the level of
a property interest is an interesting legal question, it is not
necessarily a good basis for making a legal distinction. There are no
clear rules to resolve the question. Furthermore, it is not clear that
this new requirement will result in the development of such rules.
For example, if the owner of a security grants an option to a third
party to purchase the security, should the option holder be deemed to
have a property interest in the security or a mere contract right?
One of the few cases discussing whether an adverse claim had to
be a property interest rather than a breach of contract claim was
McMillan, Ltd. v. Warrior Drilling & Engineering CO. 4 70 This case
involved an option and the trial court resolved the issue contrary to
the resolution taken by the drafters of Article 8. In McMillan, a letter
was delivered to the purchaser of closely held stock before the
purchase.47 ' The letter spelled out the terms of an option which had
been given by one of the sellers to a lender.472 The trial court held
that the option did not need to be a property interest, but upheld the
lender's adverse claim under the option to purchase the stock.473
Again, nothing in the facts of that case suggests the outcome was
either unjust or unduly burdensome on securities transfers because
the purchaser had actual knowledge.474 If a property interest had
been required, would the court have been wrong in finding the option
to be a property interest?
The example of a breach of contract claim not rising to the level
of a property right given by the drafters in the official comments to
Article 8 is a breached contract to sell a security.475 The drafters,
however, qualify that example with the assertion that unusual
Sharecom, Inc., 514 N.W.2d 584 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994). Note, however, that
Article 8 standards for recovery of a wrongfully transferred security have
always been stricter, requiring the person to be entitled to a transfer as an
owner-a mere "adverse claim" would not be sufficient. See U.C.C. § 8-404;
U.C.C. § 8-315 (1977).
470. 512 So. 2d 14, 20 (Ala. 1986) (describing the trial court's holding).
471. See id. at 17-18.
472. See id. at 17-19.
473. See id. at 19-21.
474. The option holder, however, was later equitably estopped from
exercising the option because of the delay in notice to the purchaser. See
McMillan, Ltd. v. Warrior Drilling & Eng'g Co., Inc., 507 So. 2d 151 (Ala.
1992) (affirming the trial court's finding of equitable estoppel).
475. See U.C.C. § 8-102 cmt. 1.
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circumstances could permit it to rise to the level of a property interest
and recognize that equitable remedies may give rise to property
claims. The drafters' example distinguishes fraud permitting the
remedy of rescission of the transaction (a property interest) from a
simple breach of contract where the only recovery would be damages
for breach.476  If the question could be resolved simply by
determining what remedy would be available, the distinction might
be easier to make. But would we look at the remedy when the
financial assets are in the hands of the one making the contract
(specific performance) or in the hands of a third person (replevin,
constructive trust)?
Similarly, if an attempt to transfer an indorsed security
certificate fails for want of delivery, does the purported transferee
have a contract right or a property interest? The drafters seem to
support this as a property interest.477 In contrast, in the view of the
drafters and the securities industry, a securities lending transaction
(used to complete a short sale) does not involve a retained property
interest in the party lending the securities, despite the semantic
argument.
478
In fact, the security entitlement which the drafters of Article 9
explicitly refer to as a property interest in the underlying financial
asset can be conceived of as merely a set of contractual and statutory
rights against the securities intermediary. It is not clear what aspect
of the security entitlement, since it involves a pro rata claim to a
fungible bulk, raises it from the level of contractual right to property
interest. 479 This difficulty further illustrates the problems inherent in
expressly requiring adverse claims to be property interests.
Thus, the requirement that an adverse claim be a property
interest accomplishes little because courts may find a property
interest, or finesse the issue to achieve a just result. For example, the
In Re SRJ Enterprises, Inc.480 court finessed the issue in a case under
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code. The court found that a
476. See id.
477. See id. § 8-304 cmt. 3 (drawing an inference of a property interest from
the drafters' omission of references to a promise to transfer and application of
the law of contracts).
478. See Prefatory Note, supra note 3, at Part III.C. 11.
479. See supra notes 140-149 and accompanying text
480. 150 B.R. 933 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1993).
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prohibition on transfer of rights under a franchise agreement was
enforceable, thereby effectively precluding a grant of a security
interest in the franchise. 4 81 However, the court upheld as enforceable,
a security interest in the value of the franchise based upon the fact
that the franchisee had to terminate its franchise before a purchaser
of its assets could acquire a new franchise from the franchiser.
482
Because a security interest is an interest in the debtor's personal
property,483 the ultimate outcome on the facts of that case was the
same as if the court had held that the franchisee could transfer an
interest in the franchise contract. In effect, the franchisee had a
property interest in the franchise.
2. Adverse claims limited to violations
A different concern is raised by the requirement that an adverse
claimant must establish that its interest was violated by "hold[ing],
transfer[ring] or deal[ing] with the financial asset.
'A84 The "transfer"
alternative of this requirement seems perfectly logical. If it was not a
violation of a claimant's right to "transfer" a financial asset, why
should the claimant be able to assert an adverse claim against the
transferee? Law, however, is never so simple. If the transfer was
permitted only if made subject to the claimant's right, the claimant
certainly should be able to assert a claim against the transferee.
There is less certainty of the requirement's meaning or logic when
one considers the "holding" or "dealing with" the financial asset
alternatives of the requirement. Both those terms have uncertain
legal meanings. There is also no guidance on how to determine when
"holding" or "dealing with" violates the claimant's interest.
Arguably, security interests are not adverse claims because
subsection 9-401(b) permits the debtor to transfer or further
encumber the property despite a contractual prohibition, i.e. the
secured party's rights were not violated. This conclusion apparently
can be reversed by the terms of a security agreement, because other
provisions in the Uniform Commercial Code contemplate transfer or
retention of collateral violating security interests.485 Thus, there is
481. See id. at 937-41.
482. See id.
483. See U.C.C. § 1-201(37).
484. U.C.C. § 8-102(a)(1).
485. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 1-209(9), 9-320(a), 9-332, 9-615(g).
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arguably no notice of the adverse claim without notice of the terms
of the security agreement. What other types of property interests
may lose their status as adverse claims because holding, transferring,
and dealing with the financial asset is permitted?
3. Effect of the adverse claim limitation
The effects of changing the definition of adverse claim may be
counterproductive to the goals of Article 8. The best face that can be
put on the new definition is that it increases the negotiability of
financial assets by making it easier for purchasers to be protected,
because notice of claims that are not adverse claims will not preclude
protection. 486 The concept of adverse claim in Article 8, however, is
two-edged. While notice of an adverse claim precludes protection,
487
being protected means that one takes free of adverse claims.488 Thus,
a narrower definition of adverse claim may make protected purchaser
status less valuable if the protected purchaser takes free of fewer
claims. Conversely, a broader definition of adverse claim permits a
protected purchaser to take free of more claims.
An instructive contrast can be drawn with the description of
adverse claims in Article 3 which includes property or possessory
rights as adverse claims.489 That broader description explicitly
recognizes that property interests are not the only interests from
which holders in due course need protection. Conversely, having
notice of either property interests or possessory interests would
defeat holders in due course status.
490
It is certainly not clear that because the claim is not an adverse
claim, a purchaser of a financial asset would be subject to it. In fact,
the drafters of Article 8 would argue vehemently against such a
486. See id. §§ 8-303, 8-502, 8-510(a).
487. See id.
488. See id.
489. U.C.C. § 3-306 provides in pertinent part: "A person taking an
instrument, other than a person having rights of a holder in due course, is
subject to a claim of a property or possessory right in the instrument or its
proceeds, including a claim to rescind a negotiation and to recover the
instrument or its proceeds." The prior version of Article 3 simply referred to
"claims" with no limitation as to the character of the claim. See U.C.C. §§ 3-
305(1), 3-306(a) (1962). Thus, recent amendments to the U.C.C. have all
tended to limit the definition of claim.
490. See U.C.C. § 3-302(a)(2)(v).
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construction. There are, however, three significant arguments that
could subject a purchaser protected from adverse claims to such non-
adverse claims. First, if the claim is a property interest, but not an
adverse claim due to the "hold, transfer or deal with" violation
requirement, it should still be enforceable. A security interest is an
excellent example of such a claim.491 Second, unlike Article 3 which
specifically describes the claims and defenses to which one not
qualifying as a "holder in due course" is subject,492 Article 8 has no
such provision for those who are not "protected purchasers" or
purchasers against whom adverse claims may not be asserted. In
fact, the closest analog in the 1977 version, section 8-315,493 was
unceremoniously deleted with the cryptic explanation that its
function was "not entirely clear" so the issue was left to "other
law. 4 94  The question has thus arguably been left to the courts.
491. See Schroeder, supra note 12, at 442-43.
492. U.C.C. § 3-306 provides in pertinent part: "A person taking an
instrument, other than a person having rights of a holder in due course, is
subject to a claim of a property or possessory right in the instrument or its
proceeds, including a claim to rescind a negotiation and to recover the
instrument or its proceeds." Likewise, § 3-305(a) provides in pertinent part:
"Except as stated in subsection (b) [rights of a holder in due course], the right
to enforce the obligation of a party to pay an instrument is subject to the
following:
(1) [real defenses]...;
(2) [ordinary defenses]... ; and
(3) [claims in recoupment]...."
493. U.C.C. § 8-315 (1977) provided:
(1) Any person against whom the transfer of a security is wrongful for
any reason.., as against anyone except a bona fide purchaser, may:
(a) reclaim possession of the certificated security wrongfully
transferred;
(b) obtain possession of any new certificated security representing
all or part of the same rights;
(c) compel the origination of an instruction to transfer to him or a
person designated by him an uncertificated security constituting
all or part of the same rights; or
(d) have damages.
Note that this section gave rights to those with ownership interests, not all
"adverse claimants."
494. Prefatory Note, supra note 3, at Part IV.B.8. Interestingly, the drafters
of the 1977 version had no difficulty explaining its purpose. It gave owners of
securities "a remedy for wrongful transfer." U.C.C. § 8-315 cmt. 1 (1977).
The remedy, importantly, was against the purchaser, not the issuer or transfer
agent. See id.
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Third, in a situation where the court is inclined to protect the adverse
claimant, such an argument may be an appealing way to reach an
equitable result without directly conflicting with the language of
Article 8.
The drafters were properly concerned that the marketability of
securities should not be impeded by concerns with being subject to
claims to the securities. The appropriate protection, however, is in
the awareness provisions, not the definition of adverse claims. The
cases which impeded the market were overruled by revised notice
provisions.495 If there are legitimate concerns that some claims to
financial assets should not be enforceable against the financial asset,
the concerns should have been addressed directly, similarly to the
way they were addressed in Article 3.
The probable effect of the limited definition of adverse claim
will be an increase in unnecessary and unproductive litigation over
issues of little import. Perhaps the securities industry, when it had
the chance to shape the law, hoped to achieve an extra benefit. In
reality, it accomplished little if anything for holders of financial
assets, but instead created a number of legal issues that would have
been best left where they stood.
B. Right to Modify by Contract
In the indirect holding system, the rights and property interest of
an entitlement holder are completely focused on the relationship with
the securities intermediary. That contractual relationship involves a
number of duties of the securities intermediary and correlative rights497
of the entitlement holder created by Article 8. Most of those rights
are expressly subject to contractual variation.498  Because of the
nature of the contracting process in this context, the contractual
flexibility raises important concerns.
1. Contractual lowering of standards
Under our freedom of contract notions for property rights, the
ability to modify by contract is essential. However, the contracting
495. See infra notes 525-529 and accompanying text.
496. See supra note 492 and accompanying text.
497. See U.C.C. §§ 8-504(a)-(b), 8-505(a)-(b), 8-506(l)-(2), 8-507(a)-(b), 8-
508(1)-(2), 8-509.
498. See supra notes 193-196 and accompanying text.
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realities in this context require closer analysis. It is a foregone
conclusion that at least in the consumer context the agreements will
be prepared by the securities intermediary and will not be subject to
negotiation.499 Even in nonconsumer contexts, experience teaches us
that only the economically powerful entitlement holders will be able
to negotiate these agreements in meaningful ways. It will be
surprising (shocking is probably a more accurate term) if securities
intermediaries include higher standards for performance in the
contracts. In contrast, the likelihood that many agreements will set
forth lower standards is high.
This provision in Article 8 creates one of the more significant
risks to those holding securities indirectly. Subsection 8-509(b)
requires the securities intermediary to perform its duties in a
commercially reasonable manner. That requirement, however, is
subject to the agreement of the parties. This limitation is statutory,
not contractual, so it is valid despite the fact that duties of due care
cannot be disclaimed by "agreement" under subsection 1-102(3).500
Article 8's reporter, Professor Rogers, has attempted to justify
the rule,5 0 1 but none of his justifications go beyond merely
establishing the need for a right to modify Article 8 by contract. The
drafters attempt to justify this with an example of a securities
intermediary having custody of certain foreign financial assets which
create significant risks. The intermediary, therefore, contracts to
disclaim responsibility for custodial risk with these financial
assets.502 The problem with the justification is that if those facts
justify the statute, they also establish that it is a commercially
reasonable disclaimer.
Moreover, the drafters point out that compliance with the
contractual standards is still subject to the good faith requirements of
499. For consumers, these contracts are contracts of adhesion. The author's
personal experience when attempting to negotiate a provision in a brokerage
agreement is that he was told it was a "take it or leave it" provision. The
author then asked, "Does that mean you will refuse to open an account with me
unless I accept the provision as written?" The answer was "yes!" Perhaps
some brokers may have a different approach. If the consumer has a
particularly large account, negotiation may be possible.
500. See U.C.C. § 8-504 cmt. 4.
501. See Rogers, supra note 4, at 1503-11.
502. See id.
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section 1-203 and subsection 8-102(a)(10). 50 3 Thus, the securities
intermediary already has similar "uncertain" limitations on its
functioning under the contract. While there is certainly a difference
between evaluating whether a contractual duty is commercially
reasonable and whether the performance of that contractual duty was
done in good faith, the argument is still available that good faith was
not exercised in putting the provision in the contract.
50 4
The preference of agreement over commercial reasonableness in
Article 8 is simply backwards. Requiring standards set by agreement
to be commercially reasonable is not too great a burden. Simply
imagine trying to convince a court that, although it was not
commercially reasonable, your client complied with the terms of the
agreement it prepared for its entitlement holder to sign. In contrast,
what serious limitations does it place on a securities intermediary to
have to perform in a commercially reasonable manner? The lawyer's
response that "I cannot define for my clients what that means" is
accurate, but irrelevant. There are many business risks that cannot
be clearly described and delineated beforehand. Clients should have
little concern with a given practice being determined not to be
commercially reasonable. It does not happen very often. When it
does, the practice is rarely defensible.
2. Contractual authority to encumber
One of the more troubling contexts in which Article 8's
contractual override can expressly be used is the prohibition on
granting a security interest in financial assets necessary to meet
obligations to its entitlement holders.50 5 The ability to encumber the
503. See id. The decision to incorporate the broader definition of good faith
into Article 8 was part of a package that included the contractual modification
provisions in U.C.C. §§ 8-504 to 8-509. See Rogers, supra note 4, at 1505
n.104.
504. In fact, the drafter's example of a lack of "good faith performance" is a
contractual provision "purport[ing] to establish" a usual relationship while
disclaiming a basic element that defines the relationship. U.C.C. § 8-504
cmt. 4. That is, including a contractual provision so one-sided that it would not
be consistent with the good faith performance of duty. See id.; Guttman, supra
note 66, at 26-33 (arguing for courts to rely on good faith to protect investors).
505. U.C.C. § 8-504(b) provides as follows: "Except to the extent otherwise
agreed by its entitlement holder, a securities intermediary may not grant any
security interests in a financial asset it is obligated to maintain pursuant to
subsection (a)."
INDIRECTLY HELD SECURITIES
financial assets is important to protect securities intermediaries
between the trade date and the settlement date, when they are
creating a security entitlement on margin and when they are loaning
money against the security entitlement because it permits them to re-
pledge the financial assets and thereby obtain the financing they need
to extend such credit.50 6 Because these contracts will be prepared by
the securities intermediary, they are virtually certain to contain
authorizations to encumber. It will be surprising, however, if the
securities intermediary includes anything but a blanket authorization
to encumber. With this authorization, unnecessary encumbrance
does not breach any Article 8 duty. Although it violates federal
securities laws for a broker to pledge a customer's securities, other
than to fund loans to the customer, 50 7 violation of that duty would not
violate an Article 8 duty. Moreover, these federal rules only apply to
"securities" under federal securities laws and only to those securities
intermediaries that are subject to the SEC Rules.08 Thus, a
securities intermediary in financial need can completely undercut its
entitlement holders in favor of its secured creditors.
In the indirect holding system, elimination of this entitlement
holder risk cannot be accomplished without significantly impairing
financing of securities intermediaries. Even though subsection 8-
504(a)509 requires a securities intermediary to maintain sufficient
financial assets to meet its obligations to entitlement holders, there is
no meaningful way to know if the obligation has been breached until
it is too late. The risk can, however, be reduced. The most logical
protection from the entitlement holder's standpoint would be to limit
contractual changes to those necessary to permit repledging of
financial assets securing credit extended to entitlement holders,
510
506. See U.C.C. § 8-504 cmt. 2.
507. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.8c-1, 240.15c2-1 (2001). These regulations
require the customer's consent before a broker can rehypothecate the
customer's securities and limit brokers to rehypothecating 110% of the
aggregate amount of customer indebtedness.
508. See id.
509. See supra note 176.
510. This could be accomplished by changing U.C.C. § 8-504(b) to read as
follows: "Except to the extent [otherwise agreed by] it has a security interest
in the security entitlement of its entitlement holder, a securities intermediary
may not grant any security interests in a financial asset it is obligated to
maintain pursuant to subsection (a)."
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similar to the limitations imposed by federal securities laws. An
entitlement holder has no other conceivable justification for giving
such consent. The two possible remedies for a securities
intermediary breaching this duty would be to either (1) consider the
securities intermediary not to have power to encumber those
financial assets necessary to meet obligations to entitlement
holders,511 or (2) simply treat such encumbrance as a violation of the
securities intermediary's duties.
The first of these remedies would add an unacceptable risk to
secured creditors with no easy way to assess or avoid it. This makes
financing more risky and therefore less readily available. That
remedy would increase systemic risk. The second remedy, while not
as protective of entitlement holders, would enable them to meet one
of the requirements in subsection 9-503(d) (transfer was a violation
of the intermediary's duty) that could not have been met absent the
limitation. The second remedy does not create a serious risk to the
512intermediary's secured party, because there is no duty of inquiry.
Financing is only impaired to the extent the secured party knows that
the intermediary is breaching its duty. Financing under that
circumstance does not need to be facilitated.
C. Structure of Claim Preclusion Rules
The differences between the rules protecting purchasers in the
indirect holding system513 and the protected purchaser rule514 in the
direct holding system raise the questions: Do the structural
differences between the two systems justify the rule differences? If
not, which type of rule is preferable?
Each rule protecting purchasers in the indirect holding system is
structured as a preclusion of the claimant's action in contrast to the
protected purchaser rule which sets forth the requirements a
purchaser must meet to be free from adverse claims.5 15 The official
comments to section 8-502 explain that the protected purchaser
rule's language of "takes free from adverse claims" was not used
because the entitlement holder's claim to the financial asset is
511. See infra notes 624-629 and accompanying text.
512. See infra notes 536-564 and accompanying text.
513. See U.C.C. §§ 8-502, 8-503(e), 8-510(a).
514. See id. § 8-303.
515. See id. §§ 8-303, 8-502, 8-503(e), 8-510(a).
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necessarily subject to other claims.516 The preclusion of the
claimant's action structure solves that problem for the section 8-502
rule. That explanation also justifies the subsection 8-510(a) rule
protecting purchasers of security entitlements. The justification
breaks down, however, for the rule in subsection 8-503(e) because
the purchasers being protected are purchasing financial assets which
can be, but are not necessarily, security entitlements. In fact, other
than secured parties and repo purchasers, it is unlikely that such
purchasers would be acquiring security entitlements.
The preclusion of an action structure was not the only way to
solve the structural problem in the indirect holding system. Simply
excluding the rights of the securities intermediary and other
entitlement holders and using the protected purchaser rule structure
would solve the problem for the section 8-502 and subsection 8-,
510(a) rules and, to the extent the problem exists, for the subsection
8-503 (e) rule.
In the official comments to one of the indirect holding system
rules protecting purchasers, the drafters describe as a fundamental
policy of "investor protection" reliance on a "forward-looking"
perspective in assessing the rule's impact on the "vast number of
transactions" without wrongful conduct rather than the "post hoc
perspective of what rule might be most advantageous" to a class of
claimants after someone acted wrongfully.517 The statement implies
that the ideal rule would not benefit one engaged in wrongful
conduct while not impeding the action of one not engaged in
wrongful conduct. In other. words, innocently facilitating wrongful
conduct by another would be overlooked, because it met the forward-
looking standard of making the markets function smoothly. Thus,
the ideal rule under that standard is one without a duty of inquiry and
without implied notice or knowledge. If that is true, the neutrality
principle suggests that the type of rule protecting purchasers in the
indirect holding system should also be used for the direct holding
system because the differences are not driven by the structure of the
systems. Closer analysis, however, reveals significant deficiencies in
the type of rule used in the indirect holding system.
516. See id. § 8-502 cmt. 1.
517. Id. § 8-503 cmt. 3.
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1. Allocating the burden of proof
The preclusion of an action structure does more than simply
eliminate the problem highlighted by the drafters. It shifts the
burden of proof to the adverse claimant in the indirect holding
system whereas in the direct holding system, the burden is on the
purchaser seeking protection.518
The drafters of Article 8 do not discuss the burden of proof.519
We are left with the following question: Does the structure shift the
burden of persuasion, or the burden of going forward with evidence?
Article 1 defines "burden of establishing" as the burden of
persuading the trier of fact, 520 but the drafters of Article 8 did not use
that language. On the other hand, the burden of going forward with
evidence generally applies in connection with meeting the
requirements for a presumption. A presumption is not present in this
context. Thus, it appears the burden of persuasion was shifted. To
recover, the adverse claimant will need successful discovery. The
only evidence necessarily in the claimant's possession would relate
to the mere possibility that the purchaser could have notice. Whether
the purchaser actually had notice (or colluded), had obtained control,
or had given value would involve facts known to the purchaser and
perhaps to no one else. That procedure is cumbersome and
inefficient. Shifting the burden of proof makes claims more difficult
to assert against a purchaser who qualifies for protection, thus
providing increased purchaser protection in the indirect holding
system.
If shifting the burden of proof facilitates security markets, the
neutrality principle would require that the same structure be
established in the direct holding system. Before concluding that this
structure should be used in the direct holding system, however, the
operation of the structure in the indirect holding system needs to be
more fully understood. These rules only benefit the entitlement
holder when an adverse claim is asserted against the entitlement
holder. Such assertions are rare.521 The parties most benefited by
518. See supra note 289 and accompanying text.
519. The second paragraph of official comment 3 to § 8-503 recognizes the
shifted burden in that rule, but does not discuss its practical implications or the
manner in which it will function.
520. See U.C.C. § 1-201(8).
521. See supra notes 276-281 and accompanying text.
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the rules are secured creditors in the indirect holding system.
522
Thus, the preclusion of an action structure is not as relevant to the
securities markets per se as it is to financing securities intermediaries
in those markets.
A better solution would be a procedure similar to that explicitly
set forth for holders and holders in due course in Article 3. Under
subsection 3-308(b), the holder of the negotiable instrument is
entitled to enforce it, unless the obligor establishes a defense. 23 At
that point, the holder of the instrument has the burden of establishing
holder-in-due-course status to defeat the defense. The analogous
procedure for adverse claims to financial assets would be for the
adverse claimant to have the burden of establishing its claim. When
that burden is met, the purchaser could defeat the claim by
establishing its protected status. This is the way the protected
purchaser rule in the direct holding system operates. This scheme is
logical and puts the burden on the party in possession of the
evidence. Note that the purchaser-holder has the burden of proving a
negative, lack of notice, but the purchaser's mere assertion of lack of
notice should adequately meet the burden unless the adverse
claimant can prove otherwise. Such proof on that issue is similar to
what is required by the preclusion of action rules protecting
purchasers in the indirect holding system.
524
2. The awareness standard
Historically, the benefits of a purchaser rule were dependent on
the purchaser not having notice of an adverse claim to the asset being
purchased. The reason for the no-notice requirement was that a
purchaser rule cuts off legitimate claims to the asset and it was
against public policy to cut off such claims to benefit someone who
was not sufficiently innocent when purchasing the asset. One of the
significant issues that arose was the extent to which notice was
imputed to a purchaser who did not have actual knowledge of the
claim.
522. See supra notes 294, 311,326 and accompanying text.
523. U.C.C. § 3-308(a) presumes the authenticity of and authority to make
signatures, unless a party expressly puts it in issue. Thus, the holder of the
instrument is entitled to enforce it simply by establishing status as a holder.
524. See U.C.C. §§ 8-502, 8-503(e), 8-510(a).
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This imputation of knowledge is facilitated under most of the
Uniform Commercial Code's purchaser rules by including in the
definition of notice in subparagraph 1-201(25) both actual
knowledge and a clear objective component, "reason to know." It is
also facilitated by the good faith requirement, particularly good faith
defined to require the exercise of reasonable commercial standards of
fair dealing. The drafters of Article 8 specifically rejected that
general notice definition in its rules protecting purchasers in favor of
a narrower definition of "notice of adverse claim,, 525 and eliminated
the good-faith requirement from rules protecting purchasers.
Article 8, however, does not simply use the "no notice of
adverse claim" standard. In one rule, notice of any adverse claim is
the operative standard.526 In others, the standard is increased to
notice of the specific adverse claim being asserted.5 27 In still another
context, actual knowledge is required.528 Finally, some rules require
collusion.
529
a. notice of specific claim
Using the "notice of the adverse claim" awareness standard for
two rules in the indirect holding system is a significant change from
using the "notice of any adverse claim," awareness standard for the
protected purchaser rule in the direct holding system. Using this
awareness standard for section 8-502 and subsection 8-510(a) was
one method of solving a problem inherent in the indirect holding
system.530 A security entitlement is expressly a pro rata claim, along
with other entitlement holders and the securities intermediary to a
fungible bulk of the financial asset.531 Thus, using the notice-of-any-
adverse claim structure for this protection would have an inherent
conflict: the entitlement holder would have notice of those claims
but that notice should not subject it to assertion of other claims.
Another method of resolving the problem would have been to use the
525. See supra notes 73-80 and accompanying text.
526. U.C.C. § 8-303.
527. See id. §§ 8-502, 8-503(e), 8-510(a).
528. See id. § 8-115(1).
529. See id. §§ 8-115(2), 8-404(b), 8-503(e).
530. A similar problem relating to "takes free from adverse claims" was
discussed in the text accompanying supra note 516.
531. See text accompanying supra note 147.
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no-notice-of-adverse-claim standard and except there from notice of
the claims of the securities intermediary and its other entitlement
holders.
By opting to draft the rules in terms of notice of the specific
adverse claim, the drafters apparently had additional, unarticulated
goals in mind.532 The historical rationale for purchaser rules was that
the deserving attributes (bona fides) of the purchaser justified
depriving a claimant of its property rights. An important effect of
the awareness standard chosen for the indirect holding system is to
protect purchasers who may have purchased with notice of some
problems. The standard significantly reduces the focus on the
purchaser's deserving attributes. Rather it rewards a claimant who
made its claim more widely known. The different standard
represents a sea change in purchaser rules. The focus is not on the
innocence of the entitlement holder, but on the diligence of the
claimant.
The drafters do not provide adequate insight into the reasons for
taking this course.533 Their stated policy of focusing on the forward-
looking perspective of the rule's impact on the majority of
transactions without wrongful conduct rather than '!post hoe"
perspective of using rules advantageous to claimants after someone
wrongfully acts,534 provides no guidance on this issue. To focus on
the deserving attributes of the purchaser is precisely consistent with
that policy. The question is did the purchaser act wrongfully? The
drafters' choice, however, appears to be simply a method of limiting
the number of claims that can be asserted.
5 35
532. Professor Facciolo has traced the drafting history and concluded that the
change was initially inadvertent. See Facciolo, supra note 7, at 654 n.218.
Note that it was not changed after the inadvertence was discovered.
533. This change cannot be explained as a counterbalance to having shifted
the burden to the claimant on the theory that the claimant would likely only
have evidence regarding knowledge of its claim. If the protection was defeated
by notice of any claim, the burden on the adverse claimant would not be
increased, it would be eased. The claimant would have the option of proving
notice of either its claim or any other claim.
534. See U.C.C. § 8-503 cmt. 3.
535. See supra note 532.
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b. the collusion standard
The rule protecting purchasers of financial assets against claims
from entitlement holders uses a no-collusion standard, rather than the
no-notice-of-adverse-claim standard used in section 8-502 and
subsection 8-510(a). Because collusion is different from the
increasing levels of awareness, it deserves closer analysis.
When the drafters adopted the no-collusion standard, their intent
was to establish a higher standard of participation in the
wrongdoing,536 or, as described in another official comment,
"complicity in the wrongdoing," acting "as an aider or abettor for the
tortious conduct," or "affirmative misconduct. ' 537 The no-collusion
standard appears to require both knowledge and action (or perhaps
willful inaction if aiding and abetting can include inaction).
538
Professor Rogers suggests that the key role of the standard will be to
focus the inquiry toward blameworthy conduct.
539
Professor Rogers explains that the no-collusion standard in
section 8-503 was chosen to track the no-collusion standard used in
sections 8-115 and 8-404.54 0  The contexts, however, are very
different. In section 8-115, securities intermediaries, brokers and
agents are protected from liability for complying with a wrongdoer's
effective direction or order unless they were in collusion with the
wrongdoer. 54 1 Similarly, in section 8-404 issuers are protected from
liability for complying with a wrongdoer's effective request to
register or transfer securities unless they were in collusion with the
wrongdoer.542 Lack of collusion is a new standard to Article 8, but
may be an appropriate standard to protect innocent persons
performing ministerial acts from liability for wrongful actions of
another. 543 In contrast, subsection 8-503(e) is a rule allocating the
536. See U.C.C. § 8-503 cmt. 2.
537. See id. § 8-115 cmt. 5.
538. See id.
539. See Rogers, supra note 4, at 1536-37.
540. See id. The justification can also be implied from official comment 10
to § 8-102.
541. See U.C.C. § 8-115(2).
542. See id. § 8-404(a)(4).
543. The drafters borrowed the standard from RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 876 (1979) which governs liability of an aider and abettor in the
tortious conduct of another. See U.C.C. § 8-115 cmt. 5.
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risk of property loss between two wronged parties.544  For an
entitlement holder to have the claim, the securities intermediary must
have acted wrongfully 545 but the purchaser is not acting as its agent,
rather as an independent third party. The purchaser was not carrying
out a duty, it was making an investment with its attendant risks.
Why should the section 8-503 rule protecting purchasers and limiting
an entitlement holder's rights track the section 8-115 and 8-404
standard designed to protect those acting innocently on behalf of
others who acted wrongfully?
A more provocative justification is proffered in official
comment 10 to section 8-102 where the drafters elaborate on the role
of good faith under Article 8. The comment asserts that if subsection
8-503(e) depended on notice of adverse claims, "a sound and
efficient securities clearance and settlement system" would be
impaired rather than advanced, because intermediaries would be
required "to investigate the propriety of the transactions .... "
Similar assertions are made in official comment 3 to section 8-
503.546 Those assertions are surprising on two levels. First, the
assertion that a notice of adverse claim standard creates a duty to
investigate seems inconsistent with efforts made elsewhere in Article
8. The duty of inquiry was virtually eliminated by the drafters in
their construction of the protected purchaser rule.5 47  They also
eliminated good faith as a separate requirement5 48 and defined
"notice of adverse claim" to eliminate some cases that imposed a
duty to inquire.149 Moreover, the duty of inquiry example given in
that official comment is problematic. It involves securities issuers
avoiding liability for transfers that were in breach of fiduciary duty.
And transfer by a fiduciary may require certain inquiries.
550
544. U.C.C. § 8-503(e) resolves the dispute between the entitlement holder
and a purchaser. The entitlement holder's securities intermediary who sold to
the purchaser is the wrongdoer.
545. See U.C.C. § 8-503(d)(3).
546. U.C.C. § 8-503 cmt. 3 refers to the "sound and efficient operation of the
securities holding and settlement system" and to the duty to "investigate
whether their sellers may be acting wrongfully" (emphasis added). The minor
wording differences, do not appear to evidence separate policies.
547. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
548. See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
549. See supra notes 73-80 and accompanying text.
550. See U.C.C. §§ 8-401(a)(3), 8-402(a)(1)-(5), 8-403(a).
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More surprising is the fact that the two other rules protecting
purchasers in the indirect holding system,55' in which the highly
liquid securities markets operate, each use a "no notice of the adverse
claim" standard. If the standard is not problematic for those rules to
make the clearance and settlement system more sound, why is a no-
collusion standard necessary in subsection 8-503(e)?552 There is no
readily apparent answer.
The use of the no-collusion standard only for this rule is
particularly puzzling because most adverse claims that could be
asserted in the indirect holding system are not by entitlement holders.
Those claims are severely limited.5 3 Before an entitlement holder
can assert a claim to the financial asset, it must satisfy the threshold
requirements in subsection 8-503(d). The rationale of promoting the
"safe and efficient operation of the clearance and settlement
system ' 554 justifies this first level of protection. It reinforces the
indirect holding system's scheme of giving virtually complete
responsibility to the securities intermediary for claims by the
entitlement holder.55 5  Thus, it offers protection for purchasers of
financial assets by simplifying the system so long as the securities
intermediary is either solvent or has sufficient quantities of the
particular financial asset to satisfy all claimants. It keeps the losses
with those dealing with the insolvent intermediary, rather than
passing them on more widely through the system.556 If that fails,
deference is appropriately given to the liquidation schemes that have
been established by giving the rights to the trustee or liquidator to
assert the claim in a collective action.
557
551. See id. §§ 8-502, 8-510(a).
552. Professor Rogers indicates there was consideration of using the
standard in these rules and the protected purchaser rule, but the change would
have been too great. See Rogers, supra note 4, at 1535. That fact makes the
choice in the U.C.C. § 8-503 context even more provocative.
553. See supra notes 315-325 and accompanying text.
554. U.C.C. § 8-503 cmt. 3.
555. This policy is articulated by the drafters. See id.
556. See id. Because there are often two or more tiers of holding, other rules
would simply shift losses from one group of entitlement holders to another
based upon the acts and knowledge of their securities intermediary. Even
though such shifting is a rational means of loss allocation when the second tier
intermediary is a clearing corporation-the loss is spread to participants
through the market-that structure is not always present.
557. See id. § 8-503(d).
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The problem is that the purchaser is further protected by a claim
preclusion rule limited by the no-collusion standard. 8  After the
indirect nature of an entitlement holder's claim has been taken into
account by the subsection 8-503(d) rule, why should it be treated
more harshly than other claimants? Here the justification of
furthering "the sound and efficient operation of the securities holding
and settlement system,"55 9 becomes much more attenuated.
If the real concern justifying the no-collusion standard is
complete elimination of a duty of inquiry, a knowledge standard
accomplishes the task more cleanly. Collusion, unlike knowledge, is
not a bright line standard. It is a legal conclusion, not an objectively
verifiable fact. In that respect, it is similar to imputed notice.
Protecting a purchaser who acts in the face of knowledge of an
adverse claim just because the purchaser was not additionally
affirmatively involved with any wrongdoing does not further any
important interest.
With the no-collusion standard, the question simply becomes
what will courts require before concluding that collusion was
involved? 560 This author has been unable to formulate a set of
circumstances by which it can confidently be asserted that a court
would find there was "knowledge of the adverse claim for breach of
duty" but would not find collusion.561 If one knows that the
transaction violates another's duty, can that fact alone not readily be
held to constitute collusion in violating that duty? If courts construe
collusion to include functionally the same thing as knowledge that
the adverse claim breaches the securities intermediary's duty, then
558. See id. § 8-503(e).
559. See id. § 8-503 cmt. 3.
560. Professor Rogers suggests courts can use cases under sections of Article
9 referring to collusion. See HAWKLAND & ROGERS, supra note 138, at 627.
But see Facciolo, supra note 7, at 656 n.230 (pointing out that the case law
under those sections does not address collusion).
561. Professor Rogers expresses the same difficulty with the "lower
standard" of notice of adverse claim. See Rogers, supra note 4, at 1536. The
drafters, however, state in official comment 5 to § 8-115 that knowledge is a
necessary, but not a sufficient, condition to finding collusion.
The New York legislature, however, expressed the intent that collusion
included actual knowledge of the securities intermediary's violation. N.Y.
U.C.C. LAW art. 8 pmbl (McKinney Supp. 2001-02). The first court to address
the issue seems to have followed the legislature's expressed intent. See Nathan
W. Drage, P.C. v. First Concord Sec., Ltd., 707 N.Y.S. 2d 782 (Sup. Ct. 2000).
April 2002]
762 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LA WREVIE W [Vol. 35:661
Article 8 will have created a confusion of legal standards. Raising
the historical legal standard from bona fide purchaser for value
without notice to a standard of lack of knowledge would be a far
more consistent and meaningful approach in the context of these
rules. And if it is that important, then why not use that standard in
sections 8-303, 8-502 and subsection 8-510(a) as well?
The difficulty in justifying the no-collusion standard is further
illuminated by contrasting a claim to the financial asset in the hands
of a purchaser asserted by the entitlement holder with one asserted
by a secured party of the securities intermediary. To defeat a secured
party, the purchaser must satisfy the protected purchaser rule (if the
financial asset is a directly held security), the indirect holding
system's rule in section 8-502 (if the financial asset is a security
entitlement), or some similar rule (for other types of financial
assets). 562 Why should entitlement holders be given a higher hurdle
than secured parties of the securities intermediary?
The explanation probably lies in the fact that claims by
entitlement holders against purchasers of a financial asset are not
likely due to the tracing problems 563 unless the purchaser against
whom the claim is made was a secured party of the securities
intermediary. 564  Thus, secured parties are given the benefit both
ways. If they are the claimant, they must satisfy a lower standard. If
they are the party against whom the claim is being asserted, the
entitlement holder has to meet a higher standard.
The no-collusion standard creates greater risks for entitlement
holders than are necessary. This rule demonstrates a pervasive
preference for secured parties over entitlement holders in the indirect
holding system which is unique to it, but not inherent in it.
D. Priority Rules and Awareness
In contrast to rules protecting purchasers, the drafters of Article
8 did not include an awareness element in any of its priority rules. A
few revised Article 9 priority rules, in contrast, permit notice or
565knowledge of a prior security interest to explicitly defeat priority.
562. See supra notes 327-328 and accompanying text.
563. See supra notes 276-280 and accompanying text.
564. Note that official comment 3 to § 8-503 unceremoniously states that the
rules apply to pledgees as well as other transferees.
565. Article 9 defers to purchaser rules in other articles of the U.C.C. which
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In two additional revised Article 9 priority rules, the drafters took the
likelihood of knowledge (or lack thereof) into account in structuring
the rules. 566 It is noteworthy that in most of those instances the rules
benefit purchasers and either are, or contain the traditional elements
of, purchaser rules.
Three aspects of the Article 8 and revised Article 9 priority rules
suggest they be given special attention. First, knowledge or
awareness by purchasers in security markets is not very meaningful
because the trades are completely impersonal.567 Whereas, security
interests are obtained in direct negotiation contexts where knowledge
could be meaningful. Second, the parties governed by some of the
Article 8 priority rules are (at least nominally) purchasers, not just
secured parties. Third, there is a more complicated relationship
between perfection and priority in the Article 8 and revised Article 9
priority rules for investment securities. The drafters' choices reflect
policy decisions that need to be explored and evaluated.
have "no notice" requirements. See U.C.C. § 9-331. Two of the priority rules
for purchasers of chattel paper or instruments require a lack of knowledge to
prevail. See U.C.C. § 9-330(b), (d). Priority for future advances over lien
creditors or buyers or lessees of goods can be limited by knowledge. See id. §
9-323(b), (d)-(g). Finally, certain priority to goods covered by a newly issued
certificate of title is dependent upon a lack of knowledge of a prior security
interest perfected under another state's laws. See id. § 9-337 cmt. 2.
Only in rare circumstances have courts gone beyond these express rules
in Article 9 to subordinate later security interests that qualified for priority, but
had knowledge of a prior security interest. See Gen. Ins. Co. of America v.
Lowry, 570 F.2d 120 (6th Cir. 1978) (holding that the debtor's attorney who
negotiated an unperfected security interest with the creditor had his perfected
security interest subordinated due to knowledge); Thompson v. United States,
408 F.2d 1075 (8th Cir. 1969) (holding that the perfected security interest in
favor of an affiliated corporation was subordinated to an unperfected security
interest of which it had knowledge). Several other courts have approved the
concept of egregious circumstances without applying it to the particular facts.
See Berga v. Amit Int'l Trade, Ltd., 511 F. Supp. 432 (E.D. Pa. 1981); State v.
Fowler, 611 P.2d 58 (Alaska 1980); Shallcross v. Cmty. State Bank & Trust
Co., 434 A.2d 671 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1981); Bloom v. Hilty, 234 A.2d
860 (Pa. 1967); Grossmann v. Saunders, 376 S.E.2d 66 (Va. 1989).
566. One priority rule for purchasers of chattel paper depends on the absence
of a legend or other indication of a security interest on the collateral. See
U.C.C. § 9-330(a). A security interest perfected by filing a financing statement
that contains incorrect information is subordinate to a perfected security
interest in favor of a secured party who relied on the information. See id. § 9-
338.
567. See Schroeder, supra note 12, at 353-54.
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The differential treatment of awareness in purchaser rules and
priority rules is fascinating because priority rules, like purchaser
rules, can cut off legitimate claims. 568 What justifies treating Article
8's secured parties more favorably than other purchasers? 569 Two
apparent justifications are: first, to place a very high value on
perfection of security interests because it gives the public notice (in
many cases) of the security interest, and second, to avoid litigation
over questions of awareness. The first is not very compelling
because the incentive is not diminished in any meaningful way by
limiting priority when there is awareness of a prior interest.
Perfection is still needed to beat subsequent interests, including a lien
creditor's (primarily a trustee in bankruptcy). The second
justification is more meaningful, but raises the question of why some
priority rules nevertheless have awareness elements.
Even after the notice function of perfection has been met, a
subsequent secured party can perfect or obtain a security interest in a
"preferred" way and defeat the prior interest even with actual
knowledge of that prior interest.570 Specifically, a secured party with
a previously perfected security interest (or the purchaser of a security
entitlement) can lose priority to: 1) a subsequent secured party who
perfected by (or a subsequent purchaser of a security entitlement who
obtained) control, if the prior party did not have control;5 7 1 2) a
subsequent secured party with a security interest in a certificated
568. See text accompanying supra note 362.
569. Professor Rogers attempts to justify the distinction by explaining that
for purchaser rules to work, the adverse claimant has to establish its property
interest under other law and then rely on the purchaser rule, whereas for the
security interest, both the property interest and priority are governed by
Article 9. See Rogers, supra note 4, at 1490 n.88. The argument either begs
the question or confuses two concepts. His argument may simply be that the
two dispute resolution rules are different and do not necessarily have to be
consistent-thus begging the question. On the other hand, he may be
confusing attachment and perfection of a security interest. A secured party's
property interest is obtained when the security interest attaches, whereas
secured party priority rules are closely related to perfection, which has nothing
to do with creation of the property interest.
Ironically, in his argument for rules protecting secured parties,
Professor Rogers poses the question, "Should the Finality Rules Differ for
Transferees Who Take Securities as Collateral, Rather than as Outright
Buyers?" Id. at 1523. His answer is no! Id.
570. See id. at 1481-83.
571. See U.C.C. §§ 8-510(c), 9-328(1).
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security in registered form perfected by delivery, if the prior party
did not have control; 572 3) a secured party (or purchaser of a security
entitlement) who is a securities intermediary, even if the prior party
had control;573 or 4) a secured party of a broker or securities
intermediary, if neither party has control.574 At one level, the issue
may resolve itself into this question: Are the Article 8 priority rules
basic Article 9 type priority rules to encourage perfection or do they
parallel more general purchaser rules for investment property?
575
1. Priority and control or delivery
Perfecting by filing a financing statement is not a particularly
valuable method of giving notice of a security interest in financial
assets.576 Thus, encouraging secured parties to perfect by control or
delivery is a laudable goal, because such perfection provides notice
that is more effective in these markets. The incentive for the first
party to perfect by control or delivery, however, is not diminished in
any meaningful way by including an awareness requirement because
control or delivery offers clear priority advantages.
The drafters of Article 9 rejected an "awareness" requirement
out of concern for the uncertainty it would create, thereby ostensibly
impairing the ability of those in security markets to obtain
financing. 577 Eliminating the difficult factual question of awareness
is one aspect of this justification. The drafters, while asserting that
the absence of an awareness requirement is evidence that common
law and equitable principles on the issue have been displaced,
578
572. See id. § 9-328(5).
573. See id. §§ 8-510(d), 9-328(3).
574. See id. § 9-328(6).
575. Professor Schroeder suggests that perfection by control is tantamount to
reducing the supemegotiability of investment property by making it harder for
a subsequent party to qualify for protection as a purchaser. See Schroeder,
supra note 12, at 434-35. Her suggestion clearly implies that control priority
rules are virtually like purchaser rules for secured parties.
576. Article 9 expressly limits the notice effect of a financing statement in
regard to the application of purchaser rules from other articles of the U.C.C.
See U.C.C. § 9-33 1(c).
577. Official comment 8 to § 9-328 makes this point in connection with a
discussion of whether principles of law and equity could be used to read in an
awareness requirement.
578. Displacement is the standard established by U.C.C. § 1-103 for
determining whether principles of common law or equity apply when a
statutory provision addresses the issue.
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concede that such knowledge "may, in some circumstances,
appropriately be treated as a factor in determining whether the
control party's action is the kind of egregious conduct for which
resort to other law is appropriate., 579 Thus, there is already limited
uncertainty over the same issue. What would make the subsequent
secured party's conduct egregious? Lack of a no-knowledge
requirement permits that secured party to knowingly deprive a prior
perfected secured party of the benefit of its security interest.580 Is
that egregious? Probably not because the prior creditor could have
easily protected itself by obtaining control. Lack of a no-knowledge
requirement also creates an opportunity for collusion between the
debtor and a potential secured party to defeat a prior perfected
interest. Such collusion is more likely to be considered egregious.
The uncertainty argument is greatly diminished if the awareness
requirement is lack of knowledge as opposed to lack of notice. A no-
knowledge standard would avoid imputing knowledge or claiming
reason to know or a duty to inquire. For example, a secured creditor
providing financing is at risk if there is a prior creditor with control
and would be likely to inquire whether such a creditor existed. If
knowledge of a prior perfected creditor without control were
obtained, why should the subsequent secured party be able to prime
that creditor?
The question comes down to whether perfection by filing a
financing statement and automatic perfection are simply means to
defeat a trustee in bankruptcy, leaving perfection by control or
delivery as the "real" perfection, or if perfection by control or
delivery is a close relative of being a protected purchaser or its
equivalent. If the first proposition is true, the rules are acceptable
without a no-knowledge requirement. If the second proposition is
true, the priority benefits that accompany control or delivery should
be limited to those who obtain control without knowledge of the
other secured party's perfected security interest to parallel those
rules. In fact, the validity of the second proposition is effectively
affirmed by Article 8's reporter, Professor Rogers.
581
579. U.C.C. § 9-328 cmt. 8. This comment was included as a result of issues
raised by the American Law Institute concerning the lack of an awareness
standard. See Rogers, supra note 4, at 1489-90.
580. See U.C.C. § 9-328 cmt. 3.
581. See Rogers, supra note 4, at 1481-83.
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Adding a no-knowledge requirement is not as radical as the
drafters make it appear. Due to the protected purchaser rule, a
second secured party taking control of directly held securities
without notice already obtains priority by relying on that rule.
582
Thus, in the direct holding system, adding a no-knowledge
requirement only limits the rights of a second secured party who
obtained control with knowledge but otherwise could have qualified
as a protected purchaser. A no-knowledge requirement would have a
greater effect in the indirect holding system simply because the claim
preclusion rules do not always trump the priority rules. A no-
knowledge requirement could be added simply by limiting the
priority benefits of control or delivery in subsections 8-510(c), 9-
328(1) and 9-328(5) 583 to those obtaining it without knowledge of the
perfected security interest of another.
2. Priority for intermediaries
A more troubling question related to the lack of an awareness
requirement arises with the subsection 9-328(3) rule granting priority
to a securities intermediary with a security interest in its entitlement
holder's security entitlement or securities account over any other
secured party. The parallel subsection 8-510(d) rule favoring
securities intermediaries over purchasers of security entitlements
who obtain control is also troubling. Note that a securities
intermediary automatically has control when its entitlement holder
grants it a security interest. 584  These priority rules permit the
securities intermediary to obtain priority over all earlier secured
parties or purchasers of security entitlements, even those with
control. Moreover, because the prior secured party or purchaser
582. See U.C.C. § 8-303.
583. A provision such as the following could be added to U.C.C. § 9-328(1):
"provided, however, if a secured party obtained control with knowledge of a
prior perfected security interest in the investment property, its security interest
shall be subordinate to that prior security interest." The same provision could
be added to U.C.C. § 9-328(5) by substituting "took delivery" for "control"
and "certificated security in registered form" for "investment property." A
provision such as the following could be added to § 8-510(c): "provided,
however, if a purchaser obtained control with knowledge of a prior purchaser
of a security entitlement or interest therein it shall be subordinate to that prior
purchaser."
584. See U.C.C. § 8-106(e).
April 2002]
LOYOLA OFLOSANGELESLAWREVIEW [Vol. 35:661
cannot obtain control without the involvement of the securities
intermediary, 585 the securities intermediary will always have
knowledge of a prior secured party or purchaser with control. Why
should the securities intermediary be awarded priority especially
when it has actual knowledge of the earlier interest?
This priority rule for indirectly held financial assets facilitates a
credit monopoly for securities intermediaries. 86  Statutes that
facilitate monopolies always raise a significant concern. The
justification for this rule was not directly disclosed by the drafters.
One possible justification is that many security interests in favor of
securities intermediaries are the equivalent of purchase money
security interests which are historically given priority. 587  If the
entitlement holder is buying on margin,588 the securities intermediary
will take a security interest in the financial asset to secure the margin
loan. The purchase money justification is bolstered by the fact that
purchase money priority rules of Article 9 do not apply to investment
securities. 89 The justification is weakened by the fact that a
585. To obtain control, the securities intermediary must either enter into an
agreement with the secured party or the secured party must become the
entitlement holder-an action that would require the involvement of the
securities intermediary. See id. § 8-106(d)(1), (e).
586. See Note, Super-Priority of Securities Intermediaries Under the New
Section 9-115(5)(c) of the Uniform Commercial Code, 108 HARV. L. REV.
1937, 1940-54 (1995) (listing some unfair advantages and setting forth
arguments to defeat the priority).
587. See Russell A. Hakes, According Purchase Money Status Proper
Priority, 72 OR. L. REV. 323, 328-61 (1993).
588. Not all margin lending is of the purchase money type. Any borrowing
against securities is known as borrowing on margin and is regulated by
Regulations G, T, U and X.
589. Article 8's conforming amendments to Article 9 specifically excluded
purchase money priority. See U.C.C. § 9-115(5)(f) (1994). The official
comments indicated that purchase money rules were excluded because the
control priority rule of § 9-115(5)(a) adequately covered it. See id. § 9-115
cmt. 5. That explanation, however, was not adequate. Under that version of
Article 9, a broker with control lending on margin would have shared pro rata
if another secured party had control. See id. § 9-115(5)(b). However, under
§ 9-115(5)(c) a securities intermediary extending margin credit to its customer
holding indirectly had priority, eliminating the need for purchase money
priority in that situation.
Revised Article 9 replaced § 9-115, and purchase money security
interests were defined to be available only when the collateral was goods (or
software acquired with the goods). See U.C.C. § 9-103(a)(1).
INDIRECTLYHELD SECURITIES
securities intermediary financing acquisition of a security entitlement
can easily ensure that it is the first to obtain control and therefore win
under the regular priority rule.590 A second justification for the
priority rule favoring securities intermediaries is the need to provide
security for the credit risk during the gap between the trade date and
the settlement date.591 A security interest to secure that obligation is
created5 92 by statute and considered perfected by control.5 93 This
priority rule complements that scheme.
Under the neutrality principle, priority rules for secured parties
in the indirect holding system should parallel those in the direct
holding system unless different rules have some compelling
justification. There is not an equivalent priority rule for a securities
intermediary dealing with directly held securities. 594  If the
justification is to be equivalent to purchase money security interests
with directly held securities, then it is also easy for a purchase money
lender to be the first to obtain control.595 If the rationale is protection
during the trade-settlement gap, a parallel rule is not as important for
590. The securities intermediary has control by definition. See U.C.C. § 8-
106(e). The general priority rule for investment property awards priority to the
first to obtain control. See id. § 9-328(b). If another secured party had control
of the securities account, the securities intermediary and the entitlement holder
could simply open a new "margin account." See id.
591. See supra notes 391-392 and accompanying text.
592. See U.C.C. § 9-206(a), (b).
593. See id. § 9-206 cmt. 4. This statutory security interest is a codification
of the "broker's lien" recognized at common law. See id. cmt. 2. The broader
rights of setoff, to which duties of the securities intermediary to its entitlement
holder may be subject as described in § 8-509(c)(2), are not secured by a lien,
and thus, do not provide a basis for this priority.
594. If a broker or dealer perfects its security interest in a directly held
security by delivery and the security has been indorsed to or is registered in the
name of the broker or dealer, it is treated as a security entitlement and the
indirect holding system's priority rule would apply. See id. § 8-501(d).
Perfection in directly held securities by other means would not result in
application of this rule.
595. The secured party simply has the security delivered to it (this can be
through a third person acknowledging that it holds for the secured party), see
id. § 8-301, and ensures that it is indorsed in blank or to the secured party, see
id. § 8-106(a), (b), (c). Note that if the secured party is the securities
intermediary, this will often result in the creation of a security entitlement
under § 8-501(d).
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the direct holding system because virtually all trades in the securities
markets are made in the indirect holding system.
596
Because these priority rules were not limited to priority for
credit given during the trade-settlement gap and for credit given to
purchase financial assets on margin, another justification is
necessary. One possibility is that it is simply codification of the
practical result of other rules in Article 8. Secured parties with
control have priority;598 control of indirectly held securities requires
participation of the securities intermediary 599 and the securities
intermediary is not required to give control.600  This justification
overlooks the effect of the priority rule in subordinating a security
interest previously perfected by control.
The rationale appears to have been to provide an advantage to
key players in the securities markets when they extend credit.
Superficially, this rule fits into a pattern that emerges in Article 8 of
preferring those who provide financing to participants in the
securities markets. Generally, a justification for that preference is to
minimize the systemic risk by ensuring easy priority; thus reducing
barriers to providing financing. This rule, however, is a disincentive
for outsiders wanting to finance entitlement holders because they
must obtain a subordination agreement from the securities
intermediary in order to ensure they will not be primed.60 1 Since
most securities intermediaries are also entitlement holders and would
596. See supra notes 103-105 and accompanying text.
597. Professor Rogers, the reporter for Article 8, makes essentially the same
argument in defense of the rule. See Rogers, supra note 4, at 1476-77, 1486-
88.
598. See U.C.C. § 9-328(1).
599. See id. § 8-106(d). While control via a third party with control under §
8-106(d)(3) would not directly involve the securities intermediary, it would
have been involved when the third party obtained control by one of the other
two methods. See id.
600. See id. § 8-106(g).
601. The reporter, Professor Rogers, asserts that the rule was a default rule
providing what the parties would normally agree to. His examples, which are
all convincing, however, are limited to the purchase money and credit
settlement situations. See Rogers, supra note 4, at 1486-88. The approach
taken, however, requires a secured party that is not an intermediary to work out
a tri-party priority agreement or forego making the loan. If the basic
agreement would be as Professor Rogers suggests, then the limitation of the
priority to the situations suggested is more efficient. It may preclude the
necessity of an agreement.
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benefit by the rule as borrowers more than they would be burdened
by it as lenders, the rule is particularly perplexing.
To avoid undercutting secured parties or purchasers of security
entitlements who have obtained control, the priority benefits in favor
of securities intermediaries 0 2 should be limited to the trade-
settlement gap and the purchase-money situations. 0 3 Other priority
disputes involving the securities intermediary as a secured party
should be resolved with the same rules that govern other secured
parties. Because obtaining control of a security entitlement involves
the securities intermediary, it is virtually impossible for a competing
secured party or purchaser of a security entitlement not to obtain
notice of a security intermediary's prior security interest.604 Thus,
such a change together with the change proposed above to subsection
9-328(l)605 would simply help level the playing field for securities
intermediaries as secured creditors and other secured parties. The
change should enhance the availability of credit for the securities
industry.
3. Pro rata priority
If more than one secured party of a broker or securities
intermediary has a perfected security interest in investment property,
but neither obtained control, they share pro rata.606 This means that a
subsequent secured party obtains equal priority with a prior secured
party, even if it knows of its existence. Knowledge of the existence
of the security interest is knowledge of its perfected status because
602. See supra notes 332-335 and accompanying text.
603. Subsection 9-328(3) could be rewritten as follows to solve this problem:
A security interest created under Section 9-206 or held by a securities
intermediary in a security entitlement to secure payment of the
purchase price of the security entitlement [or a securities account]
maintained with the securities intermediary has priority over a
conflicting security interest held by another secured party.
Italicized words are to be added to the subsection and words in brackets
deleted. A parallel change would need to be made to the § 8-510(d) rule.
604. This could only happen if the securities intermediary permitted the
creditor to obtain control without informing them of the securities
intermediary's security interest.
605. See supra note 583.
606. See U.C.C. § 9-328(6).
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secured parties of brokers or securities intermediaries are
automatically perfected.° 7
The aim of a secured party in the event it needs to resort to its
collateral is to have first priority. Among automatically perfected
secured parties of brokers or securities intermediaries who have not
obtained control, the pro rata priority of subsection 9-328(6) can be
overcome by either party obtaining control, so the priority rule in
subsection 9-328(1) will govem. Thus, relying on automatic
perfection will probably rarely result in pro rata priority. Shortly
before the issue arises, one of the secured parties can obtain control
if it obtains the cooperation of the debtor. 60 8 As currently written,
knowledge of the other security interest would not defeat this
priority.
Because a subsequent secured party of a broker or securities
intermediary will not trump a prior secured party and because the
prior secured party can avoid losing priority by obtaining control,
this rule does not create the potential for abuse.609  The pro rata
priority rule simply creates an incentive for secured parties of
brokers and securities intermediaries to perfect by control. This,
however, is a break with traditional lending practices in the securities
industry.
610
E. Resolving Purchaser-Priority Rule Conflicts
Determining whether the applicable claim preclusion rule or the
applicable priority rule should apply to a dispute raises a number of
issues, including the appropriate awareness standard.
607. See id. § 9-309(10).
608. See id. § 9-328 cmt. 3.
609. The rule does facilitate a maneuver not available under prior law. A
secured creditor of the broker or securities intermediary with significant
influence over it who learns of serious financial problems can obtain control,
and thereby priority over others, on the eve of bankruptcy-the "midnight
grab." Previously, bankruptcy preference law would have defeated this
creditor. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1994). Under revised Article 9, however,
automatic perfection will preclude the preference attack-thereby making the
midnight grab viable.
610. See supra note 357.
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1. Subsection 8-510(a) versus priority rules
Revised Article 9's conforming amendments to Article 8 limited
the application of the subsection 8-510(a) claim preclusion rule to
situations not governed by the priority rules in either subsection 8-
510(c) or Article 9. This change eliminated the argument that
subsection 8-510(c) operated merely as a threshold to a claim, with
the claim being resolved by application of the priority rule.
611
The question of whether the claim preclusion rule or the priority
rule should prevail is interesting only when the two rules provide
different outcomes in the same dispute. The awareness requirement
difference between the rules produces a different outcome in some
disputes. For example, the first purchaser to obtain control always
wins under the subsection 8-510(c) priority rule regardless of
whether it has notice of the other purchaser. However, if the second
purchaser obtains control without notice of the first purchaser's
claim, it would win under the subsection 8-510(a) claim preclusion
rule even if the first purchaser had control. The other basic
difference between the section 8-510 claim preclusion and priority
rules612 places the burden of proof on the party asserting priority (the
party benefiting from the rule) in subsections 9-328(1)-(3) and 8-
510(c)-(d), but on the one asserting the adverse claim (the one not
611. The claim preclusion rule simply describes the persons against whom
"[a]n action based on an adverse claim to a financial asset" may not be
asserted. U.C.C. § 8-510(a). Under the rule's operation, a qualifying person
defeats an adverse claim because the claimant cannot proceed against such a
person. The rule does not address the converse situation-whether the person
who can assert an action will prevail. This opened the way to argue that the
priority rule would then apply to resolve the dispute.
612. There are two other notable differences. First, U.C.C. § 8-510(a)
applies to both claims to financial assets and claims to security entitlements,
while § 8-510(c) is limited to priority between purchasers of security entitle-
ments. This difference, however, means there is no conflict when the adverse
claims are to the financial asset itself asserted against a purchaser of a security
entitlement--only § 8-510(a) could apply. Second, § 8-510(a) has no
limitation on the type of claim asserted against the purchaser, while § 8-510(c)
is expressly limited to disputes between two purchasers.
There is also a wording difference that is probably nonsubstantive.
Subsection 8-510(a) requires that the purchase be from an entitlement holder,
while § 8-510(c) includes no such requirement. Because it does not appear
that one can purchase a security entitlement from anyone but an entitlement
holder, this difference is not relevant.
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benefiting from the rule) in subsection 8-510(a). 613 Shifting the
burden of proof makes the claim preclusion rule harder to rely on,
but will not otherwise necessarily yield predictable differences in
who wins the dispute.
The drafters do not explain why they preferred the priority rule
over the claim preclusion rule.6 14 The rationale cannot be found in
the fact that the primary role of the subsection 8-510(c) priority rule
is to govern disputes between repo purchasers and that the drafters
wanted the applicable Article 8 rules to be independent from the
characterization of the transaction. 615  That goal is equally well
served if the claim preclusion rule takes precedence in both
situations. Thus, another explanation must be found.
Here, the reason for the preference appears to be elimination of
any effect of awareness of adverse claims. Because the parties
primarily affected by these rules are secured parties (or repo
purchasers), the drafters have chosen to benefit the first creditor.
That choice makes financing more readily available in the indirect
holding system only from the point of view of a second secured party
or repo purchaser who is the first to obtain control, yet was aware of
a prior interest. A first secured party or repo purchaser to obtain
control is only given an advantage to the extent its control is not
discovered by a later person gaining control or the rule eliminated a
duty to inquire. But why should a qualifying second secured party or
repo purchaser not be able to benefit from a claim preclusion rule?
Such a benefit would seem to facilitate financing by protecting an
"innocent" secured party or repo purchaser.
The appropriate outcome in these disputes appears to be
obtained by using a no-knowledge awareness standard to eliminate
any duty of inquiry and then giving precedence to the claim
preclusion rule rather than the priority rule. These changes would
improve the indirect holding system and bring it into harmony with
the direct holding system. 61
613. See supra notes 518-522 and accompanying text.
614. The official comments simply describe § 8-510(c) as tracking the
Article 9 priority rule, giving primacy to control and having multiple parties in
control share according to a temporal priority rule if they have not agreed
otherwise. See U.C.C. § 8-510 cmt. 4.
615. See supra notes 339-346 and accompanying text.
616. To accomplish that result, U.C.C.§ 8-510(a) would need to be amended
by deleting the bracketed material and adding the italicized material so it
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2. Priority or claim preclusion rules and entitlement holders
The question of whether the priority rules in section 8-511 or the
claim preclusion rule in subsections 8-503(d) and (e) should govern
in a dispute between an entitlement holder and a secured party of a
securities intermediary is not directly answered by Article 8. This is
one place Article 8 fails in its goal to eliminate legal uncertainty,
thus increasing systemic risk. Resolving the conflict between these
rules is complex. The analysis must start with an understanding of
the circumstances under which the priority and claim preclusion
rules lead to conflicting resolutions. Each of the three priority rules
in section 8-511 will conflict with the subsection 8-503(d) and (e)
claim preclusion rule in different situations.
a. the subsection 8-511(a) conflict
Subsection 8-511 (a) awards priority to the entitlement holder, if
the securities intermediary is not a clearing corporation 617 and does
not have control.618 However, in such a priority contest if the
entitlement holder does not meet the requirements in subsections 8-
503(d)(1)-(3) for asserting a claim,619 the secured party would argue
would read as follows (much like the Article 8 version before the conforming
amendment):
[In a case not covered by the priority rules in Article 9, or the rules
stated in subsection (c)] An action based on an adverse claim... if the
purchaser gives value, does not have [notice] -knowledge of the
adverse claim ....
In addition, the italicized material would then be added to § 8-510(c) so it
would read as follows:
In a case not covered by the priority rules in Article 9 or the rules
stated in subsection (a), a purchaser for value of a security
entitlement ....
Note that if a knowledge element is included in the provisions of § 9-328, see
supra note 583, one should also be added to § 8-510(c) to keep it consistent
with Article 9 priority rules. Such a change would minimize the difference
between § 8-510(c) and the claim preclusion rule in § 8-510(a).
617. If the securities intermediary is a clearing corporation, § 8-511(c)
applies and gives it priority. This situation is discussed in the next section.
618. If the secured party has control, § 8-511(b) gives it priority. This
situation is discussed in the next section.
619. If the entitlement holder meets all the requirements in § 8-503(d)(1)-(3),
no conflict arises. The entitlement holder wins under § 8-511 (a) and can assert
its claim under § 8-503(d), because the secured party is not entitled to § 8-
503(e) protection.
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that the entitlement holder is unable to assert its claim and therefore
the secured party would win, despite the priority rule. That argument
is based on one of two statutory constructions. First, apply both rules
to the dispute with the claim preclusion rule functioning as a
threshold to the claim and the priority rule governing if the claim is
permitted. Second, give the claim preclusion rule precedence over
the priority rule-the typical resolution of a purchaser rule versus
priority rule question.
In ascertaining the appropriate interaction between the
subsection 8-51 l(a) priority rule and the subsection 8-503(d) and (e)
claim preclusion rule, it is necessary to determine the meaning of
subsection 8-503(a). This subsection describes the property interest
of an entitlement holder in the fungible bulk of the financial asset
held by the securities intermediary and that description's
interrelationship with section 8-511. Subsection 8-503(a) states that
all interests in a particular financial asset held by a securities
intermediary, "to the extent necessary" to satisfy the claims of all
entitlement holders "are not property of the securities intermediary,
and are not subject to claims of creditors of the securities
intermediary, except as otherwise provided in Section 8-511 .,,620
There are at least three ways to interpret the interrelationship
between subsection 8-503(a) and section 8-511. First, despite the
language about the financial assets not being the property of the
securities intermediary, the existence of subsection 8-511 (a) implies
that the securities intermediary has the "power" under subsection 8-
503(a) to grant a security interest to a secured party which does not
have control, even if that security interest will not prevail over
entitlement holders.621 The drafters expressly take this position in
620. U.C.C. § 8-503(a).
621. Section 8-116 declares the securities intermediary to be a purchaser for
value of a financial asset it receives, if it establishes a security entitlement in
favor of an entitlement holder in that financial asset. A purchaser for value
generally has full power to further transfer the asset. This is implicit for
securities (note that financial asset is broader) in § 8-104(a)(1), which provides
that a person acquires a security if that person is a purchaser to whom it is
delivered. Subsection 8-302(a) states that a purchaser has all rights that the
transferor had power to transfer. It is this power to transfer that is not
explicitly described for a securities intermediary when the financial asset is
subject to a security entitlement.
776
INDIRECTLY HELD SECURITIES
official comment 3 to section 8-503.622 This reading gives
precedence to the claim preclusion rule.
Second, there is an interpretation consistent with giving
precedence to the priority rule but the drafters attempt to negate it in
official comment 3 to section 8-503.623 That interpretation focuses
on the "not property of the securities intermediary" language in
subsection 8-503(a). This language facilitates an argument that the
securities intermediary only has a property interest in the financial
asset to the extent it creates a security interest in favor of secured
creditors who are described as having priority rights under section 8-
511. 624  Read this way, subsection 8-503(a) would preclude a
purchaser (or creditor) from obtaining an interest in the fungible bulk
of the particular financial asset because the securities intermediary
did not have a property interest in it.625 That would not be true if:
622. See U.C.C. § 8-503 cmt. 3. In official comment I to § 8-503 the
drafters explain the reason for choosing the particular language in § 8-503(a).
Securities intermediaries in practice commingle customer securities with their
own. Thus, the language is intended to defeat claims of creditors of the
securities intermediary when necessary to protect entitlement holders. Thus,
while the statutory language leaves the question of power to transfer less than
clear, its intent is to be a priority rule of sorts when the securities intermediary
is insolvent. That intent, however, is also at odds with other language in those
official comments about the rule not necessarily determining how the financial
assets will be distributed in an insolvency proceeding. See id. § 8-503 cmt. 1.
The drafters are trying to walk a fairly fine line on these questions.
623. See U.C.C. § 8-503 cmt. 3.
624. See id. § 8-511(a).
625. The argument would be that a securities intermediary attempting to
create security interests in financial assets necessary to satisfy claims of
entitlement holders did not have sufficient rights in the financial asset. The
debtor is required to have "rights in the collateral" before a security interest
can be created. See id. § 9-203. The U.C.C. does not elaborate on what rights
are sufficient, and court holdings have not necessarily clarified the concept.
Subsection 8-503(a) would be used to support this argument, because it
declares that the securities intermediary does not have an interest in the
financial asset sufficient for its general creditors to attach, if there is not a
sufficient quantity of the financial asset to satisfy entitlement holders. See id. §
8-503(a).
The fact that the securities intermediary does not have a property
interest does not mean that it does not have the power to transfer a property
interest. In fact, although it is not explicit in the section, the drafters clearly
would have intended the power to exist. The question, not directly answered
by Article 8, is under what circumstances does the securities intermediary have
that power. In this present dispute, the argument would be that the reference to
§ 8-511 and the rules contained therein would negate any inference that the
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(1) the amount of the financial asset exceeds that necessary to satisfy
entitlement holders, 626 (2) the securities intermediary is a clearing
corporation 627 or (3) the secured creditor has obtained control.628
Under this interpretation, the secured party who does not have
control and is not a clearing corporation (those covered by subsection
8-511 (a)) would not have a valid claim to the financial asset.
629
In essence, this interpretation treats section 8-511 and subsection
8-503(a) together as a gatekeeper for secured party claims to the
financial asset, a role similar to the one subsection 8-503(d) plays as
a gatekeeper for entitlement holder claims against purchasers. Each
party would thus be claiming that the other party cannot make a
claim, because it cannot meet the gatekeeper's requirements. The
entitlement holder would win this battle because its threshold relates
to making a claim against the purchaser (secured party), while the
secured party's threshold relates to making a claim to the financial
asset (the security entitlement itself provides the entitlement holder
its claim to the financial asset).630 In other words, because the
secured party is precluded from making a claim to the financial asset,
the entitlement holder does not need to assert a claim against the
secured party. If this interpretation were correct, subsection 8-511 (a)
would be unnecessary and the result could have been achieved more
directly by simply eliminating it.
The third interpretation of the interplay between subsections 8-
511(a) and 8-503(a) would give subsection 8-511(a) a role to play
while giving precedence to the priority rule. Subsection 8-503(a)
would be interpreted as set forth above, to preclude the creation of
the security interest if the securities intermediary did not have
sufficient financial assets at the time of creation. In contrast,
power existed in this context.
626. This situation is of no interest, because entitlement holders are made
whole and would not need to assert competing claims.
627. See U.C.C. § 8-511(c).
628. See id. § 8-511(b).
629. This reading limits the application of § 8-503(d) and (e) to situations in
which the entitlement holder asserted a claim against a purchaser (other than a
secured party) from the securities intermediary. However, such purchasers
would not have an interest in the financial asset (unless there were enough to
satisfy entitlement holders) because the securities intermediary did not have an
interest in the financial asset that it could transfer to a purchaser. Of course, if
there were enough to satisfy entitlement holders, then no dispute would arise.
630. See U.C.C. § 8-503(a), (b).
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subsection 8-511(a) would apply to resolve the priority dispute if the
securities intermediary had sufficient assets to satisfy both the
secured party and entitlement holder at the time the security interest
was created, but not at the time of the dispute.
The ultimate question is: should the priority rule have
precedence, providing the protection for entitlement holders
subsection 8-503(a) seems to intend? Resort to the priority or
purchaser rules will only be necessary when the securities
intermediary has failed and thus the first two requirements of
subsection 8-503(d) will have been met.631 The fourth requirement is
satisfied in the situation we are examining, because the secured party
does not have control. It is the third requirement, that the securities
intermediary violated its obligation by transferring the financial asset
to the secured party, which creates the conflict.
If both rules apply or if the claim preclusion rule is given
precedence, the entitlement holder will have the difficult burden of
proving that the creation of a security interest in favor of the secured
party violated the securities intermediary's duty to maintain
sufficient interests in the financial asset.6 32  Thus, both of these
readings dramatically undermine the priority for entitlement holders
in subsection 8-511(a). Consequently, Article 8 as drafted, gives
entitlement holders a significantly greater risk because these two
readings are the most readily supportable by the text.
b. the subsections 8-511(b) and (c) conflicts
The subsection 8-503(a) question regarding the securities
intermediary's power to encumber is not raised by the conflicts
between the priority rules of subsections 8-511(b) or (C)633 and the
claim preclusion rules of subsections 8-503(d) and (e). Those rules
only conflict when the entitlement holder can meet the prerequisites
631. Two of the four requirements under § 8-503(d) are that the securities
intermediary be in insolvency proceedings and that it does not have sufficient
financial assets to meet the needs of all entitlement holders. There is no need
to assert conflicting rights under other circumstances.
632. See U.C.C. § 8-503(d)(3).
633. Because under any interpretation of §§ 8-503(a) and 8-511, a securities
intermediary has a property interest in the financial assets transferred to
secured parties with control or secured parties of clearing corporations, the
questions addressed in the preceding paragraphs raise no issues in these
conflicts.
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for asserting a claim in subsections 8-503(d) and (e). Thus, the
securities intermediary must have failed, thereby satisfying the first
two requirements of subsection 8-503(d),634 and the entitlement
holder must be able to establish that the securities intermediary
violated its obligation by transferring the financial asset to that
secured party, thereby satisfying the third requirement. It is the
fourth requirement, that the secured party not be protected by
subsection 8-503(e), that creates the issues in the conflict between
the subsection 8-511(b) or (c) priority rules and the subsection 8-
503(d) and (e) claim preclusion rule.
Subsection 8-51 l(b) awards priority over the entitlement holder
to a secured party who has control. Control is one of the elements
the secured party must meet to be protected by subsection 8-503(e).
Thus, the claim preclusion rule will conflict with the secured party's
claim of priority under subsection 8-511(b) only if the secured party
was in collusion 635 with the securities intermediary. If the secured
party was in collusion, the entitlement holder will argue that it is
entitled to assert its claim under subsection 8-503(d) and is entitled
to prevail. This is because unlike the other claim preclusion rules for
the indirect holding system, subsection 8-503(d) expressly provides
for the entitlement holder to "recover" the financial asset.6I In such
a dispute, equity and the official comments favor the entitlement
holder's position, due to the collusion.
637
Subsection 8-511 (c) awards priority over the entitlement holder
to the secured party, even if it does not have control, if the securities
intermediary is a clearing corporation. An entitlement holder entitled
to assert its claim under subsection 8-503(d), however, will argue
634. These requirements under § 8-503(d) are that the securities
intermediary must be in insolvency proceedings and that it must lack sufficient
financial assets to meet the needs of all entitlement holders.
635. If a secured party with control was not in collusion with the securities
intermediary, the secured party wins under § 8-511(b) and the entitlement
holder will have no claim due to the secured party's protected status under § 8-
503(e). All secured parties that are owed an obligation have given value, the
other requirement for protection under U.C.C. § 8-503(e). See U.C.C. § 1-
201(44).
636. U.C.C. § 8-503(d) provides in pertinent part: "The trustee or other
liquidator... may recover the financial asset .... If the trustee or other
liquidator elects not to pursue that right, an entitlement holder ... has the right
to recover its interest in the financial asset from the purchaser."
637. See U.C.C. § 8-511 cmt. 1.
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that it prevails under subsection 8-503(d) and can recover the
financial asset. 63 8  These secured parties are not protected by
subsection 8-503(e) because control is necessary to be protected by
that rule. 639 However, only when the secured party was in collusion
with the clearing corporation, does equity clearly favor the
entitlement holder. Absent collusion, failure to give precedence to
the subsection 8-511(c) priority rule would limit it when needed.
That is, upon the insolvency of the securities intermediary if the
entitlement holder can establish that the securities intermediary
violated its duty when it granted the security interest.640
c. resolving the conflicts
The appropriate outcome in the conflict between subsection 8-
511(a) and subsections 8-503(d) and (e) is to give the priority rule
precedence and avoid its virtual obsolescence. The drafters appear to
agree. Example one in official comment 1 to section 8-511 simply
gives the priority rule precedence in an insolvency situation.
Moreover, in official comment 3 to section 8-503, the drafters refer
to section 8-511 as governing whether the secured party takes subject
to the entitlement holder's claim. In that comment they state that the
priority rules are "an application to secured transactions of the
general principles expressed in subsections (d) and (e) of this
section."" That statement strongly implies that subsections (d) and
(e) are not necessary to the dispute because their principles were
taken into consideration when the priority rules were drafted.
Moreover, it appears to be an appropriate policy choice for
entitlement holders not to lose to secured parties who have not
qualified for subsection 8-511(b) or (c) priority.
As Article 8 is currently written, however, that result can be
obtained only by reading subsection 8-511(a) as a limitation on the
power to create a security interest. That is, by resorting to one of the
strained interpretations of subsection 8-503(a). A better approach
638. See supra note 636.
639. Although a secured party of a clearing corporation with control could
rely on this rule as well as the § 8-51 l(b) rule, for analysis purposes this rule is
of interest only when the secured party does not have control.
640. See U.C.C. § 8-503(d)(3).
641. Id. § 8-503 cmt. 3.
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would be to amend one of the sections to simply give the priority
rule precedence.
Subsections 8-511 (b) and (c) award priority to secured creditors
with no express limitation if a secured creditor obtained its interest
either with knowledge of the entitlement holder's adverse claim or
by acting in collusion with the securities intermediary to defraud
entitlement holders. Official comment 1 to section 8-511 belies this
conclusion. 642 The drafters considered the collusion requirement
from subsection 8-503(e) to apply, at least as far as the subsection 8-
511(b) priority rule is concerned, even though it is not explicitly
included. If official comment 1 to section 8-511 simply means that
the no-collusion requirement is engrafted into the subsection 8-
511 (b) priority rule, the statutes and the official comment conflict.
643
Interpreting that comment to mean that when both the priority rule
and the claim preclusion rule could apply the claim preclusion rule
takes precedence, significantly undermines both the subsection 8-
511 (a) and 8-511 (c) priority rules because collusion is not necessary
for the claim preclusion rule to conflict with those priority rules.
Although the official comments do not expressly address these
situations, it is apparent that the drafters would not agree with those
outcomes.
644
642. U.C.C. § 8-511, comment 1 states:
Under subsection (b) the claim of a secured creditor of a securities
intermediary has priority over the claims of entitlement holders if the
secured creditor has obtained control. If, however, the secured
creditor acted in collusion with the intermediary in violating the
intermediary's obligation to its entitlement holders, then under
subsection 8-503(e), the entitlement holders, through their
representative in insolvency proceedings, could recover the interest
from the secured creditor, that is, set aside the security interest.
643. Official comment 1 to § 8-503 seems to downplay any role of § 8-503
in resolving disputes by stating that § 8-503 "does not necessarily determine
how property held by a failed intermediary will be distributed in insolvency
proceedings." See also U.C.C. § 8-503 cmt. 2 (which seems to have a similar
implication). That statement is primarily intended to recognize the supremacy
of federal law in the form of the Securities Investor Protection Act and the
Bankruptcy Code. It suggests, however, that other rules governing insolvency
would also trump Article 8. Thus, the statement potentially has greater
ramifications, because the claim preclusion rule in § 8-503(d) and (e) only
applies if there is an insolvency proceeding.
644. See id. § 8-503 cmt. 3; see id. § 8-511 cmts. 1-2.
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Thus, we are left with confusion between the text of Article 8
and the apparent intent of the drafters. If the claim preclusion rule
preempts the priority rules, then the priority of secured parties of
clearing corporations 645 and of entitlement holders646 would be
dramatically limited. On the other hand, if the priority rules are
given precedence, subsection 8-503(e) would have a small role and
secured creditors colluding with the securities intermediaries would
be rewarded.
One way to avoid both of those outcomes and to resolve the
uncertainty in the application of the provisions would be to amend
both rules. The priority rules in section 8-511 could be given
precedence over the rules in subsections 8-503(d) and (e). This
change would solve the problem with the subsection 8-511(a)
priority rule conflict6 7 and part of the problem with the subsection 8-
511(c) priority rule conflict. Subsections 8-511(b) and (c) could then
be amended to include the no-collusion requirement. Better still, a
no-knowledge requirement should replace the no-collusion standard
as previously discussed with reference to subsection 8-503(e).
64 8
The lack of knowledge should apply both to the time a secured party
obtains control and at the time a secured party of a clearing
corporation obtains its security interest.
649
645. See supra notes 638-640 and accompanying text.
646. See supra notes 617-632 and accompanying text.
647. See supra notes 617-632 and accompanying text.
648. See supra text accompanying notes 536-564.
649. These changes to § 8-511(b) and (c) all could be accomplished by
adding the italicized text and deleting the bracketed text so it would read as
follows:
(b) A claim of a creditor of a securities intermediary who has a
security interest in a financial asset held by a securities intermediary
has priority over claims of the securities intermediary's entitlement
holders who have security entitlements with respect to that financial
asset [if] to the extent the creditor [has] obtained its security interest
and control over the financial asset without knowledge of the
entitlement holder's claim based upon breach of the securities
intermediary's duties under Section 8-504.
(c) If a clearing corporation does not have sufficient financial assets to
satisfy both its obligations to entitlement holders who have security
entitlements with respect to a financial asset and its obligation to a
creditor of the clearing corporation who has a security interest in that
financial asset, the claim of the creditor has priority over the claims of
entitlement holders, to the extent the creditor obtained its security
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VII. CONCLUSION
Whether securities would be best held directly or indirectly is a
question that defies an easy answer. Institutional investors holding
indirectly resolve the question by using brokers who are not their
securities intermediary and by taking advantage of other institutional
benefits not available to smaller investors. 650 Of the many factors
that influence determining how to hold securities, risk to the
participant is one of the most critical. The differences in risk would
make the inquiry of how to hold securities easy. However, this is
tempered by the fact that trading of securities is currently much
easier in the indirect system. Thus, the inquiry is converted to
whether the securities are being held long term, in which case direct
holding is clearly superior, or whether a trade in the short term is
possible, where the expense and inconvenience of direct holding
weigh against it.
Development of clearing and settlement systems that would
permit trading in uncertificated securities in the direct holding
system would significantly change the playing field. With that
development, the current structure of Article 8 would lead investors
out of indirect holding due to the unnecessary risks. It may well be,
however, that the indirect holding system provides a more efficient
system for trading.
To accommodate the current and increasing volume of securities
trading, systems for holding securities that are compatible with such
trading volume are essential. Closely related to that need are transfer
and registration rules that minimize, to the extent reasonably
practical, the "systemic risk" inherent in the securities markets. Two
types of rules important to this goal are negotiability vis-h-vis
adverse claimants and certainty of priority for lenders making loans
to cover settlement risks. Both types of rules involve allocating risks
among participants in the market.
The direct holding system in Article 8 does not allocate the risks
in the same manner as the indirect holding system. The indirect
holding system's priority and claim preclusion rules favor secured
interest without knowledge of the entitlement holder's claim based
upon breach of the clearing corporation's obligations under Section
8-504.
650. See Facciolo, supra note 7, at 674.
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lenders to the securities industry in virtually every instance. While
many of these preferences facilitate much-needed credit to the
securities industry, they do so by shifting the risk of intermediary
misbehavior almost entirely onto entitlement holders. Although
lender safety is essential to reducing systemic risk, the protections in
the indirect holding system go further than necessary. The source of
the unnecessary risk appears to be best characterized as the result of
over-zealousness on the part of the securities industry in establishing
a legal scheme to protect its lenders. The sections providing that
protection also happen to be the most confusing provisions in Article
8.
The argument has been made that shifting the risk to entitlement
holders is appropriate for efficiently functioning markets because
SIPC, private insurance, and federal regulation mitigate the risk of
securities intermediary misbehavior. 651  The argument, however,
overlooks the fact that the direct holding system allocates
significantly more risks to secured lenders. Neither system's
allocation appears to be ideal. The question is: "What risk of
intermediary misbehavior can be placed on secured parties without
significantly reducing secured credit to the securities industry or
significantly increasing its cost?" There are no empirical studies that
answer this question nor can any such study be expected to
definitively answer it.
Wisdom counsels refining the legal rules governing both the
direct and indirect holding system based upon the neutrality principle
so that the choice of how to hold financial assets is not skewed by
disparate rules in the different systems. If the differences are limited
to those inherent in a particular type of holding, better systems will
result and market adjustments will be facilitated. The changes
suggested in this article would give lenders in the indirect holding
system the necessary certainty limited only to the extent they were
knowingly facilitating a breach of duty by the securities intermediary
to the investor. These changes will not have a chilling effect on the
availability of credit to the market. The small reduction in certainty
to lenders in the indirect holding system would be accompanied by a
concomitant increase in certainty in the direct holding system. They
would also provide significant help to entitlement holders, including
651. See Schroeder, supra note 12, at 493-502.
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members of the securities industry, in reducing risks. The suggested
changes may also facilitate a market-based clearance and settlement
system for directly held uncertificated securities.
